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military technology
The case of the Fleet Ballistic Missile programme
Recent perspectives on nuclear deterrence stress the importance of 
professional military organisations being managed through a check 
and balance system of civilian control. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons 
technology requires a degree of technical expertise which tends to lim-
it civilian supervision of military research and development activities.
This study explores the conditions where civilian control of the devel-
opment of nuclear weapons technology may be secured, or lost. Using 
the Fleet Ballistic Missile programme of the US Navy as a case study, 
the author analyses how research and development teams respond to 
political control and adapt to the evolution of nuclear strategy. Based 
on insights from organisation theory and historical institutionalism, the 
development of military technology is presented as a long-term pro-
cess, during which civilian control is rapidly declining.
The case of the Fleet Ballistic Missile programme sheds light on the im-
pact of organisational procedures and routines in the development of 
military technology. As the programme specialised in particular strate-
gic issues, such routines and procedures progressively locked the evo-
lution of nuclear weapons technology into a narrow framework and 
limited its adaption to the evolution of US nuclear strategy. In addition, 
attempts to increase the participation of civilian leaders in research and 
development activities did not appear as a successful approach in re-
gaining control of nuclear weapons technology. Finally, the long-term 
evolution of the FBM programme contributes to explaining why some 
ballistic missiles currently under development seem to be locked in a 
Cold War framework, while current nuclear policies are addressing new 
threats such as proliferation, terrorism and transnational actors.
Keywords:  nuclear weapons, Cold War, arms control, US Navy, military technology, 
innovation, United States, management and organisation theory.
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Chapter	1
Introduction
More than 60 years after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, no consensus has yet been reached regarding the impact of 
nuclear weapons on international security. In the immediate aftermath 
of the Second World War, the immense destructive power of nuclear 
weapons was generally considered to bring the costs of a large war 
between great powers to an unacceptable level. While conventional 
military victory remained possible, the risk of a nuclear retaliation 
outweighed any possible gain from aggression or conquest. Bernard 
Brodie summarised this point in 1946, noting, “thus far, the chief pur-
pose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, 
its chief purpose must be to avert them”.1 For Brodie, the emergence 
of nuclear weapons implied that great powers had entered an era of 
deterrence, where political objectives would best be achieved by mak-
ing threats instead of using violence. Today, this perspective is mainly 
supported by tenants of what is known as the “realist” theory of inter-
national relations. For these experts and scholars, nuclear weapons may 
still contribute to international stability and security, as their mere 
existence incites states to behave in an exceedingly cautious manner.2
Over the years, this approach has been criticised for oversimplify-
ing the decision-making processes related to nuclear issues. During 
the Cold War, psychological studies on national security and foreign 
policy stressed how strategic misperceptions and cognitive biases could 
potentially lead to catastrophic deterrence failures.3 More recently, 
1 Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt, 1946), 44.
2 Kenneth N. Waltz, “More may be Better” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, A Debate 
Renewed, ed. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: Norton, 1995), 5.
3 See: Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Prin-
ceton University Press, 1976); Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. 
Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
The author would like to thank Rolf Hobson, Torunn Laugen Haaland and Jacob Aasland 
Ravndal for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. Mary Curry, Marianna Enamoneta and 
Maxime Dressenetto also provided invaluable technical assistance and support on this study.
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detailed analyses of US and Soviet Cold War policies have profited 
from insights rooted in organisation theory. In contrast to other cri-
tiques of nuclear weapons, organisational views on deterrence do not 
lead to definitive conclusions, but instead identifies under which do-
mestic conditions and institutional settings deterrence may be stable, 
or unstable. From this perspective, the configuration of civil-military 
relations may seriously influence the shaping of nuclear policy. While 
military institutions play a decisive role in decisions concerning nu-
clear issues, organisational biases, inflexible routines and parochial 
interests occasionally affect their behaviour. In this context, “unless 
managed through a check and balance system of civilian control”, mil-
itary organisations “are unlikely to fulfil the operational requirements 
for stable nuclear deterrence”.4
However, not all aspects of nuclear decision-making represent the 
same challenges for civilian authorities. As noted by Scott Sagan, de-
claratory policy and nuclear strategy is most often elaborated by politi-
cal elites or under civilian supervision, and then used as a guideline by 
military commanders for the development of operational war plans.5 
In contrast, other nuclear issues are more difficult to control. Unlike 
declaratory policy, the development of nuclear weapons requires a de-
gree of technical expertise, which prevents civilian authorities from 
directly managing research and development activities. This repre-
sents an important problem, as the development of military technol-
ogy has a critical impact on the stability of nuclear deterrence. Given 
that nuclear policy is reliant on making threats instead of using force 
to achieve political objectives, the technical credibility of a given strat-
egy is indeed paramount.6 In order for civilian leaders to keep nuclear 
issues under political control, weapons systems under development 
must therefore satisfactorily address the problems posed by national 
security strategies.
The difficulty in managing the development of nuclear weap-
ons raises some important questions regarding relations between the 
4 Scott D. Sagan, “More may be Worse” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, A Debate Rene-
wed, ed. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: Norton, 1995), 49.
5 While Sagan acknowledges that “war plans may not always fully reflect the expecta-
tions of senior civilian authorities”, he argues that “declaratory policy is rarely com-
pletely inconsistent with classified nuclear doctrine”. See: Scott D. Sagan, “The Case 
for Non-First Use”, Survival 51, no. 3 (2009): 165. 
6 See: Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Richard Rosecrance, Strategic Deterrence Reconsi-
dered, Adelphi Papers, no. 116 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1975).
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strategic community and the military research community. Under 
which conditions may political control over the development of nu-
clear weapons technology may be secured, or lost? How do military 
organisations transform nuclear strategies into engineering problems 
during the development of new weapons systems? To what extent 
should civilian leaders intervene in the selection of technical solutions? 
How does the relationship between new strategies and aging technolo-
gies evolve over time? 
In answering these questions, the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) 
programme of the US Navy seems to provide the most rewarding case 
study. Active from 1955 to 1990, the FBM programme represented 
one of the most enduring research and development projects of the 
Cold War. In addition, it had to adapt to successive evolutions of US 
nuclear strategy. This project, among the least controversial weapons 
programmes in history, is believed to find its origins in the efforts 
of the Eisenhower administration in addressing the problem of mis-
sile vulnerability. Launched from submarines and supposedly immune 
to enemy action, the missiles developed within the FBM programme 
were considered to provide the so-called second strike capability that 
was the key to nuclear deterrence.7 However, as US nuclear strategy 
progressively placed greater emphasis on striking hardened military 
targets, the programme faced the challenge of adapting to new mis-
sions, focusing on prompt, flexible and precise counterforce strikes.8
Another interesting characteristic of the FBM programme lies in 
its strong influence on current nuclear missile technologies both in 
the United States and abroad. For more than three decades, the FBM 
programme produced a family of five missiles, which remain today 
the backbone of US and British nuclear forces. While technologies 
initially developed within the programme differed significantly from 
the solutions adopted by other weapons systems, it progressively be-
came the basis for the development of new ballistic missiles outside 
7 Harvey M. Sapolsky, “The U.S. Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile Program and Finite De-
terrence”, in Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, its Origins and Practice, 
ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 123–136; Donald 
MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, “The Shaping of Nuclear Weapon System Technol-
ogy: US Fleet Ballistic Missile Guidance and Navigation. I : From Polaris to Posei-
don”, Social Studies of Science 18, no. 3 (1988): 419–463.
8 Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, “The Shaping of Nuclear Weapon System 
Technology: US Fleet Ballistic Missile Guidance and Navigation: II: ‘Going for Broke’ 
– The Path to Trident II” Social Studies of Science 18, no. 4 (1988): 581–624; Graham 
Spinardi, “Why the U.S. Navy went for Hard-Target Counterforce in Trident II: (And 
Why it Didn’t Get There Sooner)”, International Security 15, no. 2 (1990): 147–190.
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the US Navy.9 Today, even countries such as Russia, France and China 
rely on concepts first introduced by the FBM programme to develop a 
new generation of nuclear-armed missiles.10 Therefore, by improving 
our knowledge of the dynamics that shaped the technological devel-
opment of the FBM programme, we would significantly improve our 
understanding of the rationale behind the characteristics of current 
weapons systems.
Previous studies
The academic literature on nuclear weapons technology is character-
ised by the lack of a causal model explaining the dynamics that shaped 
the FBM programme and structured its relations with civil authorities 
and US nuclear policy. Only two major in-depth cases studies have 
previously dealt with the development of nuclear weapons technology 
within the FBM programme. In 1972, Harvey M. Sapolsky published 
The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success 
in Government.11 What he proposed was an analysis of the early his-
tory of the FBM programme, from the scope of management theory. 
Consequently, the connection between nuclear strategy and the devel-
opment of weapons technology was not the primary focus of his study. 
Moreover, as the US Navy developed new nuclear missiles until the 
end of the Cold War, this case study presents only the first half of the 
history of the FBM programme. 
Secondly, in 1994, Graham Spinardi published From Polaris to 
Trident: the Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology.12 In con-
trast to Sapolsky’s work, this case study presents the entire history of 
the FBM programme, from its origins to the end of the Cold War. 
Nevertheless, in Spinardi’s words, his research “does not purport to be 
9 Technologies such as solid propellant or multiple warheads, initially developed within 
the FBM programme, are now common features of ballistics missiles operated by the 
US Air Force: see: [Jane’s], Jane’s Weapon System 1988–1989, ed. Bernard Blake (Lon-
don: Jane’s Yearbooks, 1988), ref. 4561.111, 2716.111 and 17.111.
10 See: Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004); 
A. Ochsenbein “SS-NX-30 Bulava Datenblatt” (SS-NX-30 Bulava Datasheet), dtig.or-
gefense, 2 August 2007, Defense Threat Information Group, 26 April 2010 <online>; 
“M-51. Missile mer-sol balistique stratégique” ( M-51 sea-based strategic ballistic 
missile), www.defence.gouv.fr, 2010, French Ministry of Defence – General Delega-
tion for Ordnance, 26 April 2010 <online>; “JL-2 (CSS-NX-4). Chinese Submarine-
Launched Ballistic Missile”, globalsecurity.org, 2009, 26 April 2010 <online>.
11 Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic 
Success in Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).
12 Graham Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile 
Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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an explanatory theory”.13 While existing theories about nuclear weap-
ons technology are briefly commented, his main objective is to provide 
a method for constructing the history of the FBM programme.14 The 
final conclusion reached by Spinardi is that “technology is not com-
pletely out of control […], but neither is it very much under control”.15 
This somewhat dry assessment should be understood as a call for more 
research on the relationship between US nuclear strategy and the FBM 
programme. Indeed, Spinardi’s research raises the question as to how 
and why political control was lost over some aspects of military tech-
nology, but not others. Moreover, as Spinardi did not rely on a single 
analytical model to explain the dynamics of the FBM programme, it is 
difficult to generalise his findings and generate meaningful lessons in 
understanding current issues in nuclear weapons technology. 
This study precisely aims at bridging this knowledge gap, and de-
veloping a causal model tracing possible processes through which po-
litical elites may gain or lose control over the development of nuclear 
weapons technology. It also challenges the conventional wisdom that 
the FBM programme was a project under tight civilian control, ini-
tially created to provide a survivable missile force. Instead, this study 
stresses how, in the long run, organisational procedures and routines 
increased rigidity in the functioning of the FBM programme, limit-
ing the options offered to political leaders for the development of new 
nuclear weapons systems. Based on recently declassified documents 
and newly available material, it also addresses factual errors in previ-
ous historical studies of the FBM programme, and argues that the US 
Navy never directly answered the late evolution of US nuclear strategy 
toward counterforce strikes.
13 Ibid., 15.
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 193.
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Chapter	2
The development of nuclear 
weapons technology
Strategy, bureaucracy and technological 
determinism
In spite of the importance of military technology for nuclear deter-
rence, there is no consensus as to how major nuclear weapons pro-
grammes respond to political control. Alternatively, based on the 
generalisation of observations made during in-depth case studies fo-
cusing on major technological changes in the US military, three main 
perspectives have emerged. 
In what is often referred to as the politics-in-command perspec-
tive, the existence of a permanent connection between strategy and the 
evolution of military technology is clearly established.16 Policy makers 
are in full control of weapons programmes, which are created, devel-
oped and selected in order to propose an optimal solution to national 
security threats:
Political and military leaders […], assess the threats to the secu-
rity of their nations and alliances. They then select amongst the 
new technologies available, or provide resources for the creation 
of new technologies, in order to meet these threats rationally. 
Strategic goals come first, technology follows.17
16 Note that “Politics-in-commands” is used here in a rather broad sense. See: Donald 
MacKenzie, “Toward an Historical Sociology of Nuclear Weapons”, in Arms Races: 
Technological and Political Dynamics, ed. Nils Petter Gleditsch and Olav Njølstad (Oslo: 
International Peace Research Institute, 1990), 122.
17 Donald MacKenzie, “Technology and the Arms Race: Review of Innovation and the 
Arms Race: how the United States and the Soviet Union develop new military tech-
nologies by Matthew Evangelista”, International Security 14, no. 1 (1989): 162.
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A second perspective, based on insights from the bureaucratic politics 
theory, acknowledges the existence of a connection between nuclear 
strategy and the evolution of military technology, while refuting its 
benign nature.18 Here, the formulation of strategy and the selection 
of weapons programmes are not understood as perfectly rational proc-
esses, but rather as “the product of the competition of purposes with-
in individuals and groups”.19 As a result, military technology is not 
only developed to respond to meeting strategic challenges, but is also 
shaped to make some policy options and strategies more achievable 
than others.20
However, the capacity of political elites to influence or control 
the development of weapons programmes has been severely criticised 
by a third perspective often referred to as technology-out-of-control.21 
From this point of view, the key factor shaping the evolution of weap-
ons programmes is technological determinism: instead of being devel-
oped in accordance with the demands of policy makers, “technologies 
change following their own internal logic or the careers, institutional 
and financial interests of their developers”.22 Weapons programmes are 
therefore developed not because they propose a solution to a particular 
strategic problem, but because some evolutions are “technically sweet” 
and create an irresistible technological momentum, or “creep”.23 In 
the most radical version of this perspective, the connection between 
strategy and military technology is reintroduced, but its causal order 
is reversed. Far from being the servant of strategy, the evolution of 
military technology eventually restricts the number of policy options 
available for political elites and strategy makers to the point where 
18 For an overview of the bureaucratic perspective on military decision-making, see: Gra-
ham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, 
1971).
19 Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defence (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1961), 2.
20 See: Allan Krass, “The Evolution of Military Technology and Deterrence Strategy”, 
in World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Year Book 1981 (Stockholm: 1981); Alan 
Roberts, “Preparing to Fight a Nuclear War” Arena, no. 51 (Melbourne: 1981).
21 See: Ralph Eugene Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology (New 
York: Cowles Book Co., 1970); Deborah Shapley, “Technology Creep and the Arms 
Race: ICBM problem a Sleeper”, Science 201, no. 4361 (1978); Marek Thee, The Race 
in Military Technology (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1982); –––, Impact 
of Military Technology on the Arms Race: Armaments Dynamics in the Nuclear Age (Oslo: 
1987); Herbert F. York, The Origins of MIRV. Report no. 9, (Stockholm: PRIO, 1975); 
–––, Making Weapons – Talking Peace: A physicist Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (New 
York: Basic Books, 1988).
22 MacKenzie, “Toward an Historical Sociology of Nuclear Weapons”, 122.
23 Dietrich Schroeer, Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Arms Race (New York: Wiley, 
1984), 299; Shapley, “Technology Creep and the Arms Race”.
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they have “no real independent choice in the matter”.24 In other words, 
in the relationship between policy and the development of weapons 
programmes, military technology is the independent variable and 
strategy is the dependent variable.
History, institutions and nuclear weapons 
technology
In 1988, Mathew Evangelista proposed taking a first step toward the 
reconciliation of these three opposed perspectives in Innovation and the 
Arms Race.25 In what was the first major departure from the tradition 
of single, in-depth case studies, Evangelista proposed a comparative 
analysis of the long-term development of thermonuclear and tactical 
nuclear weapons both in the United States and the Soviet Union. One 
of the main conclusions he reached was that politics-in-command, bu-
reaucratic politics and technological determinism could not be con-
ceptualised as general, universally valid theories. Instead, these three 
perspectives describe processes at work in different political conditions 
and at different stages of the development of military technology.
The approach proposed by Mathew Evangelista could have rep-
resented an important evolution of the research agenda. It called for 
what Donald Mackenzie defined as an “historical sociology” of military 
technology.26 This view criticised previous case studies which focused 
on a decisive innovation or a particular weapons system for their short 
time perspective, while the relation between strategy and weapons 
programmes evolves only slowly over time.27 Therefore, for an his-
torical sociologist of nuclear weapons, the objective is not to produce 
a general theory such as politics-in-command or technological deter-
minism. In contrast, what is to be addressed is how some particular 
weapons programmes emerge and are developed through phases where 
politics, bureaucracy and technological determinism influence their 
relation to the strategic problems.28
24 Herbert F. York, The advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (San Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman, 1976), 11.
25 Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: how the United States and the Soviet 
Union develop new military technologies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
26 Donald A. Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy: An Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Gui-
dance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990); –––, “Toward an Historical Sociology of Nuclear 
Weapons”. 
27 Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 8.
28 MacKenzie, “Toward an Historical Sociology of Nuclear Weapons”, 137–138.
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However, this interesting evolution of the research agenda was in-
terrupted by the sudden end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. During the 1990s, most of academic attention drifted 
away from the issue of nuclear weapons, and a structured debate about 
nuclear weapons technology has still to reappear. This study proposes 
to reactivate the previous research agenda set by Mathew Evangelista 
and Donald McKenzie, and presents a theoretical model to analyse 
the case of the FBM programme from the perspective of historical 
sociology. 
In proposing an historical sociology of the FBM programme, most 
social and political theories are unsuitable. Focusing on the imme-
diate reaction of actors or organisations to their environment, such 
approaches artificially freeze time, “reducing a moving picture to a 
snapshot”.29 Instead, the occurrence and succession of different phases 
in the development of the FBM programme can be seen as the product 
of large processes at play over time. Under these conditions, the de-
velopment of nuclear missiles within the US Navy is best understood 
from a historical institutionalist perspective, which proposes analysing 
the construction, maintenance and adaption of formal and informal 
institutions, as a long-term process.30 Institutions are defined as “rela-
tively enduring collections of rules and organised practices, embedded 
in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in 
the face of individual turnover and changing external circumstances”.31 
The central idea of historical institutionalism is that “choices made at 
a point in time create institutions that generate recognisable patterns 
of constraints and opportunities at a latter point”.32 Historical insti-
tutionalism understands the evolution of institutions as a sequential 
process whose rhythm is set by the succession of critical junctures and 
path dependent processes.
29 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Prin-
ceton University Press, 2004), 120.
30 See: Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1984).
31 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “Elaborating the New Institutionalism”, in The 
Oxford handbook of political institutions, ed. R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert 
A. Rockman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3. See also: James G. March and 
Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York: Free Press, 1989); James G. March 
and Johan P. Olsen, Democratic Governance (New York: Free Press, 1995).
32 Walter W. Powell, “Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis”, in The New Insi-
tutionalism in Organizational Analysis, ed. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 188–189.
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Critical junctures
Critical junctures can be defined as major disclosures, “such as when 
people abandon previous views and come to hold new ones”.33 They 
represent “choice points when a particular option is adopted from two 
or more alternatives”, over “relatively short periods of time”.34 From 
an historical institutionalist perspective, critical junctures may well 
account for the creation of the FBM programme and the emergence of 
its key institutions. Indeed, critical junctures are characterised by dra-
matic changes in the political/strategic environment, the introduction 
of new technologies, and by the creation of new organisations.35 When 
these three conditions are simultaneously met, military organisations 
cannot rely on routines or existing technologies to shape their activity. 
On the contrary, in order to produce and survive, young organisations 
must seek and obtain support from political elites, and are therefore 
more inclined to directly frame their activity according to nuclear 
strategy. Therefore, critical junctures represent phases when political 
and military leaders were most likely to be in full control of the FBM 
programme.
How would the FBM programme connect new technologies with 
problems posed in the strategic environment during critical junctures? 
According to Lynn Eden, in such circumstances, doctrine is used as a 
guide to collective action.36 Barry Posen defines military doctrine as 
the means chosen to achieve the goals set by a grand strategy. More 
precisely, doctrine addresses and determines “What means shall be 
employed? and How they shall be employed?”37 Doctrine, Eden ar-
gues, “articulates purposes and includes assumptions and knowledge 
about the world that are incorporated into organisational approaches 
to problem solving”.38
33 Barry R. Weingast, “Persuasion, Preference, Change, and Critical Junctures: The Mi-
crofundations of a Mascroscopic concept”, in Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersec-
tion Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism, ed. Ira Katznelson and Barry 
R. Weingast (New York: Russel Sage foundation, 2005), 171.
34 Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel R. Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, 
Narrative and Counterfactual in Institutional Theory”, paper presented at the ASPA 
2005 Annual Convention, Washington D.C, 2005, 11.
35 Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devasta-
tion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 49–50. On the introduction of new tech-
nologies as a critical perturbation in the activity of military organisations, see: Ronald 
J. Kurth, The Politics of Technological Innovation in the United States Navy, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University, 1970).
36 Eden, Whole World on Fire, 52–53.
37 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the 
World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 13.
38 Eden, Whole World on Fire, 52–53. See also: Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 
41–44.
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In addition, bureaucratic politics may also have had an impact on 
the institutional setting of the FBM programme during critical junc-
tures. Indeed, young organisations searching to secure their existence 
may have to face domestic opposition from rival organisations, public 
opinion or influential individuals.39 In a context of inter-service rivalry, 
direct competition is not always the most efficient means to survive 
and produce. Instead, an organisation can choose to frame its activities 
in order, placing itself in a “niche” position, protected from competi-
tion. A good example is the US Army, which decided to specialise in 
tactical nuclear weapons after having lost a competition for strategic 
nuclear weapons against the Air Force.40
Organisational frames
In their attempt to solve strategic problems and face challenges from 
their bureaucratic environment, new weapons programmes generate 
and allocate resources, attention and expertise to some specific areas. 
A specific set of institutions is generated thus creating a frame for the 
general development of military technology.41 Such structures enable 
the development of new weapons systems because they: assist actors 
in taking decisions when information and time are limited; coordi-
nate their activity; control internal conflict; and propose a common 
goal to the entire organisation.42 But such institutions also constrain 
the activity of participants by channelling their behaviour and exclud-
ing problems and solutions from the agenda. Whether they enable or 
constrain the development of military technology, such institutions 
represent “organisational frames”, that is “a framework for action that 
structures how actors identify problems and find solutions”.43
How can we identify and analyse the organisational frame that 
shaped the development of nuclear weapons technology within the 
FBM programme? According to Eden, frames can be “seen”, or “read” 
in “enduring features of organisations, such as organisational routines, 
organisational expertise or specialised fields of activity.44 While organ-
39 For a description of organisational behaviour in a bureaucratic politics environment, 
see: Allison, Essence of Decision.
40 Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
41 Eden, Whole World on Fire, 50–51.
42 See: Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes 
in Administrative Organization (New York: Free Press, 1997, 1945); James G. March 
and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (Cambridge: Blackwell Business, 1993, 1958), 
160–61, 97–200.
43 Eden, Whole World on Fire,
44 Ibid., 55–56.
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isational frames may vary greatly among different organisations, four 
of their key characteristics can be identified by answering the follow-
ing questions: 1. What is the declared purpose or goal of the organisa-
tion in charge of developing a given weapons system? 2. What are the 
strategic problems identified and debated within the organisation? 3. 
What are the research strategies and technologies used to solve these 
problems? 4. What are the constraints and requirements placed on 
possible solutions?45
Path dependence
A distinctive feature of organisational frames lies in their ability to 
influence the development of technology both instantly and at a future 
time. Indeed, “past choices and actions structure future possibilities, 
both by shaping the understandings that actors bring to new situa-
tions and by shaping the social environment in which decisions are 
made and carried out”.46 In this regard, a concept central to the analy-
sis of military institutions is that of path dependence, which describes 
how “organisational actors making rational decisions construct around 
themselves an environment that constrain their ability to change fur-
ther in later years”.47 For a research and development project such as 
the FBM programme, path dependent processes imply that once an 
organisation “has started down a track, the cost for reversal is very 
high”.48 To illustrate this relatively abstract concept, Margaret Levy 
compares path dependent trajectories with the structure of a tree:
For the same trunk, there are many different branches and 
smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around and 
clamber from one to the other – and essential if the chosen 
branch dies – the branch on which a climber begins is the one 
she tends to follow.49
For Lynn Eden, the most powerful reason for the existence of path-
dependant trajectories as followed by many military organisations and 
45 Ibid., 49–57.
46 Ibid., 51.
47 Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 61.
48 Margaret Levy, “A Model, a Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and 
Historical Analysis”, in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure, ed. Mark 
I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
28.
49 Eden, Whole World on Fire, 51.
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weapons programmes is the self-reinforcing nature of their organisa-
tional frames.50 Once created during a critical juncture, organisational 
frames evolve through a process of “positive feedback”: the more they 
are applied, the more stable and the more profitable they become for 
the organisation concerned. 
Why is this? The historical institutionalist literature proposes 
three key mechanisms that may be applied in the case of the FBM pro-
gramme. Firstly, the environment – either at the strategic or bureau-
cratic level – may offer incentives to use certain organisational frames 
for an extended period of time. As the programme operates according 
to a given frame for a long period of time, it must invest in person-
nel, human networks, knowledge, hardware and resources. These “sunk 
costs” represent a capital that would be lost if radical changes were 
introduced. Furthermore, as some actors join and leave the organisa-
tion according to the evolution of their career or their age, the actual 
rationale behind the existence of routines is progressively forgotten. 
Thus, what was rationally set as an organisational frame at a critical 
juncture slowly becomes a ritual.51 At this point, the reasons for the 
existence of a ritualised frame may well have ceased to exist. However, 
as there is no actor left to remember the actual rationale behind the 
frame, its existence would not necessarily be threatened.52
Secondly, this problem is reinforced by the fact that organisational 
frames shape the way in which organisational actors understand their 
environment. Ritualised frames produce organisational knowledge, un-
derstood as the “representations of the world that are articulated or as-
sumed at the organisational level”.53 In this perspective, organisational 
frames are self-reinforcing, because the longer they exist, the more 
rigid they become. The more rigid they become, the less they allow 
actors to understand change in their environment, and the less the 
organisation understands change in its environment, the longer old 
frames persist and become more rigid.
Thirdly, historical institutionalists would expect the FBM pro-
gramme to experience what economists call the problem of “increasing 
50 Ibid., 53.
51 John W. Meyer and Bryan Rowan, “Insitutionalized Organizations: Formal Strutures 
as Myth and Ceremony”, American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 2 (1977): 340–363.
52 For a broader discussion of this issue, see: James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The 
New Insitutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life”, American Political Scien-
ce Review 78, no. 3 (1984): 734–749.
53 Eden, Whole World on Fire, 50.
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returns”.54 Once a given research and development strategy is adopted, 
“the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other pos-
sible options increases over time”.55 This problem is partly connect-
ed to the existence and the self-reinforcing nature of organisational 
knowledge. Indeed, the “use of knowledge-laden routines leads to or-
ganisational learning, more refined routines and greater capacity to 
solve problems”.56 But technology also becomes a driving factor for 
organisational frames, as “the increasing efficiency of the adopted rou-
tines provides a powerful rationale for continued use and the approach 
taken seems more sensible than other approaches”.57 In other words, 
for a research and development project such as the FBM programme, 
once a given technology had been introduced, it becomes easier and 
more efficient to improve and develop it further, instead of searching 
for brand new solutions. 
In a long-term perspective, a given organisational frame may be-
come self-sustaining, because the three mechanisms presented above 
(sunk costs, organisational knowledge and the increasing returns of 
technology) are mutually reinforcing. As the environment provides a 
prolonged incentive for a given organisational frame, particular types 
of research and development activities are performed and become more 
efficient. But as technology becomes a reason, per se, to follow a given 
track, it also locks the organisation into a framework that fails to ad-
dress the novel solutions required by the evolution of strategy.
Thus, the path-dependant evolution of military organisations and 
their research and development activities can account for some breaks 
in the connection between strategy and the development of military 
technology. As strategy evolves according to its own determinants – 
mainly threats to national security, but possibly bureaucratic interfer-
ences as well – the development of relevant solutions follows its own 
internal organisational logic, according to the path set by the organisa-
tional frame selected during the previous critical juncture. In the case 
of the FBM programme, this would mean that unless a new critical 
juncture occurs, political control over the development of the nuclear 
weapons technology is unlikely to be re-established. 
54 See: Brian W. Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994); Pierson, Politics in Time. Paul Pierson, Positive 
Feedback and Path Dependence (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2004).
55 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Study of Politics”, 
American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 252.
56 Eden, Whole World on Fire, 52.
57 Ibid., 52. 
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A brief outline of the chapters
The following chapters apply the institutionalist framework presented 
above to study how the FBM programme related to US nuclear strat-
egy between 1955 and 1990. Chapter three deals with the emergence 
of the FBM programme between 1955 and 1960. It presents the crea-
tion of the programme as the result of critical juncture and explains 
how political elites achieved control over the initial development of 
nuclear weapons technology within the US Navy. Then, it sheds light 
on how the leadership of the FBM programme attempted to translate 
US nuclear strategy into engineering problems. Chapter four traces 
the evolution of the programme between 1960 and 1974. It stresses 
how the FBM programme became increasingly affected by sunk costs, 
organisational knowledge and the increasing returns of technology 
while addressing the problems posed by US nuclear strategy. Chapter 
five explains why the FBM programme became unable to fully adapt 
to the evolution of US nuclear strategy after 1974. Finally, chapter six 
presents the conclusions of this study. Using insights for the case of the 
FBM programme, it sheds new light on some key technical character-
istics of current nuclear missiles and addresses contemporary issues of 
nuclear weapons technology.
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Chapter	3
Framing the FBM programme
The birth of the FBM programme
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, adapting the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons technology to nuclear strategy did not rep-
resent a critical problem for the United States. Indeed, following the 
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the country had only 
a limited nuclear stockpile and no well-established national nuclear 
policy. Instead, policy-makers, military commanders and scholars were 
engaged in an active debate to decide whether nuclear weapons should 
be used to win or deter future wars.58
Nevertheless, military services such as the Navy and the Air Force 
did not hesitate in developing new nuclear weapons and elaborating 
their war plans. With the end of combat operations in Europe and the 
Pacific, new justifications for resource attribution had to be found, 
and inter-service rivalries soon emerged. From the Air Force’s point 
of view, future wars would be primarily fought by means of nuclear 
weapons. The entire stockpile was to be delivered at once, during a 
massive air offensive. A short campaign of strategic bombing aimed 
at industrial and urban centres would produce the general collapse of 
the opponent.59 In contrast, Navy leaders did not believe that strategic 
58 For an overview of this debate and detailed presentation of its main actors, see: Fred 
M. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).
59 For instance, the Air Force war plan Harrow planned to deliver 50 nuclear weapons 
on 20 Soviet cities. However, these numbers grew quickly and by December 1948, 
the Joint Chief of Staff approved war plan Trojan calling for delivering 133 bombs 
on 70 cities. See: David A. Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill. Nulcear Weapons 
and American Strategy”, International Security 7, no. 4 (1983): 16. For further details 
about early Air Force nuclear war plans see: Alfred Goldberg, “A Brief Survey of the 
Evolution of Ideas about counterforce”, memorandum RAND-5431-PR, October 
1967 (revised March 1981), Eisenhower papers, box 9, The National Security Archive, 
Washington D.C.; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: the Atomic Bomb in the Cold 
War, 1945–1950 (New York: Knopf, 1980).
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bombing alone could cause an opponent to capitulate. In their per-
spective, strategic bombing was held as “morally wrong and military 
unsound”, as “levelling large cities has a tendency to alienate the affec-
tion of inhabitants and does not create an atmosphere of international 
good will after the war”.60 In the Navy’s view, nuclear weapons did not 
necessarily have priority over other means of warfare and would only 
be used to assist the systematic destruction of the enemy’s military 
assets. a doctrine known as counterforce. Indeed, according to the 1949 
Emergency War Plan, in the event of an armed conflict, naval battle 
groups would be in charge of “the precision bombing of smaller ele-
ments of the selected target systems – elements not suitable for high 
altitude bombing but which must be cleared up to make the effort 
more effective”.61 The use of nuclear weapons was not considered rele-
vant for all situations, and limited wars could well be fought only with 
conventional ammunition, as the Korean war was about to prove. If 
nuclear ordnance had to be utilised, it would be directed principally at 
targets of naval interest such as submarine pens, ports, shipyards, naval 
bases and “enemy airfields that posed a threat to carrier operations”.62 
During the first half of the 1950s, the main nuclear delivery ve-
hicle developed by the Navy was the Regulus cruise missile, an un-
manned aircraft able to strike targets at ranges less than 500 miles.63 
The Regulus was in accord with the nuclear doctrine of the Navy. 
Compared to the strategic bombers of the Air Force it was a short 
range system. For guidance, it relied on at least two surface radar sta-
tions. While this configuration prevented the Regulus from flying 
deep inside hostile territory, it provided the precision needed to strike 
most tactical targets such as hostile battle groups, naval bases, subma-
rine pens and airfields. If more precision was needed, the missile could 
be controlled manually by an operator located in a chase plane flying 
in immediate proximity.
However, as a formal nuclear policy became more clearly estab-
lished in the United States, nuclear operations within the US Navy 
were seriously perturbed. The endorsement of the strategy of massive 
60 Rear Admiral Ralf Ofstie, “The National Defence Program: Unification and Strategy”, 
testimony, March 1949, Hearings of House Armed Service Committee, Washington 
D.C., 183. The second quotation is from: Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill”, 70.
61 “Navy Presentation about 14 March. Section three”, Briefing, March 1949, Opera-
tional Archives, folder 1844/46, Naval Historical Center, Washington D.C. 
62 Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: the Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950 
(Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1994), 115.
63 Technical characteristics of the Regulus missile are taken from: David K. Stumpf, 
Regulus: America’s First Nuclear Submarine Missile (Paducah: Turner, 1996).
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retaliation in 1953 constrained the Navy to dramatically change its 
nuclear doctrine, abandon cruise missile technology and create a new 
organisation to handle these problems. This crisis, therefore, presented 
the three conditions of a major critical juncture, which would eventu-
ally give birth to the FBM programme.
The strategy of massive retaliation
During the early 1950’s, the increasing number of available nuclear 
weapons and the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union ac-
celerated the formulation of a formal nuclear strategy in the United 
States. In a meeting of 30 October 1953, the National Security 
Council (NSC) identified the basic problem of US security as being 
able “to meet the Soviet threat, [while] in doing so to avoid seriously 
weakening the U.S. economy or undermining […] fundamental values 
and institutions”.64 The nature of the “Soviet threat” was not primarily 
understood as a direct nuclear attack on the United States, a scenario 
considered as rather improbable because the Soviet Union still lacked 
adequate delivery vehicles. In light of the Korean War experience and 
as a consequence of the American inferiority in conventional forces, 
the most likely threats to US security consisted in a potential military 
intervention against European allies or a Soviet attempt “to win alle-
giance of presently uncommitted areas of the world”.65
To address these challenges, the new strategy called for “placing 
more reliance on deterrent power, and less dependence on local defen-
sive power”.66 Instead of separating nuclear issues from conventional 
military threats and vital interests from peripheral ones, the United 
States would respond to any Soviet provocation by an instantaneous 
and disproportionate nuclear attack on the USSR and communist 
China.67 By threatening to eradicate the industrial and demographic 
substance of the communist world, the objective was not to win a war, 
but to deter an opponent from initiating hostilities in the first place, 
even at the non-nuclear level. Under these circumstances, there was no 
need for superior conventional military capabilities to meet the Soviet 
64 “A report to the National Security Council on Basic National Security Policy”, report 
NSC 162/2, 30 October 1953, personal collection, 1.
65 Ibid.
66 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy”, speech, 12 
January 1954 (published on 25 January), Department of State Bulletin, Washington 
D.C. In the literature, this speech is often referred as the “Massive retaliation Speech”. 
At the policy level, the strategy of massive retaliation was adopted on 30 October 
1953, by NSC report 1662/2 quoted above. 
67 Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 12–13.
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threat, and the US economy and institutions would be spared a costly 
arms build-up. Known as “massive retaliation”, this approach to na-
tional security represented the first formal nuclear strategy adopted by 
the United States, in the sense that it represented “a political-military 
means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ secu-
rity for itself”.68
The strategy of massive retaliation was in total opposition to the 
counterforce doctrine initially adopted by the Navy. It implied that 
nuclear weapons had priority over conventional means of warfare and 
were to be used against civilian targets. In a classified speech at the 
Naval War College, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles pressed the 
Navy to radically change its nuclear operations approach and adapt 
more quickly to the new strategy. “Atomic forces are now our primary 
forces. It means that actions by other forces, on land, sea or air are rel-
egated to a secondary role […]. It means that nuclear weapons, fission 
and fusion, will be used in the next major war.”69 How those weap-
ons would be employed was carefully defined during meetings of the 
NSC. In the advent of a Soviet attack on US interests, nuclear weap-
ons would be used to inflict “massive retaliatory damages by offensive 
striking power”.70 The retaliation was to be conducted immediately, 
over large population centres, regardless of targets, of tactical value or 
naval interest.71
Ballistic missile technology
The strategy of massive retaliation not only implied that the Navy 
had to change its nuclear doctrine, it also forced the Navy to start 
the development of a totally new weapons system. In order to seri-
ously threaten the demographic and industrial structure of the USSR, 
the United States had to be able to deliver nuclear weapons to tar-
gets located well inside the borders of the Soviet Union, preferably 
on Moscow. Because of its short range, the Regulus was unsuitable 
for the mission. In the first place, the Navy planned the development 
of a second generation of Regulus missiles, flying at higher altitudes 
68 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 13.
69 John Foster Dulles, “Confidential Speech at the Naval War College”, speech, 25 May 
1954, Newport. Also quoted in: Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 183–84. I am 
grateful to Mary Curry from the National Security Archive (Washington D.C.) for 
access to this document and Fred Kaplan’s research notes. 
70 NSC report 162/2, 5.
71 Ibid. See also: “U.S. Objectives in the Event of General War with the Soviet Bloc”, 
memorandum NSC 5410/1, 29 March 1954, Fred Kaplan Collection 80, box 1, The 
National Security Archive, Washington D.C.
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and able to strike targets located 1,200 miles inland. However, taking 
into account the rapid progress in Soviet air defences and the advances 
in surface-to-air missiles, neither manned bombers nor cruise missiles 
were considered to be viable solutions in the long run.72 
To address the technological challenge posed by the strategy of 
massive retaliation, a panel of experts was established around James 
Killian, the scientific adviser to the president. Officially known as 
the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP), Killian’s committee was 
tasked by President Eisenhower with defining what types of technolo-
gies were to be developed in order to protect US interests over the long 
term. The conclusions reached by the panel were summed up in a re-
port presented to the NSC in February 1955.73 The recommendations 
covered numerous aspects of US defence policy and proposed to launch 
very ambitious research programmes to develop communications, in-
telligence and warning systems.
Concerning the problem of performing nuclear strikes deep inside 
Soviet territory, the TCP recommended the development of intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). ICBMs would merge technology 
from rocketry, artillery and nuclear weaponry to create a new weapons 
system with no known shield. A nuclear warhead was to be mounted 
on a guided rocket, which would accelerate until it reached a pre-set 
angle and velocity, well above the atmosphere. The warhead would 
then be released, and pursue its flight on an unguided and an unpow-
ered trajectory. Falling on its target under the laws of ballistics – thus 
explaining the name of such missiles – a nuclear warhead would be-
have just as an artillery shell fired by conventional guns. Because most 
of the flight path was free from atmospheric friction, ranges of several 
thousand nautical miles and velocities of about 3.5 miles per second 
were achievable. From the United States, flight time to Moscow was 
about twenty to thirty minutes. Under these conditions, Soviet early 
warning systems and air defences would be futile.74
72 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),  “Air Defence of the Sino-Soviet Block, 1955–
1960”, National Intelligence Estimate NIE 1-5-55, 12 July 1955. Cruise missiles 
however, reappeared during the early 1980’s, using terrain following navigation sys-
tems enabling to fly at extremely low altitude, thus avoiding radar detection.
73 Technical Capabilities Panel, “Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack”, report, 14 Fe-
burary 1955, Scientific Advisory Committee, Washington D.C.
74 For a general-public description of ICBM technology, see: George Harry Stine, ICBM: 
The Making of the Weapon that Changed the World (New York: Orion, 1991). This esti-
mation of ICBM flight time between the USA and the USSR is inferred from: Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA), “Ballistic Missile Defence Technologies”, report 
OTA-ISC-254, September 1985, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 94.
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However, the TCP also predicted that the United States “would 
not have a militarily significant capability with the ICBM until about 
1965, although a small number could be operational before that date”.75 
A temporary weapons system was needed, involving simpler missiles 
with shorter range, able to reach the Soviet Union from overseas bases 
in Europe. As an interim solution, the panel of experts recommended 
that “there be developed ballistic missiles (with about 1,500 nauti-
cal miles range and megaton warhead) for strategic bombardment”.76 
Because of their range, the weapons recommended by the TCP were 
referred to as intermediate range ballistic missiles or (IRBMs). As an 
emergency measure, pragmatism was the key word, and “both land-
basing and ship-basing should be considered”.77
Fig. 1: Typical IRBM flight trajectory
The creation of the Special Project Office
By February 1955, two of the three main conditions for a major criti-
cal juncture were in place. Firstly, the strategy of massive retaliation 
implied an important disclosure in the doctrinal environment of the 
Navy. Secondly, the Killian committee proposed abandoning cruise 
missiles in favour of ballistic missiles, a novel technology. However, 
75 TCP, “meeting the Threat of a Surprise Attack”. 
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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the occurrence of a third event – the creation of a new organisation 
specifically tasked with designing a naval IRBM – was necessary in 
order to overcome bureaucratic opposition to the creation of the FBM 
programme.
Within the Navy, the opposition to a ballistic missile programme 
was twofold. Firstly, a large number of officers considered it an immor-
al project, as the purpose of ballistic missiles was to perform strikes 
over civilian targets. Secondly, there were technical objections to the 
sea-basing of ballistic missiles. In the Navy, the development of aerial 
weapons came under the purview of the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) 
and the Bureau of Ordnances (BuOrd). However, both bureaus refused 
to support the development of ballistic missiles because their opera-
tion from ships was considered too dangerous and beyond the state of 
the art.78 In September 1947, a German V-2 was test-fired from the 
deck of the aircraft carrier USS Midway. Although the missile flew 
successfully, it did not appear to be a useful weapon. The handling of 
its cryogenic liquid fuel and the countdown of several hours prior to 
launching were too complicated for naval operations.79 In 1949, dur-
ing operation Crossover another German V2 was set on fire on the deck 
of a mock-up ship to assess the potential damages resulting from a 
launch accident. The result was dramatic, exceeding by far the worst 
predictions of engineers, and leading them to abandon all research on 
ballistic missiles.80
The resistance of the Navy toward a sea-based IRBM was progres-
sively overcome during the spring and the summer of 1955. In March, 
James S. Russell, one of the few supporters of a naval IRBM, became 
the secretary of the BuAer and began lobbying for the development 
of a naval ballistic missile.81 On 17 August, Robert A. Carney was 
replaced by Arleigh A. Burke as chief of naval operations (CNO).82 
As opposed to Carney, Burke had “the desire to develop a distinc-
tively naval contribution to national strategy” and was sympathetic 
78 On technical of naval IRBMs within the US Navy, see: Gordon O. Pehrson, interview 
by John T. Mason, 5 February 1974.
79 Robert A. Fuhrman, “The Fleet Ballistic Missile System: Polaris to Trident”, Journal 
of Spacecraft 5, no. 5 (1978): 267.
80 James Baar and William E. Howard, Polaris! (New York: Harcourt, 1960), 14.
81 Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases, Monograph series in 
World Affairs 4, no. 3 (Denver: The social Science Foundation and Graduate School of 
International Studies, 1966), 35.
82 For further details about Admiral Arleigh Burke, see: David A. Rosenberg, “Arleigh 
Burke: The Last CNO”, in Quarterdeck and Bridge: Two Centuries of American Naval Lea-
dership, ed. James Bradford (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1996): 361–394. 
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to the idea of placing ballistic missiles at sea.83 On his first day of of-
fice, he ordered a briefing about the capabilities of IRBMs, and took 
the definitive decision to initiate a research project after less than a 
week. On 13 September, the National Security Council ordered that 
the recommendations of the TCP be applied immediately.84 At this 
time, the Navy had no choice but to go ahead with the development 
of a naval IRBM. However, internal resistance remained important 
within the Navy, and frictions between BuAer and BuOrd prevented 
any significant advances, as the two bureaus now sought control over 
the programme.
To overcome this problem, Burke adopted a radical and unprec-
edented solution. No research and development activities relative 
to a naval IRBM were to be conducted by the BuOrd or the BuAer. 
Instead, on 17 November, the Special Projects Office (SPO) was cre-
ated with the specific task of handling the problems associated with 
the ship basing of ballistic missiles.85 To direct the SPO, Burke de-
cided to rely on an aviator, “because a technical expert would be too 
narrow minded” and appointed Rear Admiral William Raborn on 2 
December.86 Raborn and the rest of the SPO were separate from the 
normal hierarchy of the Navy and reported only to Burke. Burke wrote 
a letter that Raborn had to carry on his person whenever in service. 
The contents indicated that Raborn had carte blanche and “top prior-
ity” over any other Navy programmes to develop a naval IRBM.87 The 
FBM programme was born.
Bureaucratic politics and counterforce strikes
Paradoxically, the National Security Council´s adoption of the recom-
mendations proposed by TCP and the creation of the SPO did not im-
ply that the Navy had fully secured the right to develop a naval IRBM. 
Because the FBM programme was created nearly nine months after 
the TCP report was published, the Navy was falling behind the Air 
Force and the Army in the race for an operational IRBM. In a context 
83 Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 136; Arleigh Burke, interview by John T. Mason, 12 
December 1972.
84 Special Project Office [SPO], “Polaris Chronology. History of the Fleet Ballistic Mis-
sile Weapon System Development Program”, Chronology, 1967, U.S. Nuclear History 
Collection, NH00031, DNSA, Washington D.C., 1. 
85 Ibid., 1.
86 Quoted in: Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 25.
87 William Raborn, interview by John T. Mason, 15 September 1972. 
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of reduced military spending, President Eisenhower decided to fund 
no more than four ballistic missile programmes.88 The Air Force was 
already developing two ICBMs, the Atlas and the Titan. In 1954, one 
year before the TCP published its recommendations, the Air Force also 
started the development of an IRBM with ideal characteristics (a range 
of 1,500 miles and a warhead of 1.44 megatons).89 Early in 1955, the 
Army proposed a fourth missile programme, the Jupiter IRBM, with a 
performance similar to its Air Force counterpart.90 As no room was left 
for the Navy, the SPO was in the awkward position of being ordered 
to develop a naval IRBM, but denied the necessary funds for the work.
In order to survive, the FBM programme had to first obtain domes-
tic support, before it could even begin to develop a naval IRBM ad-
dressing the strategic problems faced by the United States. However, 
as a very young organisation, the SPO was not committed to any 
course of action. Having both the incentive and the capability to seize 
any opportunity to develop a naval IRBM, the FBM programme would 
address its bureaucratic environment with a high level of pragmatism 
during its first years of activity. 
The Jupiter missile
To the few Navy leaders sympathetic to the development of a naval 
IRBM, the lack of funding initially appeared as the main threat to 
the existence of the FBM programme. In order to obtain a portion 
of the resources allocated to the development of other IRBMs by the 
Eisenhower administration, Admiral Burke searched for alliances even 
before he nominated Raborn as the head of the SPO. The Air Force 
had the most advanced project and proposed a smaller missile, but 
refused to ally with the Navy. However, Burke was more successful 
in persuading the Secretary of Defense that the Navy should team up 
with the Army.91 On 8 November 1955, the Department of Defense 
ordered the Army to consider the possibility of a sea-based version for 
the Jupiter missile.92 In December, the evaluation was completed, and 
the Department of Defense authorised the Army and the Navy to initi-
88 Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 7.
89 Clayton K. S. Chun, Thunder over the Horizon : From V-2 Rockets to Ballistic Missiles 
(Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), 68.
90 For a detailed account of the competition between the Air Force and the Army over the 
development of the first generation of IRBMs, see: Armacost, The Politics of Weapons 
Innovation.
91 Raborn, interview. Burke extensively relied on Secretary of Navy Charles Thomas to 
obtain support from the Secretary of Defense.
92 SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 1.
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ate the joint development of the Jupiter, allotting 50.8 million dollars 
for the fiscal year 1956.93
At the very beginning of 1956, the first few rules framing the 
activity of the FBM programme began to appear, but remained rela-
tively limited. Officially, the purpose of the programme was “to han-
dle the problems associated with the ship-launched weapons system” 
developed by the Army.94 However, as an organisation, the SPO was 
actually much more committed to assuring its own survival than to 
anything else.95 In a tight budgetary context, and with many detrac-
tors left in the Navy, the SPO would probably have been disbanded 
if Burke had left the office of Chief of Naval Operations. Therefore, 
in Raborn’s perspective, developing a sea-based IRBM had to become 
something comparable to a religious commitment.96 He communi-
cated with his engineers through an internal publication named “The 
Dope”, the main purpose of which was to boost morale, and explain 
external threats to the programme.97 Furthermore, engineers had to 
abandon other personal goals and commit entirely to the organisa-
tion. Known as “Raborn’s tigers”, members of the SPO were totally 
dedicated to the FBM programme, and spent every Saturday as well as 
many Sundays at their offices.98
As the general architecture of the Jupiter IRBM had already been 
defined by the Army, the only research and development problem left 
to the SPO was to adapt the missile to its new naval environment. As 
discussed previously, in 1956 the Navy had only very limited experi-
ence in operating ballistic missiles from ships. An immediate conse-
quence being that the SPO could not rely on any existing framework 
to propose solutions to this technical problem. Instead, engineers di-
rectly addressed external criticism of the FBM programme as it ap-
peared, and designed individual solutions to each. An obvious risk was 
that the overall coherence of the project would suffer, but it allowed 
93 “Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Army-Navy Ballistic Missile Committee”, 
memorandum, log no. 55-2889, 20 December 1955, Digital National Security Ar-
chives, NH00549, Washington D.C., 2.
94 SPO, “Polaris Chronology. History of the Fleet Ballistic Missile Weapon System De-
velopment Program”, 1.
95 See: Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 14–60.
96 Raborn, interview. During the same interview, Raborn also declared that developing 
successfully a naval IRBM took the proportion of “evangelic faith.” 
97 Even Arleigh Burke occasionally contributed to this publication. See: Arleigh Burke, 
“National Strategic Target List and Single Integrated Operational Plan, Special Edi-
tion of Flag Officers Dope”, memorandum, 4 December 1960, U.S. Nuclear History, 
NH00291, DNSA, Washington D.C.
98 Clement Hayes Watson, interview by John T. Mason, 17 November 1972; Raborn, 
interview.
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the FBM programme to survive its detractors, which was in fine the 
principal objective of the SPO. 
The main criticism raised against the FBM programme originated 
from the Navy itself and was the direct continuation of those formu-
lated before the creation of the SPO. Firstly, there were still an im-
portant number of Navy leaders who considered Ballistic Missiles as 
immoral weapons. They were joined in their criticism by naval avia-
tors who feared that developing a new weapons system would have a 
negative impact on conventional forces and the construction of new 
aircraft carriers, by taking valuable budgetary resources away.99 As a 
former aviator, Raborn took the criticism seriously and addressed the 
issue personally. He proposed to senior Navy leaders and naval aviators 
to aim future naval IRBMs at targets of naval interest and at Soviet air 
defences. This implied that the naval version of the Jupiter system was 
to be developed with characteristics optimised for counterforce strikes, 
but it made sense both vis-à-vis the Navy’s interests and the strategy of 
massive retaliation. By suppressing air defences deep inland, the naval 
IRBM would allow carriers at sea to launch their aircraft unopposed 
over Soviet territory.100 As the Air Force would also benefit from the 
destruction of Soviet air defences, it would be possible to execute mas-
sive retaliation more effectively and with a higher degree of confidence 
before ICBMs could be deployed in great numbers. The intention of 
the SPO to develop a naval IRBM suitable for counterforce strikes was 
made public when Burke, as Chief of Naval Operations, presented the 
FBM programme to the House Appropriations Committee for the first 
time on 6 February 1956, stressing the necessity and the possibility of 
striking tactical targets.101
A second type of criticism against the FBM programme was root-
ed in the technical challenges implied by the development of naval 
IRBMs, with the handling of cryogenic fuel being the principal source 
of concern.102 The solution proposed by the SPO was to deploy the 
Jupiter on the easiest sea platform at its disposal. While the Regulus 
missile could be fired from aircraft carriers, cruisers and submarines, 
the Jupiter was to be first deployed exclusively on mariner-class cargo 
99 Robert Halley Wertheim, interview by John T. Mason, 23 January 1981. 
100 Ibid.
101 Burke, Arleigh, “Department of Defense appropriations, 1957”, testimony, February 
1956, Hearings of the House Armed Service Committee, Washington D.C., 659.
102 Thomas S. Gates, interview by John T. Mason, 3 October 1972; Watson, interview.
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ships.103 The dead-line for the first test launch was 1 January 1960. 
A hypothetical deployment of ballistic missiles onboard submarines 
would not occur before 1965, and would only be considered if the 
experience on surface ships was conclusive.104 
The new basing plan adopted by the SPO helped to solve problems 
relative to navigation, communications and launch operations, but did 
little to address the handling and safety issues raised by cryogenic fu-
els. However, this problem soon became critical when the Air Force 
began to attack the FBM programme on the grounds that fuelling an 
IRBM at sea would take too long and would be too dangerous to have 
any usefulness.105 In order to resolve this recurring issue, the SPO de-
cided to exchange the liquid fuel of the Jupiter missile for a solid, stor-
able propellant.106 The new missile was called Jupiter S – S for “solid”. 
As the SPO had no engineers with a background in solid propellants, 
the Jupiter S would be powered by an existing technology, a cluster of 
six small “Big Stoop” sounding rockets.107 A second stage was added, 
constituted of a single Big Stoop rocket. However, as the SPO decided 
to rely on a primitive solid propellant technology, the size and weight 
of the missile grew to monstrous proportions, and the effective range 
was likely to be much below the 1,500 miles required by the Killian 
committee.108
At this early stage of the FBM programme, the constraints and 
requirements placed on the development of a naval IRBM were mini-
mal. The counterforce doctrine selected by the Navy implied that the 
missile might have to trade some characteristics in order to increase 
precision as well as command and control communications. However, 
those problems were still considered to be remote, and in the SPO’s 
103 Burke, interview; Ronald J. Kurth, The Politics of Technological Innovation in the United 
States Navy, 239.
104 Fuhrman, “The Fleet Ballistic Missile System: Polaris to Trident”: 267.
105 “Minutes of the 4th meeting OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), Ballistic Mis-
siles Committee, Held 15 January 1956, in Room 3E912 at 1430”, minutes, OSD-
BMC ¾, 13 March, 1956, U.S. Nuclear History, NH00557, DNSA, Washington 
D.C., 2. 
106 Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 27; Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 28.
107 Sounding rockets are small, low-cost research rockets using solid propellant, typically 
used to conduct scientific experiments in the upper atmosphere or on sub-orbital flight 
trajectories. 
108 Preliminary studies of the SPO concluded to a missile with a 120-inch diameter and 
a weight of 160,000 pounds. See: J.D. Hunley, “Minuteman and the development 
of Solid Rocket Launch Technology”, in To Reach the New Frontier: A History of U.S. 
Launch Vehicles, ed. Denis R. Jenkins and Roger D. Launius (Lexington: Univervisty 
Press of Kentucky, 2002), 241; Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, Wernher Von 
Braun has been quoted saying that with a cluster of Big Stoop rockets, any IRBM 
fired from the Atlantic Ocean would not be able to strike targets located further than 
the Simplon Tunnel between Switzerland and Italy. Not quite the optimal target for a 
strategy of massive retaliation against the Soviet Union. 
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perspective, it was considered that with sufficient money and gifted 
engineers, any problem could be fixed in time.109 Once again, prag-
matism was the key word, and the entire early organisational frame 
of the FBM programme was well summed up when Raborn declared 
in anger “I don’t care how big and ornery it is, we’re gonna take the 
bastard to sea!”110
Table 1: Primitive organisational frame, Jupiter S missile
purpose/goal of the organisation survival, adapting the Jupiter missile to a 
naval environment
problems addressed any bureaucratic or technical critic to the 
FBM programme
solutions proposed developing a tactical weapons system 
able to support carrier groups by 
striking military targets of naval interest, 
developing a solid propellant missile
constraints on possible solutions –
From Jupiter to Polaris
By early summer 1956, the FBM programme began to generate a rela-
tive consensus within the Navy. So far, the informal institutions con-
stituting the organisational frame of the programme were relatively 
limited, but they were flexible and enabled to address the main bu-
reaucratic threats to the programme. The next step for the SPO was to 
obtain support from policy makers outside the Navy, by explaining the 
contribution of a Naval IRBM to the strategy of massive retaliation. 
Indeed, as the FBM programme secured the right to develop a naval 
version of the Jupiter missile, it was the Jupiter programme itself that 
became threatened.
In the first place, the Jupiter missile had been launched by the 
Army to gain a more important role in nuclear warfare. Until 1955, 
the Army only had control over small, low-yield nuclear weapons that 
could be used at the tactical level on the battleground, but not to deter 
the Soviet Union. The purpose of the Jupiter missile was to open the 
gates of strategic nuclear weapons to the Army, but it had virtually the 
exact same performances as the Thor IRBM proposed by the Air Force, 
109 Raborn, interview.
110 Baar and Howard, Polaris!, 52.
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placing the whole programme in a delicate situation.111 As the Air 
Force began the development of the Thor one year before the Army, it 
had a decisive lead and would achieve an operational capability first. 
Furthermore, the Jupiter programme was led by Wernher von Braun 
and a team of German rocket scientists that conceived the missile as 
the basis for a future space launch vehicle.112 The result was a very large 
weapons system, difficult to transport and to handle, while the Air 
Force’s missile could easily be airlifted to Europe within hours.
As the FBM programme only consisted in adapting the Jupiter 
to a naval environment, there was little the SPO could do to help the 
Army securing the whole project. It became progressively apparent 
that the Army was unable to save the Jupiter missile from the Air 
Force’s attacks.113 In order to survive and save the FBM programme, 
the SPO had to end its cooperation with the Army and design a naval 
IRBM of its own. 
To end the collaboration with the Army, the SPO once again pro-
ceeded in a very pragmatic manner. During the hot months of 1956, 
the Navy organised the “Naval Academy of Science”, a summer study 
on anti-submarine warfare. The objective was not to discuss ballistic 
missiles. However, Edward Teller – the chief designer of the hydrogen 
bomb – was invited to give a conference about the possibility of re-
placing conventional warheads placed in depth charges and torpedoes 
with nuclear ones.114 Teller first met scepticism, as current nuclear war-
heads were far too voluminous to fit torpedoes. However, he success-
fully convinced his audience that smaller warheads in the megaton 
range would soon be available and criticised the Navy for planning 
to “put a 1956 warhead in a 1965 weapons system”.115 Vice Admiral 
Lawson P. Ramage was present and understood immediately the im-
plications for the FBM programme. If a smaller warhead could be uti-
lised, the missile would not only be much lighter, but the quantity of 
solid propellant required to achieve a given range would be dramati-
111 See: Philip J. Klass, “Hybird IRBM Fight May Fall Into Management, Not Techni-
cal Fields,” Aviation Week, 24 June 1957; “Why Two IRBMs?”, Aviation Week, 25 
November 1957.
112 For more details on the Jupiter missile as first step toward the development of space 
launch vehicles, see: Michael J. Neufeld, Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007).
113 Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation, 82–128.
114 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 29–30. For more details on Teller’s work, see: York, 
The advisors.
115 William F. Whitmore, “Military Operation research – A personal Restrospective” Pu-
blications in Operations Research 9 (1963), 263.
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cally reduced.116 Ramage did not wait for the conference to finish but 
rushed immediately to report Teller’s prediction to Raborn and the 
rest of SPO. Simultaneously, Raborn was informed that two junior 
researchers from the Office of Naval Research had achieved a massive 
breakthrough in solid propellant performances by using an aluminium 
additive.117 If Teller was right and if the new solid propellant technol-
ogy held its promises, a very light IRBM suitable for naval operations 
– weighing only one third of the Jupiter S – would be within reach 
within a couple of years.
By September 1956, the SPO had a bureaucratic incentive and 
a technological opportunity to abandon the Jupiter S and develop a 
new ballistic missile of its own. The Navy, its mind assuaged by the 
organisational frame of the SPO, was now ready to support the project 
and the future of the FBM programme was back in the hands of the 
National Security Council.118 However, duplicating the performances 
of the Thor and the Jupiter was not enough, as the Navy would be con-
fronted with competition from projects that had a two years advantage. 
Returning to the basic strategic problems that led to the concept 
of massive retaliation, Raborn noticed that the issue of keeping defence 
spending at a low level remained unaddressed by the Air Force and the 
Army. While the ultimate logic of the Thor and Jupiter missiles was 
to allow the US economy to save some of the money allocated to con-
ventional defence, both were very expensive weapons systems. On 15 
November 1956, Raborn held a long presentation to the Secretary of 
Defense about the advantages of a small naval IRBM using solid fuel. 
He concluded his briefing by presenting an expected saving of 500 
million dollars.119 The Secretary of Defense was enthusiastic, declaring 
“Well Admiral, you’ve shown me a lot of sexy slides this morning, but 
I tell you that last slide where you showed that tremendous saving was 
the sexiest one of all.”120
With the implicit support of the Department of Defense for the 
development of a small naval IRBM, the last step for the SPO was 
116 Weight is known to have a “multiplier effect” on the range of ballistic missiles: even 
very slight variations of weight can increase range by several dozens or hundreds of 
miles. 
117 Raborn, interview; Pehrson, interview. See also: Hunley, “Minuteman and the devel-
opment of Solid Rocket Launch Technology”: 241–243.
118 Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 32–33.
119 Raborn, interview. During this interview, Raborn remembered having presented a 
saving of 50, not 500 million dollars. While the precise presentation given by Raborn 
on November 1956 is not available, all declassified minutes of meeting relative to the 
FBM programme present an estimated saving of half a billion dollars.
120 Raborn, interview; Watson, interview.
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to kill the Jupiter programme. Only two days after Raborn met the 
Secretary of Defense, the Navy voted with the Air Force in the Joint 
Chief of Staffs against the Jupiter missile.121 Now, the SPO had free 
scope. By 8 December, the Department of Defense ordered the FBM 
programme to terminate all cooperation with the army and to begin 
the development of a small, solid propellant missile, named Polaris.122
Polaris as a weapon of massive retaliation
With the FBM programme having secured relatively strong support 
from the rest of the Navy and being freed from the tutorship of the 
Army, the next step for the SPO was to design a missile that would 
be optimally suited for massive retaliations. Developing a totally new 
weapons system represented a more complex task than the mere ad-
aptation of an existing missile to the naval environment. With little 
experience in the general design of ballistic missiles, the FBM pro-
gramme now faced the challenge of selecting the most suitable missile 
technologies for national strategy. However, the youth and flexibility 
of the FBM programme could be used once again to adapt its activities 
through trial and error. The only difference being that instead of fo-
cusing on bureaucratic politics, the FBM programme was now directly 
addressing the problems posed by US nuclear strategy.
Political opposition to counterforces strikes
Immediately following authorisation of the development of the Polaris 
missile, the National Security council ordered Raborn to present the 
new research and development agenda of the FBM programme by 
11 January. With only four weeks notice, the presentation given by 
Raborn was directly inspired by concepts previously developed for 
the Jupiter S missile. The basic argument developed to convince the 
National Security Council that the FBM programme was a priority 
121 Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation, 118. From a bureaucratic perspective, it 
is interesting to note that the Jupiter missile was eventually not cancelled, but trans-
ferred into the hands of the Air Force.
122 Strategic Systems Project Office (SSPO), “FBM Facts/Chronology. Polaris-Poseidon-
Trident”, rapport, 1990, Natural Resource Defense Council Research Collection, 
record 431, Box 30, The National Security Archives, Washington D.C., 3.
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for national security was that Polaris would perform the same tasks as 
Jupiter, only more efficiently.123 
The purpose of the whole FBM programme was described as devel-
oping a “smaller, lighter missile” enabling strikes on “a greater choice 
of targets […], to wipe out even a very hard target”.124 Despite a few 
elusive references to the concepts of deterrence and retaliation, the 
presentation indicated that the FBM programme was only working on 
three practical problems related to striking military targets. Firstly, in 
order to obtain the precision required to destroy hard targets, accurate 
navigation systems had to determine the exact position of the launch-
ing ship. Secondly, a procedure to prepare and launch the missile safely 
and with a “high rate of fire” had to be determined. Thirdly, in order 
to decide whether or not more missiles should be used against the 
same set of targets, it would be necessary to assess the probable impact 
point, to detect if a nuclear explosion occurred in the neighbourhood 
of the target and to evaluate damages.125 The solutions proposed by 
Raborn and the SPO were to convert a civil freighter into a test-bed 
for navigation equipment, to convert a second ship to practice launch 
operations, and to develop more advanced command and control com-
munications.126 In order to provide the precision required by counter-
force strikes, the use of a star-tracker allowing accurate navigation by 
means of one or several star-sightings was considered.127 Furthermore, 
better communication assets had to be developed in order to obtain 
information about target damage. Once again, pragmatism was a key 
word, and the constraints on potential solutions remained limited to 
keeping the weight of the missile under 30,000 pounds. 
While the presentation given by Raborn stated that the Polaris 
missile would be “an immediate retaliatory weapon”, the National 
Security Council was left with the feeling that the FBM programme 
was not entirely framing its activity around the issue of deterrence, as 
required by the strategy of massive retaliation.128 From the perspective 
123 William F. Raborn, “Presentation to the National Security Council on the Fleet Ballis-
tic Missile Project”, presentation, 11 January 1957, U.S. Nuclear History, NH0568, 
DNSA, Washington D.C., 38–39, and slides no. 1–5.
124 Ibid., 39. So called “hard targets” are military targets which structure have been rein-
forced to withstand the blast of surrounding nuclear explosions. 
125 Raborn, “Presentation to the National Security Council on the Fleet Ballistic Missile 
Project”, 41–42 and slide 3.
126 Ibid., slide 3.
127 Wertheim, interview. For a technical account of star-tracker technology and its early 
application to ballistic missiles, see: “Stellar-inertial Guidance Reduces Errors”, Avi-
ation Week, 17 March 1958.
128 Raborn, “Presentation to the National Security Council on the Fleet Ballistic Missile 
Project”, 40.
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of the SPO, the concept of retaliation was not necessarily related to 
deterrence and called for a different set of targets, mainly of a military 
nature.129 In contrast, other ballistic missile programmes presented 
that day to the National Security Council were more directly defined 
as deterrent systems.130 As a result, the FBM programme was given a 
lower funding priority than any other ICBM and IRBM programme.131 
Table 2: Aborted counterforce organisational frame, Raborn’s presentation to 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 January 1957
purpose/goal of the organisation provide a “smaller, lighter missile”, with the 
capability to wipe out “even a very hard 
target”
problems addressed 1. precision
2. high rate of fire
3. target damage assessment
solutions proposed 1. develop equipments for precise 
navigation
2. practice high rate of fire
3. develop communication assets
constraints on possible solutions missile weight under 30,000 pounds
The NAVWAG study
Changing the organisational frame of the FBM programme was not an 
insoluble problem for the SPO. There had been no sunk costs so far. 
The characteristics of the Polaris missile had not yet been precisely de-
fined and no production parts had been produced. By chance, only three 
days after Raborn’s presentation, the Naval Warfare Analysis Group 
(NAVWAG) finished an independent study on the potential contribu-
tion of the FBM programme to National Security. The NAVWAG was 
constituted of a group of civilians formally connected to the Navy but 
working independently, and had not been implicated in the previous 
129 “Proceedings of the Steering Committee of the Polaris-submarine Special Task Group. 
Second Meeting 24–25 January 1957”, minutes, 02075730059, 25 January 1957, 
U.S. Nuclear History, NH00569, DNSA, Washington D.C., 3.
130 See: “Presentations on the U.S. Ballistic Missiles Programs before the National Se-
curity Council, 11 January 1957”, report, 11 January 1957, U.S. Nuclear History, 
NH00568, DNSA, Washington D.C.
131 See: Norton Garrison, “Memorandum for Special Assistant for Guided Missiles, Of-
fice of Secretary of Defense, Subj: FBM (Polaris) Priority”, memorandum, Op-51/
nc – 0089P51, 7 February 1957, personal archive; “Agenda of the 28th meeting 
OSD Ballistic Missile Committee, to be Held 13 February 1957, in Room 3E131 
at 1000 Hours”, agenda, OSD-BMC 2/28, 13 February 1957, U.S. Nuclear History, 
NH00571, DNSA, Washington D.C., 5–6.
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activities of the SPO.132 Its vision of the FBM programme was a radi-
cal departure from how the Navy and the SPO had considered ballis-
tic missiles and nuclear warfare until then. Furthermore, it contained 
all the information needed by the SPO to redefine the organisational 
frame of the FBM programme. 
The main conclusion reached by the NAVWAG study was that 
the purpose of the FBM programme should be expressed as “a de-
terrent capability”.133 The goal of the whole programme was there-
fore to produce a missile capable of destroying “very highly defended 
population or industrial targets”, especially Moscow.134 The two main 
problems recognised by the NAVWAG study were the vulnerability 
of the launching platform and the ability of the missile to produce an 
adequate level of destruction over the target area.135 The proposed so-
lution for the vulnerability issue was to develop missiles with a range 
of 2,500 miles that could be fired from submarines. The implicit logic 
was that a greater missile range would offer more sea room for the sub-
marine to hide. However, as the development of the FBM programme 
was an emergency measure, surface ship basing and a minimal range 
of 1,150 miles were acceptable for initial missiles. In order to provide 
an adequate level of destruction over the target area, the solution pro-
posed was to develop a warhead with a circular error probable (CEP) 
of four miles.136 A yield of one megaton was still considered optimal, 
however a 0.4 megaton warhead was considered as acceptable for the 
first generation of missiles. In contrast to what Raborn told the NSC, 
the NAVWAG study stipulated that “missile characteristics desir-
able for other targets should be deferred beyond this initial stage”.137 
Finally, the main constraint on the development of these solutions was 
the need to meet the tight schedule imposed by the competition with 
the Air Force. As a “considerable growth potential” was anticipated, 
low-performance solutions could be adopted on the first generation of 
Polaris missiles as interim fixes.138 
132 Keith R. Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group: A History of Naval Operations Analy-
sis (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1984), 186.
133 Naval Warfare Analysis Group (NAWVAG), “Study 1, Introduction of the Fleet Bal-
listic Missile into Service”, report, NAVWAG 1, 30 January 1957, U.S. Nuclear His-
tory, NH00570, DNSA, Washington D.C., 1. 
134 Ibid., 2.
135 Ibid., 2–3.
136 Ibid., 2.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid., 1.
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As a naval aviator, Raborn was reluctant to accept the concepts 
proposed by the NAVWAG study, as all consideration of supporting 
aircraft carrier strikes were abandoned. As a very religious individual, 
using atomic weapons to burn cities, industries and civilians was also 
in contradiction with his personal ethics. Until late June 1957, Raborn 
would still make some sporadic comments presenting the Polaris mis-
sile as a weapon whose “tactical mission would be to beat down fixed 
base air and missile defences to pave the way for carrier strikes aimed 
at mobile or concealed targets”.139 However, the decision to apply the 
NAVWAG study as the organisational frame of the FBM programme 
was taken at a higher level. With Raborn’s “idealism” blocking any 
evolution toward the deterrent force sought after in the strategy of 
massive retaliation, Burke decided to intervene directly. In a memo-
randum of 15 January 1957, he enforced the NAVWAG study as the 
new framework of the FBM programme. The purpose, problems and 
potential solutions outlined in the study were “approved as the basis 
of Navy planning for the introduction of the FBM into service”, and 
were “specifically applicable to the drafting of the operational require-
ments, and development characteristics […] and shall be used as a 
guideline”.140 
Placed directly under the orders of Burke, Raborn had no choice 
but to apply the memorandum. In less than two months (February 
and March), the SPO applied the recommendations of the NAVWAG 
group to determine the specification of the Polaris missile and draft 
the first blueprints.141 The result was a two-stage, very small missile, 
measuring less than 30 feet, weighting 28,800 pounds, with a range 
of 1,150 miles and a single warhead of 600 kilotons. The guidance 
system would be exclusively inertial and was supposed to provide an 
accuracy of 4-miles CEP. 142 Without the help of a star-tracker, this 
would be insufficient for striking hardened military targets but pre-
cise enough for hitting Moscow. With a flight time of less than fifteen 
139 “Navy views Polaris as a Support Weapon”, Aviation Week, 17 June 1957.
140 Arleigh Burke, “Extract from CNO Memorandum, subj: Introduction of the Fleet 
Ballistic Missile into Service”, memorandum, 15 January 1957, personal archive.
141 SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 4.
142 An inertial guidance system consisting of a stable platform held on a known orienta-
tion by three gyroscopes (one by axis), regardless of the movements of the missile. On 
the stable platform is mounted a set of three accelerometers (one by axis). Knowing the 
location of the launch platform, position of the missile can be inferred by integrating 
acceleration along the three axes against time. For more detail on inertial guidance 
system, see: Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy, especially 1–94.
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minutes, a terminal speed several times higher than any surface-to-air 
missile, Polaris would outclass the most advanced Soviet air defences. 
Table 3: Basic organisational frame, NAVWAG study no. 1
purpose/goal of the organisation providing a deterrent capability
problems addressed 1. vulnerability
2. destruction of urban-industrial targets
solutions proposed 1. sea basing, large patrol areas
2. military payload equivalent to a yield 
between 0.4 and 1Mt over a 4-miles 
diameter area
constraints on possible solutions achieve surface launch capability before 
1961
Adjusting Polaris to the strategic environment
The changes imposed by Burke on the FBM programme had not been 
implemented in vain. In the eyes of Secretary of Defense Thomas 
Wilson, the new technical characteristics of Polaris made it “a more 
desirable weapons system”, and the FBM programme was attributed 
the highest priority level for defence spending and industrial procure-
ment.143 By the summer of 1957, the only task left to the SPO was to 
complete the development of the Polaris Missile, and carry out some 
fine tuning to adjust or even attempt to stay ahead of changes in the 
strategic environment.
The Sputnik years
With the key characteristics of the Polaris defined, the next step for 
the FBM programme was to define the characteristics of the launching 
platform. While Burke ordered the SPO to apply the recommenda-
tions given by the NAVWAG study, he did not order the organisation 
to immediately develop a missile launched from submarines. In his 
memorandum of 15 January, Burke acknowledged that a nuclear bal-
listic missile submarine (SSBN) would be “the optimum launching 
vehicle in terms of survival and economy of forces”.144 However, as the 
achievement of efficient solutions depended on the constraint of meet-
143 Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson, “Memorandum for the President”, memo-
randum, 7 May 1957, U.S. Nuclear History, NH 00575, DNSA, Washington D.C., 1.
144 Burke, “Extract from CNO Memorandum”, 1. 
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ing a tight schedule, Burke ordered SPO designers and the bureau of 
ships to determine in the first place “what type of surface combatant 
ship is best suited for task force employment of the FBM”.145 The ob-
jective was to achieve a surface launch capability by 1961, and a hypo-
thetical submarine launch capability by 1965, but only if submarine 
basing would be within the state of the art by then.146
However, on 15 May 1957, the USSR began to test fire a new mis-
sile design, known as the R-7 rocket. According to US intelligence, 
the size and flight characteristics of the R-7 seemed to indicate that 
the USSR was about to achieve the capability of delivering very large 
nuclear warheads directly over continental America.147 Soviet progress 
in rocketry generated the belief in the United States that a “missile 
gap” existed.148 It also generated a perception of mutual deterrence, 
where both sides were prevented from using nuclear weapons because 
of the threat of annihilation by retaliation in kind.149 Finally, it threat-
ened the credibility of the strategy of massive retaliation. At a time 
when the manned bomber was still the backbone of US nuclear forces, 
a surprise R-7 attack on mainland and overseas bases could leave the 
country with extremely limited retaliatory power.150 
In order to propose a useful contribution to national security and 
support the credibility of the strategy of massive retaliation, ballistic 
missiles under development had to be invulnerable to a Soviet surprise 
attack. The solution proposed by the Air Force was to conceal mis-
145 Burke, “Extract from CNO Memorandum”, 1. Emphasis added.
146 SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 5.
147 On American intelligence monitoring Soviet ICBM tests, see: Donald MacKenzie, 
“The Soviet Union and Strategic Missile Guidance”, International Security 13, no. 2 
(1988): 5–54; Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 299–303.
148 On the reaction of the Eisenhower administration to the R-7 rocket and the alleged 
missile gap, see: “Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 4, 
1957”, memorandum, 6 November 1957, Nuclear History Program Collection, box 
1, The National Security Archives, Washington D.C. See also: Peter J. Roman, Eisen-
hower and the Missile Gap (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
149 While the USSR detonated a nuclear device for the first time on 29 August 1949, So-
viet capabilities to delivery vehicles were very scarce and their capabilities limited un-
til the R-7 became operational. First, Soviets lacked long range bombers in adequate 
numbers. Second, U.S. Air Force officers planned to use a fraction of their nuclear 
arsenal to destroy Soviet bombers on the ground. As General Curtis Le May put it: “If 
I see that the Russians are amassing their planes for an attack, I’m going to knock the 
shit out of them before they take off the ground”. Quoted in: Kaplan, The Wizards of 
Armageddon, 134.
150 This issue was anticipated as soon as 1954, but failed to attract decisive attention 
from policy makers until the Soviet Union began flight testing its first R-7 rockets. 
See: Hoffman et al., “Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases”, report R-266, 1954, 
RAND, Santa Monica. 
DSS-2_2010.indd   42 09.08.2010   16:06:17
	 Nuclear	strategy	and	the	d	evelopment	of	military	technology	 43
siles in hardened underground silos.151 The Navy, however, was in a 
more delicate situation. In 1946 and 1955, two campaigns of nuclear 
tests – operations Crossover and Wingwam – demonstrated that once 
located, surface units and SSBNs were vulnerable even to relatively 
imprecise and low yield weapons.152 However, at that point, the SPO 
had invested little in research and development activities concerning 
surface basing of the Polaris missile. A second-hand freighter had been 
bought in January, but its main purpose was to test navigation equip-
ments, and the characteristics of an operational platform remained to 
be defined.
With the recent tensions generated by Raborn’s presentation still 
in mind, the SPO did not wait for political pressure to include the 
problem of vulnerability in the organisational frame of the FBM pro-
gramme. Considering the conclusions of the NAVWAG study, SSBNs 
were determined as being the most survivable launch platform. Their 
mode of propulsion allowed them to remain hidden underwater until 
food provisions and human endurance were exhausted. While there 
were still concerns about whether or not launching a ballistic missile 
from a submarine was within the state of the art, the SPO took im-
mediate and pragmatic action. To pre-empt the critics of the National 
Security Council and the Department of Defense about the vulner-
ability of the Polaris missile, the SPO did not design a new SSBN but 
proposed to adapt a nuclear powered submarine already in construc-
tion and to place sixteen Polaris in it amidships. By 18 June 1957, the 
characteristics of the SSBN were set definitely, more than three months 
before the original schedule. Accordingly, by 1 July Burke was able 
to reduce the development programme for the submarine basing of 
the Polaris missile by two years. It was due to be commissioned by 1 
January 1963.153
The choice of accelerating the development of a submarine launch 
platform for the Polaris missile proved to be a wise move. On 4 October 
1957, an R-7 rocket placed “Sputnik”, the first manmade earth satel-
151 See: Major General Jacob E. Smart, “Plan for Decreasing the Vulnerability of the 
Strike Force”, memorandum, 17 January 1959, Fred Kaplan Collection 80, box 1, The 
National Security Archive, Washington D.C.; Jerome B. Wienser, “Vulnerability of 
ATLAS Missile Sites”, memorandum K-S-8199, 3 December 1959, Nuclear History 
Program Collection, Box 2, The National Security Archives, Washington D.C.; “SAC 
Shapes Missile Force for Survival”, Aviation Week, 20 June 1960.
152 See: Samuel Glasstone and Philip Dolan, “Shock Effects of Surface and Subsurface 
Bursts”, report, 1977, The effects of nuclear weapons, US Department of Defense, Energy 
Research and Development Administration, Washington D.C. 
153 SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 4.
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lite, into orbit. This event triggered panic among US political elites.154 
In the context of the coming 1960 election, the Democratic Party ex-
aggerated the importance of the missile gap and put pressure on the 
Eisenhower administration to close it by accelerating the develop-
ment of invulnerable ballistic missiles.155 With already four months 
of research and development activities regarding SSBN basing for the 
Polaris missile, the SPO was in a good position to answer the call. 
During November, mock-ups of the Polaris missiles were fired from a 
fixed underwater tube to demonstrate the feasibility of the project.156 
On 26 November, key decision makers were informed that an opera-
tional Polaris missile could be embarked onboard submarines as early 
as October 1960.157 The interim solution of placing ballistic missiles 
onboard surface units was discarded. By 9 December, the Secretary of 
Defense accepted the development plan of the FBM programme. He 
ordered to proceed directly and with maximum priority the commis-
sioning of the first generation of Polaris missiles and tripled the pro-
gramme funding accordingly.158
Submarine communications
While adapting the FBM programme to address the challenge of 
survivability had been a relatively painless process, it placed impor-
tant constraints on the solutions proposed for other components of 
the Polaris system, especially on control and communications assets. 
As radio waves only superficially penetrate the surface of the oceans, 
communications with SSBNs on patrol were difficult. Furthermore, 
two-way communications implied that submarines would emit radio 
waves, thus revealing their position to enemy units equipped with di-
rection-finding equipment. Exotic solutions were considered, but were 
154 See: “Implications of the Soviet Earth Satellite for U.S. Security”, memorandum NSC 
5520, 18 November 1957, Nuclear History Program collection, box 1, The National 
Security Archive, Washington D.C.; CIA, “Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and 
Policies, 1957–1962”, National Intelligence Estimate NIE 11-4-57, 11 December 
1957, Nuclear History Program Collection, box 2, The National Security Archives, 
Washington D.C.
155 Christopher A. Preble, “Who Ever Believed in the Missile Gap? John F. Kennedy and 
the Politics of National Security”, Presidential Studies Quarterly 33 (1983): 801–826.
156 “Polaris Begins Underwater Tests”, Aviation Week, 4 November 1957.
157 SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 5.
158 This decision is quoted in: “Comments and Recommendations on Report to the Presi-
dent by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM (Office Defense Mobilization) Sci-
ence Advisory Committee”, report to the National Security Council NSC-5724/1, 16 
December 1957, U.S. Nuclear History, NH00407, DNSA, Washington D.C., 19. 
See also: SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 5; “Boost for Polaris”, Aviation week, 28 October 
1957. For more details on the acceleration of the FBM program after the launch of the 
first earth satellite by the Soviet Union, see: Burke, interview; Gates, interview.
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almost immediately rejected.159 In case of failure, the development of 
uncertain technologies would jeopardise the entire programme, and 
the problem of communications subsequently threatened to become 
the “Achilles heel of the entire Polaris operation”.160 Accordingly, vir-
tually no research and development activities were conducted by the 
SPO, and submarines would have to rely on existing technology con-
sisting of random wire antennas trailed right below the surface of the 
ocean.161 This system was considered relatively unreliable, and Burke 
decided that each SSBN crew must “not only use direct data from its 
commanders in the United States”, but also would “get the dope”, or 
in other words, “listen to several news stations [in order to figure if] 
the Soviets have attacked the United States”.162 
In a new study published in November 1957, the NAVWAG 
group proposed to turn the constraints on control and communica-
tions assets into an advantage for the FBM programme by seeking 
support from those who were criticising the logic of massive retalia-
tion.163 In the context of mutual deterrence implied by the R-7 rocket, 
the threat of camping out massive retaliation was no longer credible 
against limited Soviet provocations because it would imply that the 
United States would suffer intolerable destruction by retaliation in 
kind. Scenarios for more progressive retaliations were proposed by the 
Air Force, but were unpractical. Indeed, if command and control cen-
tres were destroyed during the first hours of a nuclear exchange, there 
would be no means of controlling conflict escalation and termination. 
By relying on news channels as much as on direct orders, SSBNs were 
less affected by this problem, as submarine commanders could receive 
orders prior to departure to stop retaliations if means of surrender was 
heard over the radio. 
Another important shortcoming of the strategy of massive retal-
iation was that virtually all nuclear weapons would be delivered at 
once. With its urban centres totally destroyed, and no more nuclear 
attack to fear, the Soviet Union would have nothing to lose in push-
159 John Buescher, interview by John T. Mason, 4 March 1982. Morse code by underwater 
explosions and permanent connections between submarines and their bases by the 
means of a coop wire were initially considered.
160 Quoted in: Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 238. Watson, interview. 
161 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 81.
162 Burke, interview.
163 NAVWAG, “Study 5, National Policy Implications of Atomic Parity (u) (Revised)”, 
report NAVWAG 5, 20 November 1957, U.S. Nuclear History, NH00094, DNSA, 
Washington D.C.
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ing forward the attacks it started in the first place.164 In contrast, the 
invulnerability of SSBNs and the relative independence from com-
mand and control centres would allow for a low rate of fire retalia-
tions, possibly extended over several weeks. This was the reasoning of 
“torturing the opponent”, by burning its civilians when they would 
leave atomic shelters after each previous attack.165 As “people could 
not live out their life in shelters”, slow rate of fire retaliations would 
“force the aggressor [the Soviet Union] to capitulate, to surrender his 
remaining stockpile, to change his form of government, to renounce 
any gains from his aggression, and to assist his erstwhile victim in 
reconstruction”.166
Table 4: Basic organisational frame, NAVWAG study no. 5
purpose/goal of the organisation providing a deterrent capability
problems addressed 1. vulnerability
2. destruction of urban-industrial targets
solutions proposed 1. SSBN basing, large patrol areas
2. military payload equivalent to a yield 
between 0.4 and 1Mt over a 4-miles 
diameter area
constraints on possible solutions achieve submarine launch capability 
before September 1960, communication 
systems excluded from the research 
agenda
From a counterforce organisational frame that held the bombing of 
cities as immoral to a deterrent frame that explicitly argued in favour 
of torturing civilians, the FBM programme had come full circle. This 
illustrates not only the capability of the SPO to efficiently adapt to 
its strategic and bureaucratic environment in order to produce and to 
survive, but also demonstrates how open the opportunity set was dur-
ing this critical juncture. After a difficult birth, the FBM programme 
was now called a “sound concept” and found wide support from policy 
makers (both supporters and critics to the strategy of massive retali-
ation) and the Navy.167 During the years 1958 and 1959, virtually no 
modifications were applied to the organisational frame of the FBM pro-
gramme. Engineers developed the solutions established after the two 
164 For instance, it is not the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki per se that 
forced Imperial Japan to capitulate, but the threat of further nuclear attacks. 
165 NAVWAG, “study 5”, 26.
166 Ibid., 26.
167 “Polaris on Submarine Called Sound Concept”. Aviation Week, 25 November 1957.
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NAVWAG studies and Burke secured the funding of the programme 
by presenting its purpose, problems and potential solutions in numer-
ous classified and public presentations.168 By 15 October 1960, Polaris 
A-1 became operational when the nuclear powered submarine USS 
George Washington departed for its first operational patrol with 16 
missiles on board.169 The organisational frame of the FBM programme 
had allowed the SPO to successfully develop a challenging military 
technology – the naval IRBM – and policy makers to obtain a weapons 
system ideally suited for their strategic need. In the next chapter, we 
shall see how the development of successors to the original Polaris A-1 
missile contributed to solidify the framework that shaped the develop-
ment of new missiles within the FBM programme. 
168 For examples, see: Arleigh Burke, “Remarks by Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN, Chief 
of Naval Operations, at the Secretaries Conferences”, speech, 21 June 1958, Opera-
tional Archives, Arleigh Burke papers, Command Files post 1 Jan 46, off box, Naval 
Historical Center, Washington D.C.; Arleigh Burke, “Address by Admiral Arleigh 
Burke, USN, Chief of Naval Operations Before the Air War College – Maxwell Air 
Force Base, Alabama”, speech, 22 May 1958, Operational Archives, Arleigh Burke 
papers, Command Files post 1 Jan 46, off box, Naval Historical Center, Washington 
D.C.; Arleigh Burke, “Address by Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN, Chief of Naval Op-
erations before the San Jose State College, California”, Department of Defense press 
release no. 237–60, 4 March 1960, Operational Archives, Arleigh Burke papers, Com-
mand Files post 1 Jan 46, off box, Naval Historical Center, Washington D.C.
169 SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 5.
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Chapter	4
Technology and path 
dependence
Sunk costs
When Polaris A-1 first became operational at the end of 1960, the FBM 
programme had reached the term of its initial mission. Originally, the 
SPO was only supposed to design a naval IRBM and its correspond-
ing launch platform, to test these elements and produce an original 
batch of 205 missiles. Once this mission was completed, the FBM 
programme would be disbanded and research and development ac-
tivities redistributed among other bureaus of the Navy.170 However, 
because of its early commissioning, Polaris A-1 was only an interim 
weapons system, far from the ultimate objective of a 2,500 mile range 
and one megaton yield set by the NAVWAG studies. Accordingly, 
work on possible improvements for the original missile began even 
before Polaris A-1 became operational, and the FBM programme was 
allowed to survive, at least until a missile with optimal performance 
was commissioned.
The decision to develop an improved version of the original Polaris 
missile was taken simultaneously with the decision to accelerate the 
FBM programme after the launch of an earth satellite by the Soviet 
Union.171 The rationale for this decision was simple. Polaris A-1 was a 
crash programme, an interim weapon, and therefore “performance was 
a manipulatable variable”.172 In contrast, for improved versions of the 
Polaris missile, schedule was not paramount and performance more 
170 Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 214–15.
171 SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 5.
172 Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 141.
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important. The objective was that by 1962, a range and destructive 
power closer to the original recommendations of the TCP would be 
on offer. Meeting the maximum performances recommended by the 
NAVWAG studies was not an immediate objective, but ear-marked 
for a third follow-on missile.
Polaris A-2: “a minimum change concept”
Despite a relatively relaxed time schedule, the SPO did not have com-
pletely free scope to develop a successor to the original Polaris A-1 mis-
sile. Eisenhower’s ambition to reduce the defence budget and achieve 
an arms control agreement with the USSR did not generate a strong 
interest for an immediate follow-on missile.173 Primarily concerned 
with limiting military spending, the administration called for a new 
missile with “minimum change concepts,” or best, for a missile that 
“didn’t require new concepts at all”.174 Developing a brand new missile 
and relying on innovative technical solutions was not an option.
The demand of policy makers to reutilise existing solutions for 
a new missile placed the SPO in a delicate situation. With limited 
funding to improve Polaris A-1, the organisation faced, for the first 
time, the issue of sunk costs. As significant sums had been invested in 
solutions such as solid propellant or missile warheads, developing new 
technologies was difficult. In this context, the SPO decided to base its 
new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on Polaris A-1 blue-
prints, and only improved discrete components of the missile.175 This 
improved weapons system, named Polaris A-2, therefore prolonged 
not only the solutions but also the technologies that characterised the 
organisational frame of the FBM programme.
Two types of technologies were particularly affected by the mecha-
nism of sunk costs. Firstly, to improve performances regarding anti-city 
retaliation, the SPO decided to improve nuclear yield. However, since 
the United States was observing a moratorium on nuclear tests, devel-
oping a new warhead appeared risky and costly.176 Instead, the SPO 
decided to conserve the same warhead as previously selected for Polaris 
173 See: Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap.
174 Buescher, interview.
175 Ibid.
176 On the 1958 moratorium and the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, see: Benjamin P. 
Greene, Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test-ban Debate, 1945–1963 (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2007), Robert A. Divine, “Early Record on Test Mora-
toriums”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 42, no. 5 (1986): 24–26.
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A-1. A minor improvement in the quality of the uranium tamper of 
the warhead made it possible to achieve a yield of 800 kilotons.177 
Secondly, the issue of sunk costs also determined which type of 
propulsion system was to be used for Polaris A-2. Concerning the 
problem of survivability, limited funds prevented the SPO from 
considering new basing modes or investigating technologies to sig-
nificantly increase the submarines’ stealth properties. However, mis-
sile range could be improved at relatively low cost by reducing inert 
weight and improving the propulsion of Polaris A-1.178 Therefore, the 
SPO was left with no other solution but to increase range to provide 
SSBNs greater patrol areas to increase the survivability of the SLBM 
force, a solution previously identified by the NAVWAG studies.179 
Shortly after the SPO began the development of the Polaris A-1 mis-
sile, safe and storable liquid fuels suitable for naval operations had 
become available.180 Known as hypergolic fuel, this new technology 
presented a higher specific impulse, – that is better performances – 
both at the theoretical and practical level.181 However, since 1956, sig-
nificant funds had been invested in developing solid propellants, and 
this field had become a recognised speciality of the SPO.182 As Polaris 
A-2 was a minimal change concept, switching back to liquid fuels did 
not figure as a solution for the SPO. 
Instead, the propulsion system adopted for Polaris A-2 entailed 
virtually no development costs. During the development of the A-1 
missile, an alternative type of solid propellant had been investigated 
by the SPO as a back-up solution, should the main propulsion project 
fail. But the backup propellant turned out to perform better, and while 
it could not be tested in time for Polaris A-1, it was decided for use in 
the second stage of Polaris A-2.183 As the organisation was reluctant 
to change too much of the Polaris missile at once, it was decided that 
177 [Jane’s], Weapon systems 1969–70, ed. R.T. Pretty and D.H.R. Archer (Jane’s year-
books, 1969), ref. 1130.411.
178 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 63–65.
179 NAVWAG, “Study 1”, 2–3.
180 By the time the SPO proceeded to the development of Polaris A-2, hypergolic fuels 
were tested for the Air Force’s Titan II ICBM, and were already successfully deployed 
on the Soviet Navy’s R-21 SLBM. See: Podvig and Bukharin, Russian Strategic Nuclear 
Forces, 315–19.
181 On liquid fuels and solid propellant performances, see: George P. Sutton, Rocket Pro-
pulsion Elements (New York: Wiley, 2001).
182 The reputation of the SPO in this field was such that he Air force attempted to get im-
plicated in the activities of the FBM programme when developing the solid propelled 
Minuteman ICBM. See: Hunley, “Minuteman and the development of Solid Rocket 
Launch Technology”, 229–300.
183 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 64.
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this more effective – but unproven – propellant was not to be used for 
the first stage of the new missile. Instead, an ordinary Polaris A-1 first 
stage was used, but stretched by three feet, just enough to achieve a 
range of 1,500 miles.184 This low-cost development policy proved suc-
cessful when Polaris A-2 was commissioned on June 26, 1962, with 
range and yield exactly matching the requested performances.185
Polaris A-3: getting deeper into sunk costs
The sunk costs of previous research and development activities were 
further reinforced by the development of a third generation of Polaris 
missile, known as Polaris A-3. In November 1960, one of the last deci-
sions of the Eisenhower administration regarding the FBM programme 
had been to order the development of a third version of the Polaris 
missile, meeting the highest performance objectives recommended by 
the NAVWAG studies (range 2,500 miles, yield one megaton).186 As 
its predecessor, Polaris A-3 was to be a minimal adaptation of exist-
ing technologies.187 To improve missile range and nuclear yield at low 
costs, a scaled-up version of Polaris A-2 represented the most straight-
forward approach. However, the Navy had already invested in a large 
fleet of SSBNs, so Polaris A-3 had to fit within the launch tubes of 
existing submarines. 
Achieving a range of 2,500 miles and a yield of one megaton with-
out increasing missile size proved to be a tough challenge for the SPO. 
The 1958 moratorium on nuclear tests and the 1963 Partial Test Ban 
Treaty prevented the development of new nuclear ordnance and the 
warhead design used for Polaris A-1 and Polaris A-2 had reached its 
theoretical limits.188 Furthermore, the SPO proved unable to develop 
a new solid propellant able to provide a range of 2,500 miles.189 In or-
der to meet requested performance objectives, it became obvious that 
184 “Missiles 1962”, Flight International, 8 November 1962, 748.
185 SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 12.
186 Ibid., 9. 
187 Buescher, interview.
188 On the 1958 moratorium and the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, see: Greene, Eisenho-
wer, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test-ban Debate, 1945–1963; Divine, “Early Record 
on Test Moratoriums”, 24–27.
189 Confident that the new propellant developed for Polaris A-2 had demonstrated suf-
ficient reliability during flight tests, the SPO decided to improve slightly its for-
mulation and used it for both stages of Polaris A-3. However, the larger volume of 
propellant led to an unacceptable increase of pressure and temperature in the engine 
of the first stage. After a nozzle broke down during a ground test of Polaris A-3, the 
formulation of the propellant had to be reduced. See: SPO, “Proceedings of the Special 
Project office. Task II – 29th Meeting, Monitor and sponsor the Fleet Ballistic Missile 
Development Program”, minutes STG task II-29, 29 January 1962, Nuclear History 
Collection, NH 00745, DNSA, Washington D.C., 27–29.
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the FBM programme would have to find a cheap way to develop new 
technologies for Polaris A-3. Because of the sunk costs of solid propel-
lant, the SPO refused to switch to liquid fuel. Instead, the organisation 
decided to distribute the payload of Polaris A-3 among three smaller 
warheads.190 This solution relied on a conceptual trick, but made it 
possible to improve range and yield while keeping other solutions 
developed for Polaris A-1 and A-2 intact, including the propulsion 
system. 
Regarding the objective of achieving a one megaton yield, the con-
cept of multiple warheads relied on an intriguing property of nuclear 
effects against non-hardened targets. As the yield of devices tested be-
fore the 1954 moratorium increased, the radius of blast damages did 
not follow on a one-to-one ratio, but was equal to only 2/3 of the yield 
progression.191 The reduction in blast damage efficiency was measured 
in terms of equivalent megatonnage (EMT). One of the important con-
ceptual implications of this phenomenon was that against soft targets 
– and soft targets only – several “small” nuclear warheads have a higher 
destructive power than a single large, high-yield weapon. For the SPO, 
the discovery of the equivalent megatonnage effect represented an ex-
cellent occasion to avoid the cost and technological risk of developing 
a new high-yield warhead. As a small backup warhead with a yield of 
200 kilotons had been tested before the moratorium, the SPO decided 
to use three multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV) based on this existing 
design for Polaris A-3.192 Providing a yield of 600 kilotons, this com-
bination made it possible to reach approximately the equivalent mega-
tonnage of a single one-megaton weapon (660 kilotons).193 
190 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 67.
191 Robert Erhlich, Waging Nuclear Peace: The Technology and Politics of Nuclear Weapons 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 73–79.
192 For a discussion of the MRV system developed for Polaris A-3, see: SPO, “Proceedings 
of the Special Project office. Task II – 37th Meeting, Monitor and sponsor the Fleet 
Ballistic Missile Development Program”, minutes STG task II-37, 24 May 1963, Nu-
clear History Collection, NH 00763, DNSA, Washington D.C., 117–142.
193 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 67. 
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Fig. 2: Thrust termination system
With regard to range objectives, multiple warheads contributed to-
wards reducing inert weight in three different ways. Firstly, because 
of the equivalent megatonnage effect, multiple warheads had a much 
better yield-to-weight ratio than a single nuclear weapon. Secondly, 
multiple warheads eliminated the need for a heavy thrust termination 
system. As solid propellant rockets could not be throttled back or shut 
down, the second stage of Polaris A-1 and A-2 was equipped with 
vents at its upper end. Blowing up the vents would briefly invert the 
thrust and produce a short backward momentum, allowing the war-
head to separate from its booster (see figure 2.1.3-1).194 On Polaris A-3 
however, small-size warheads could be ejected laterally, allowing the 
second stage to pursue its flight on a trajectory between the three war-
heads until burnout (see figure 5.1.3-2).195 The need for a heavy thrust 
termination system was eliminated. Thirdly, Multiple Warhead tech-
nology improved accuracy. As warheads were released at a more pre-
cise velocity and avoided interference with hot gas emissions from the 
thrust termination system, the circular error probable was reduced.196 
This effect was first unexpected, but it gave Polaris A-3 an excellent 
194 For a more precise description of thrust termination systems see: Sutton and Biblarz, 
Rocket Propulsion Elements, 9, 526–27.
195 SPO “Proceedings of the Special Project office, Task II – 37th Meeting”, 117–135. See 
also: Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York: Orion Books, 
1988), 205; Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 68; Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 259.
196 Avoiding interferences with hot gas emissions from the thrust-termination system 
essentially improved down-range accuracy, or in other words, reduced the chances 
that the warhead fell short or too wide of its intended target. Improving down-range 
accuracy was particularly welcome because this was the most important source of in-
accuracy for Polaris A-1 and A-2. Jack W. Dunlap, interview by John T. Mason, 2 
October 1972.
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accuracy of 0.5 miles which could be used to relax the size and weight 
of the inertial guidance system.197
Fig. 3: Multiple warhead system
As for Polaris A-2, the inexpensive development policy selected by the 
SPO for Polaris A-3 proved successful. On 28 September 1964, the 
missile became operational when the USS Daniel Webster left for patrol 
area with 16 missiles onboard.198 With an equivalent megatonnage 
roughly equal to a single megaton warhead and a range of 2,500 miles, 
Polaris A-3 met the highest objectives set by the NAVWAG studies 
and represented the ultimate version of the Polaris missile. 
To reflect this important range improvement, the expression “na-
val IRBM” disappeared in favour of “submarine-launched ballistic 
missile” (SLBM). However, this success came at a price for the FBM 
programme. The development of Polaris A-2 and A-3 had significant-
ly increased the sunk costs introduced during the initial development 
of the original Polaris A-1 missile. For the first time, the development 
of relevant technologies within the FBM was not only affected by the 
strategic or bureaucratic environment, but also by previous choices 
made by the SPO. Solutions that were initially considered as interim 
197 Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 429. Originally, Polaris A-3 had a CEP of 1.2 mile. 
However, during a set of flight tests, the SPO used a different – and more favourable 
– method of calibration for monitoring instruments. Consequently, it is difficult to as-
sess precisely the actual accuracy of the missile. See: SPO, “Proceedings of the Special 
Project office. Task II – 46th Meeting, Monitor and sponsor the Fleet Ballistic Missile 
Development Program”, minutes STG task II-46, 19 November 1964, Nuclear His-
tory Collection, NH 00796, DNSA, Washington D.C., 84–85.
198 SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 16.
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fixes were now included as basic features of SLBMs. Moreover, while 
the MRV technology utilised on Polaris A-3 incurred modest develop-
ment costs compared to a radical shift in missile design, it still intro-
duced new sunk costs, and increased the commitment to the general 
design of the original Polaris missile.
Organisational knowledge
During the development of Polaris A-2 and A-3, the evolution of 
US nuclear strategy contributed to reinforce the specialisation of the 
FBM programme on issues related to deterrence and anti-city retali-
ations. As policy makers proposed incentives encouraging the FBM 
programme to repeatedly address these issues, the strategic purpose of 
the programme began to be ritualised by members of the SPO. Once 
an important field of research, the issue of counterforce strikes was 
now on the point of being excluded from the competences of the FBM 
programme. 
The strategy of flexible response and the FBM programme
On 20 January 1961, John Fitzgerald Kennedy was inaugurated as 
President of the United States. In contrast to Eisenhower, who worked 
toward a reduction of military spending, Kennedy believed that a mas-
sive arms build-up was necessary to close the missile gap, and turned 
this idea into his main campaign argument.199 After only nine days in 
office, he ordered a dramatic acceleration of the FBM programme.200 
Indeed, Robert McNamara, the new Secretary of Defense, had both a 
new nuclear strategy for the United States as well as a precise idea of 
what the FBM programme should contribute.
McNamara’s central criticism of the strategy of massive retalia-
tion was that it was “too drastic for use except in extreme circum-
stances,” and therefore that “most communist challenges could not be 
resisted”.201 The retaliatory power conferred upon the Soviet Union by 
its new ICBM capability would deter the United States from using nu-
clear weapons. Therefore, Soviet leaders could slowly attack US inter-
ests by limited but repeated provocations – a strategy which Kennedy 
199 Preble, “Who Ever Believed in the Missile Gap? John F. Kennedy and the Politics of 
National Security”.
200 SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 10.
201 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1981), 218.
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himself called “Sputnik diplomacy”.202 Instead, McNamara proposed a 
strategy of flexible response which would make it possible to deter even 
limited Soviet attacks on US interests, by developing capabilities to 
respond to any provocation across the spectrum of conventional and 
nuclear warfare. The strategy of flexible response envisaged three lev-
els of reaction to the Soviet threat. Firstly, limited provocations and 
conventional attacks on allied countries would be deterred (or fought) 
by conventional forces.203 The second level of reaction implied the use 
of nuclear weapons, but in a rather limited and controlled way, rather 
than the all-out attack planned by Eisenhower and Dulles.204 The third 
level of reaction was supposed to deter the most critical threat to US in-
terests, a massive nuclear attack on American urban-industrial centres. 
In this scenario, the United States would use the full strength of its 
nuclear arsenal to perform retaliatory strikes over the Soviet Union.205
The doctrine implied by the strategy of flexible response relied 
on two opposed, but complementary concepts. Firstly, city-avoidance 
implied that in the first stages of a nuclear war, Soviet military forces 
and assets would be targeted, but not civilian areas. This point was 
made publicly in a speech given by McNamara on 16 June 1962 at 
the University of Michigan: “The principal military objectives, in the 
event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, 
should be the destruction of the enemy’s military forces, not of his 
civilian population.”206 The rationale behind this argument was not to 
win the war, but to maintain an element of deterrence even after the 
war was declared, by giving the Soviet Union “the strongest imagina-
ble incentive to refrain from striking our own [US] cities”.207 
The opposite, but complementary idea was that of mutual as-
sured destruction. If the Soviet Union did not spare American urban 
202 John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 37.
203 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, “Remarks of the Secretary of Defense At the 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan”, Department of Defense Press Release 
no. 980–62, 16 June 1962, Fred Kaplan Collection 80, box 2, The National Security 
Archive, Washington D.C., 8; Robert S. McNamara, “Statement of the Secretary of 
Defense before the Senate Subcommittee of Department of Defense Appropriations, 
the Fiscal Year 1936–67, Defense Program and 1963 Defense Budget”, statement, 14 
February 1962, Nuclear History Collection, NH00439, DNSA, Washington D.C., 
7–10, 41–87.
204 See: “Procedures for Nuclear Weapons Use”, National Security Action Memorandum 
NSAM-122, 16 January 1962, Presidential Directive Collection, PD00793, DNSA, 
Washington D.C.
205 “Proposed Policy Directive: Military Elements of National Security Policy”, memo-
randum, I-18802 (draft), 18 July 1961, Nuclear History Collection, 00151, DNSA, 
Washington D.C., 5.
206 McNamara, “Remarks of the Secretary of Defense at the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan”, 9.
207 Ibid., 10.
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centres, the United States would retaliate “from the grave” and eradi-
cate the demographic and economic substance of the communist bloc. 
Nevertheless, even in this ultimate scenario, the role of strategic nu-
clear weapons was slightly different to that on which the strategy of 
massive retaliation rested. Indeed, McNamara considered that even the 
most destructive nuclear exchanges would end up in a process of polit-
ical bargaining.208 Holding some of the enemy’s urban centres hostage 
was supposed to provide a better position for negotiations than a situ-
ation in which all Soviet cities and civilian assets had been previously 
destroyed.
Taken as such, the strategy of flexible response offered the FBM 
programme as many incentives to address problems attached to coun-
terforce strikes as to stay with the heritage of the NAVWAG studies. 
However, from McNamara’s perspective, the ultimate threat of mutual 
assured destruction was the keystone of the architecture of the strat-
egy of flexible response.209 As the strategic forces used for threatening 
Soviet cities would have to be available after a potentially prolonged 
conflict that had escalated across the spectrum of warfare – including 
extended nuclear exchanges – the need for more survivable retalia-
tory weapons systems was obvious. With its airfields and ICBM bases 
relatively vulnerable, the long-term survivability of the Air Force’s 
nuclear weapons was in doubt.210 In contrast, the FBM programme was 
considered to be the best solution available in a short-term perspec-
tive. This point of view was shared by McNamara who stressed that 
“Polaris […] because of its especially invulnerable nature is well suited 
to serve as strategic reserve force”.211 Therefore, the strategy of flexible 
response prolonged the original goal of the FBM which was already “to 
provide a deterrent capability”.212 
208 Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 10; William W. Kaufmann, The McNa-
mara Strategy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 75.
209 McNamara’s emphasis on mutual assured destruction is sometimes presented as the 
result of the hostility of the public opinion toward the concept of city-avoidance. In 
addition, alternative accounts of US nuclear strategy stress that despite the “no-city” 
concept introduced by Robert McNamara, the actual target of US nuclear forces was 
remarkably stable during this period. For more details, see: Freedman, The Evolution of 
Nuclear Strategy, 215–42; Scott D. Sagan. Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National 
Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
210 Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 254–55. About the lack of confidence of the Air 
Force in the survivability of its missile force see: General Thomas Power, “Letter to 
General Curtis E. LeMay, Chief of Staff”, letter, 1 May 1962, U.S. Nuclear History, 
NH00074, DNSA, Washington D.C. 
211 McNamara, “Remarks of the Secretary of Defense at the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan”, 11.
212 Quoted from: NAWVAG, “Study 1”, 1.
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The new strategy also confirmed and reinforced the main problems 
addressed by the FBM programme during the development of Polaris 
A-1. Indeed, implicit to the objective to develop deterrent reserve 
force was the problem of enabling SSBNs and their missile payload to 
survive extended nuclear exchanges or anti-submarine warfare opera-
tions conducted by the Soviet Navy. Moreover, the concept of mutual 
assured destruction implied that the problem of producing maximum 
destruction of urban-industrial areas of the communist bloc was more 
important than ever.
To ensure that the FBM programme would durably frame its ac-
tivities around the concept of mutual assured destruction and not 
city avoidance, McNamara added financial incentives. While denying 
the Air Force the necessary funds to develop the XB-70 counterforce 
bomber, the Department of Defense allowed seven different budget 
extensions to the FBM programme between 1960 and 1964, in order 
to commission new submarines and allow the SPO to complete the de-
velopment of Polaris A-2 and A-3.213 In consequence, retaining the or-
ganisational frame established during the development of Polaris A-1 
made sense for the FBM programme both with regard to the strategic 
environment and from the perspective of the budgetary competition 
between the Navy and the Air Force.
Losing track of counterforce
The financial incentives placed by Robert McNamara on the FBM 
programme to pursue the development of purely deterrent anti-city 
SLBMs, had a strong impact on the research agenda of the SPO. 
Officially, the organisation had abandoned all research on counterforce 
strikes in the beginning of 1957, when the recommendations of the 
first NAVWAG study were adopted as the basis for the development 
of Polaris A-1.214 However, until 1962, counterforce issues continued 
to be studied as a small backup project, should US nuclear strategy 
change and abandon the concept of anti-city retaliations. This decision 
was characteristic of the pragmatism of the SPO during the first years 
of its existence. Unable to foresee the result of the 1960 presidential 
election, and at a time when the strategy of flexible response was still 
a very abstract and poorly defined concept, the organisation probably 
considered it safer not to place all its eggs in one basket. 
213 SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 9–16. See also: Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 255.
214 See: Burke, “Extract from CNO Memorandum, subj: introduction of the Fleet Bal-
listic Missile into Service”.
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Based on the experience of the aborted Jupiter S missile, three low 
cost solutions were proposed to transform Polaris missiles into special-
ised counterforce weapons if required. Firstly, a very accurate guidance 
system could be developed by using a star-tracker.215 Secondly, a single 
large warhead could be developed to replace the original payload of 
Polaris A-3.216 Thirdly, in order to assess damages and coordinate fur-
ther attacks, a “tactical monitoring system” could be mounted in the 
nose cone of the missile.217 After burnout and warhead separation, it 
would send a five-second signal to the launching submarine indicat-
ing that missile flight was successful.218 However, after the strategy of 
flexible response was duly explained by policy makers and McNamara 
provided a financial incentive to focus on deterrent issues, these three 
technologies were progressively abandoned.219
Once excluded from the research agenda, counterforce issues dis-
appeared almost immediately from the organisational knowledge of 
the SPO. A possible reason for that might be the very high rotation 
rate of SPO personnel. By 1962, Burke and Raborn had already put a 
term to their involvement in the FBM programme.220 By 1964, virtu-
ally all key leaders who had participated in the initial development of 
the Jupiter S missile had left the organisation.221 Instead, a new gen-
eration of officers and engineers arrived, but as counterforce research 
215 For a technical account of this system, see: SPO, “Proceedings of the Special Project 
office. Task II – 33th Meeting, Monitor and Sponsor the Fleet Ballistic Missile De-
velopment Program”, minutes STG task II-33, 21 September 1962, Nuclear History 
Collection, NH 00752, DNSA, Washington D.C., 40–47.
216 Ibid., 44. During this meeting, the possibility to use the multiple warheads to per-
form simultaneous hard target strikes was also considered.
217 SPO, “Proceedings of the Special Project office. Task II – 29th Meeting”, 30–34.
218 Ibid., 30–34.
219 The development of a single, large yield warhead for Polaris A-3 was discussed for 
the last time on 22 March 1963. The development of a star-tracker was progressively 
abandoned during the following year. Finally, the tactical monitoring system was au-
thorised to survive because of its extremely light weight. But as it implied both two-
way communications and near-surface operations, submariners delayed its operational 
deployment until the system was finally abandoned in 1968. See: SPO, “Proceedings 
of the Special Project office. Task II – 36th Meeting, Monitor and sponsor the Fleet 
Ballistic Missile Development Program”, minutes STG task II-36, 22 March 1963, 
Nuclear History Collection, NH 00761, DNSA, Washington D.C.; “Proceedings of 
the Special Project office. Task II – 43th Meeting, Monitor and sponsor the Fleet Bal-
listic Missile Development Program”, minutes STG task II-43, 28 May 1964, Nuclear 
History Collection, NH 00785, DNSA, Washington D.C., 257.; Spinardi, From Pola-
ris to Trident, 221n.
220 Burke retired from the Navy on 21 August 1961 and Raborn left the SPO six month 
later.
221 See participant lists enclosed with the minutes of the 2nd (24–25 January, 1957) and 
46th (19 November 1964) meetings of Polaris Steering Task Group. None of the key 
speakers present in 1957 were part of the 1962 meeting. The only exceptions were 
Dr. Draper (an external consultant on gyroscope issues), and Admiral Levering Smith, 
the technical director of the SPO. However, Smith had a reputation of being a great 
adversary to counterforce ideas.
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was being abandoned, they were not well informed about this field of 
activity of the FBM programme. As a result, after 1964, there are no 
available publications or minutes of meetings of the SPO acknowl-
edging the fact that a counterforce research project had ever existed 
within the organisation. In contrast, when interviewed, most former 
SPO leaders evinced the belief that the FBM programme had always 
been addressing problems attached to survivability and anti-city re-
taliation.222 This evolution of organisational knowledge placed a new 
constraint on the development of SLBM technology, by totally exclud-
ing an important set of solutions that could be useful if the evolution 
of US nuclear strategy were to place emphasis on counterforce strikes.
As a side effect of the eviction of counterforce issues from the 
research agenda of the SPO, the deterrent purpose of the FBM pro-
gramme soon became ritualised by its members. Because the objec-
tives of the organisation had remained unchanged since 1957, the 
second generation of SPO leaders knew little about the rationale be-
hind the choice of the objectives of the FBM programme. From 1962 
onwards, the new leadership of the SPO found it difficult to recall 
why the purpose of the FBM programme was to provide a deterrent 
capability against urban-industrial targets. During key meetings of 
the organisation, newcomers occasionally expressed doubts about the 
strategic purpose of the FBM programme, and the rationale behind 
it.223 However, by then virtually no SPO leader had been a part of the 
initial decision to set the development of deterrent, anti-city weapons 
as the main purpose of the FBM programme, and the question was left 
unaddressed. Instead, it was decided to keep sending missile proposals 
until policy makers manifested their opposition.224 
While losing sight of the rationale behind the actual goals of the 
FBM programme represented a first step toward ritualising the or-
ganisational purpose of the SPO, this process was accelerated when 
policy makers and media presented deterrence as a particularly no-
ble mission. In November 1962, immediately after the Cuban Missile 
crisis, President Kennedy sent a letter to the SPO stressing the great 
contribution to national security made by the survivability of Polaris 
missiles.225 Later, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev was quoted in 
Time Magazine saying that “Polaris was one of the main considerations 
222 Gate, interview; Shugg, interview; Buescher, interview.
223 SPO, “Proceedings of the Special Project office. Task II – 33th Meeting”, 74–75.
224 Ibid., 219.
225 Wertheim, interview.
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in his pulling back in the Cuban crisis”.226 In the eyes of the organisa-
tion, this confirmed that the purpose of the FBM programme was to 
provide a survivable anti-city deterrent, an interpretation that gener-
ated great enthusiasm.227 Burke, Raborn and other pioneer figures of 
the FBM programme were idolised, and new infrastructures such as 
buildings and support centres were named after them.228 Established 
as a ritual, the contribution of SLBMs to nuclear deterrence made it 
difficult for the SPO to change its objectives, and hence the general 
frame of the FBM programme. Indeed, as Polaris A-3 was commis-
sioned on September 1964, the specialisation of the SPO in the issue 
of survivable, deterrent missiles became understood as the traditional 
role of the FBM programme, not only for members of the organisation, 
but also for external observers.229
Table 5: Basic organisational frame, Polaris A-2 and A-3
purpose/goal of the organisation providing a deterrent capability available 
even after a prolonged  nuclear exchange
problems addressed 1. vulnerability
2. destruction of urban-industrial areas
solutions proposed 1. SSBN basing, increased range for 
larger patrol areas thanks to low inert 
weight, provided by multiple warhead 
technology
2. high equivalent megatonnage for 
maximal effects against urban-industrial 
targets, provided by multiple warhead 
technology
constraints on possible solutions low-costs development
communication systems excluded from 
the research agenda
research on counterforce strikes excluded 
from the organisational knowledge of the 
SPO
226 Philip A. Beshany, interview by John T. Mason, 8 November 1977, printed transcript 
(extracts) consulted off box at the Operational Archives of the Naval Historical Center, 
Washington D.C.
227 Beshany, interview.
228 SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 16.
229 On the commissioning of Polaris A-3, see: SPO, “Polaris Chronology”, 17. 
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Increasing returns of technology
During the development of Polaris A-3, the key characteristics of the 
FBM programme had been remarkably stable. Neither the purpose, 
problem, solutions or constraints that defined the organisational frame 
of the SPO had experienced significant changes. Regarding SLBM 
technology, the mechanism of sunk costs had reinforced the techni-
cal solutions adopted previously by Polaris A-1. In this context, the 
SPO soon proposed to develop yet another missile as a direct evolution 
of existing technologies. The new project was known as Polaris B-3. 
Except for a 20-inch increase in missile diameter in order to accom-
modate more multiple warheads, no changes in missile technology was 
introduced compared to the Polaris A-3.230 However, as no grounds 
were found in the strategic environment to justify an improved version 
of the Polaris missile, the Department of Defense denied the SPO the 
authorisation to develop a new SLBM.231 
This refusal almost killed the FBM programme. By the spring of 
1963, the SPO began to transfer its research and development activities 
away from the field of ballistic missiles and toward deep s ubmerged res-
cue systems.232 Nevertheless, the emergence of operational anti -ballistic 
missile (ABM) defences in the Soviet Union saved the FBM programme 
just before all research on SLBM technology was abandoned. While the 
problem of ABM defences was relatively new to the FBM programme, 
the SPO did not only search for an efficient solution with regard to this 
evolution of the strategic environment, but also for the technology that 
would best use previous work on the rejected Polaris B-3 proposal.
The emergence of Anti-Ballistic Missile defences
During a military parade on 7 November 1964, Soviet air defences 
displayed an ABM defence system, known as Galosh.233 Included in the 
230 A missile with a greater diameter could be installed in former SSBNs because of a new, 
thinner missile casing developed for an aborted project to provide NATO allies with 
Polaris missiles mounted on truck and trailers. See Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 84.
231 Robert S. McNamara, “Recommended FY 1964 – FY 1968 Strategic Retaliatory Forc-
es”, memorandum, 21 November 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, CC02519, 
DNSA, Washington D.C., 22–23.
232 This decision was taken following the lost with all hands of the attack submarine USS 
Thresher, on 10 April 1963. See: Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 90.
233 [Jane’s], Weapons systems 1974–75, ed. R.T. Pretty and D.H.R. Archer (London: Jane’s 
yearbooks, 1974), ref. 2932.131. The concept of ABM defences was known since the 
first days of long-range rocketry. It consisted in destroying incoming warheads thanks 
to an interceptor missile, either by direct impact or by detonating a nuclear charge. 
For an overview of the concepts and technologies employed by ABM defences, see: 
Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, Ballistic Missile Defence (Washington D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1984).
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parade was a mysterious interceptor missile, the A-35. Nothing but 
the missile casing and the four nozzles of the first stage was revealed to 
western eyes, but it sufficed to trigger panic in the US strategic com-
munity.234 In contrast to intelligence estimates expecting Soviet ABM 
defences to be operational by the end of the decade, the A-35 proved 
that the Soviet Union already had an operational system providing at 
least a limited protection to Moscow. Moreover, there were indications 
that interceptor missiles would be equipped with a very large thermo-
nuclear warhead (2-3 megaton), implying that even a relatively im-
precise interception would destroy one or several incoming missiles.235
Arguably, the emergence of Soviet ABM defences offered the SPO a 
good opportunity to change its organisational frame and renew SLBM 
technology. As it appeared that the Soviet Union might have the capa-
bility to intercept incoming missiles, the problem of anti-city retalia-
tion was reopened. Based on the first intelligence reports anticipating 
the commissioning of ABM defences around Moscow and Leningrad, 
the Department of Defense proposed that the SPO reactivate research 
into SLBMs.236 The problem of anti-city retaliation was reformulated 
as the “penetration of defended urban-industrial targets”.237 
Probably influenced by the radical design of the A-35 intercep-
tor, and the criticism that the United States was failing to develop 
new weapons systems, President Johnson intervened personally to en-
courage the FBM programme to develop a brand new missile.238 On 
5 January 1965, only eight weeks after the first display of the Galosh 
system, the President ordered the SPO to initiate a concept study for a 
second generation SLBM, named Poseidon C-3.239 To favour the devel-
opment of a brand new missile, and not just an improved version of the 
Polaris system, budgetary limitations inherited from the Eisenhower 
era were lifted. Instead, 35 million dollars were allocated to the FBM 
programme for the preliminary design of an original SLBM, removing 
the barrier of sunk costs to the development of new technologies.240 
234 [Jane’s], Weapon systems 1969–70, ref. 2932.131.
235 For a complete description of the Galosh ABM system, see: Podvig, Russian Strategic 
Nuclear Forces, 413–18.
236 Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 220.
237 “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense”, National Security Action Memorandum 
254, 18 July 1963, Presidential Directive Collection, PD01004, DNSA, Washington 
D.C., 1; CIA, “Soviet Military Capabilities and Policies (1962–1967)”, National In-
telligence Estimate NIE 1-4-63, 22 March 1963, personal archive.
238 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 90.
239 Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making (Cambridge: 
Ballinger, 1975), 6.
240 Ibid., 6. 
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For the first time since 1957 and the development of Polaris A-1, the 
SPO had a strong incentive and the financial means to dramatically 
change its organisational frame by proposing totally new solutions.
The difficult development of penetration aids
By the time President Johnson launched Poseidon C-3, the most 
promising solution to defeat ABM defences was the concept of penetra-
tion aids. Explored since 1962 at the theoretical and experimental level 
in anticipation of future ABM systems, the concept had been tested 
with success against anti-missile radar prototypes developed by the 
US Army.241 The basic idea was to develop a package of countermeas-
ures that could be added to single warhead missiles or replace one of 
the three warheads of Polaris A-3.242 Penetration aids consisted of two 
chaff packs (to blind Soviet early warning radars), several decoys (to 
delay identification of the actual warhead) and an electronic jammer 
(to deny fire control radars range information).243 In addition, mis-
sile and warhead electronics would be “hardened” against electromag-
netic impulses released by the nuclear warheads of ABM interceptor 
missiles.
However, this solution was never adopted by the FBM programme. 
As was the case with most brand new technologies, penetration aids 
were initially very difficult to transform into an operational system. 
Firstly, flight tests conducted between 1962 and 1964 shed light on 
the difficulty of correctly ejecting chaffs and decoys from the rest of 
the payload.244 Secondly, radars utilised by the Galosh system were 
operating at relatively low frequencies (100 to 200 Mhz). Contrary to 
other wave lengths, this allowed operators to infer the size of the tar-
get, and therefore identify actual warheads among smaller decoys. This 
technical problem had been anticipated by the SPO since May 1964, 
and implied that “a successful decoy would have to be given the size 
and the substance of a real re-entry body”.245A major consequence was 
that in order to carry a single warhead and multiple decoys of the right 
size, Poseidon would have to carry a huge payload. Thirdly, as Galosh 
was a long range system, there was a risk that ABM defences could 
have time to discriminate the actual warhead from decoys by test-
241 For example, see: SPO, “Proceedings of the Special Project office. Task II – 29th Meet-
ing”, 64.
242 Ibid., 35–69.
243 Ibid., 35–79, especially pages 41, 42, 45, 48, 49 and 62.
244 Ibid., 35–69.
245 SPO, “Proceedings of the Special Project office. Task II – 43th Meeting”, 137.
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ing many parameters such as temperature, shape, weight, structure, or 
electromagnetic properties.246 To solve this issue, the Strategic Military 
Panel of the President Science Advisory Board (referred in this study 
as SMP) recommended complex solutions. Inflatable balloons would 
be used as very large decoys, and the actual warhead would be hidden 
in one of them. Other balloons would embark equipment necessary to 
simulate weight, temperature and other characteristics of the warhead. 
It was understood that the decoys would burn during atmospheric re-
entry, but at that time, there would be too little time left for efficient 
ABM defence.247 Therefore, penetration aids represented not only a 
difficult technology to develop, but also an inefficient solution to the 
problem of anti-city retaliations, as it implied delivering a very large 
payload over urban areas while using only a fraction of it to destroy 
the target.
In spite of these limitations, most ballistic missile operators de-
cided to develop and commission penetration aids. Between 1965 and 
1967, the Air Force commissioned the Minuteman II ICBM, equipped 
with a small penetration aids package providing a fair level of confi-
dence against the main urban-industrial targets of the Soviet Union.248 
Similarly, the British Royal Navy began the development of counter-
measures for its ballistic missile force purchased in the US, in order 
to assure that even a limited SLBM retaliatory attack could enable 
at least one warhead to reach Moscow.249 For these two organisations, 
penetration aids technology was not only possible, but also represented 
the best solution to the problem of ABM defence as it existed in the 
mid-1960s. 
Multiple warheads as a solution to ABM defences
The FBM programme never adopted penetration aids because a tech-
nology already developed by the SPO could also be used to defeat 
ABM systems. One of the interesting conclusions reached during re-
search on penetration aids was that decoys and actual warheads should 
ideally appear identical in size and weight.250 Provided that “the best 
246 Richard L. Garwin, interview by author, 22 September 2009.
247 Ibid.
248 [Jane’s], Jane’s Weapon System 1987–1988, ed. Bernard Blake (London: Jane’s Year-
books, 1987), ref. 2716.111.
249 The British SLBM force relied on Polaris A-3 missiles purchased in the United States. 
To retrofit the Chevaline penetration aids package developed by British engineers, the 
Royal Navy had to remove one of the three warheads of its Polaris missiles. Lawrence 
Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (London: MacMillan, 1980), 48.Carter and 
Schwartz, Ballistic Missile Defence, 262.
250 SPO, “Proceedings of the Special Project office. Task II – 43th Meeting”, 137.
DSS-2_2010.indd   66 09.08.2010   16:06:18
	 Nuclear	strategy	and	the	d	evelopment	of	military	technology	 67
decoy is one that weighs as much and looks just like, and therefore 
might be as well, a warhead,” the technology of multiple warheads 
featured by Polaris A-3 offered excellent prospects for the penetration 
of defended urban-industrial targets.251 The only development work 
left to the SPO was to increase the number of warheads deployed by a 
single missile against ABM defences, and design a system to disperse 
the payload so that a single A-35 interceptor would not destroy several 
re-entry vehicles.
In order to increase the number of warheads delivered by a single 
missile, the SPO resuscitated Polaris B-3, the preliminary design of 
which had been achieved during the summer of 1964.252 Based on 
previous studies, the organisation considered it possible to fit up to 
16 warheads of 100 kilotons in a single B-3 missile.253 The develop-
ment of Polaris B-3 also included a new warhead separation system, as 
the very large payload could not be properly ejected by the same meth-
od as used on Polaris A-3.254 This separation system was improved at 
low costs by relying on technologies previously developed for space 
exploration. In order to enable a single rocket to perform multiple 
satellite launches, the Air Force and NASA had developed a post-boost 
vehicle, or “bus”.255 The bus was placed at the top of the booster and 
supported the satellites. After the rocket had achieved earth orbit, the 
bus would separate and use small engines to place each satellite on its 
own specific orbit.256 With regard to ballistic missile technology, a 
single bus vehicle could vector several warheads at different speeds and 
in different directions, thus ensuring proper separation and allowing 
several distant targets to be reached with precision.257 
This evolution of multiple warhead technology was soon referred 
to as MIRV (or multiple independently re-targetable vehicles). While 
the engine of the bus had to be stopped and restarted during warhead 
release, the SPO categorically refused to employ liquid fuels because of 
its commitment to solid propellant technology. As a result, Poseidon’s 
bus had a relatively poor performance, and in order to maintain a range 
251 Robert Wertheim, quoted in Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 92.
252 Robert Lindsey, “B-3 Polaris Expected to be Operational in ‘70”, Missiles and Rockets, 
24 August 1964.
253 SPO, “Proceedings of the Special Project office. Task II – 43th Meeting”, 141.
254 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 88.
255 Garwin, interview.
256 Ibid.
257 SPO, “Proceedings of the Special Project office. Task II – 45th Meeting, Monitor and 
sponsor the Fleet Ballistic Missile Development Program”, minutes STG task II-45, 
30 September 1964, Nuclear History Collection, NH 00793, DNSA, Washington 
D.C., 152. 
DSS-2_2010.indd   67 09.08.2010   16:06:18
	 68	 Defence	and	Security	Studies	2-2010
of 2,500 miles, the number of warheads had to be reduced from 16 to 
14, and their yield from 100 to 40 kilotons.258 This configuration nev-
ertheless achieved an equivalent megatonnage of 560 kilotons, which 
was still above the 500 kilotons limit considered satisfactory by the 
SPO.
Fig. 4: Multiple independently re-targetable vehicles
Multiple warheads technology presented increasing returns because its 
benefits grew over time and offered better capabilities than other solu-
tions such as penetration aids. The mechanism by which MIRVed war-
heads were adopted was indeed fundamentally different from previous 
technological choices made the SPO. While the selection of solid pro-
pellant in 1957 was the pragmatic choice of an organisation looking 
for optimal solutions regarding bureaucratic and strategic problems, 
MIRVed warheads represented the best technology only in the specific 
context of the FBM programme. Indeed, for an organisation such as 
the Air Force with no previous experience in multiple warheads, the 
development of MIRV technologies was potentially as difficult as the 
implementation of penetration aids. Furthermore, as the equivalent 
megatonnage effect does not apply to hardened military targets, small 
MIRVed warheads would have been unsuitable for the counterforce 
missions planned by the Air Force. In contrast, multiple warheads 
technology was better suited to other problems addressed by the FBM 
programme. Indeed, by off-loading warheads from Poseidon’s bus, mis-
sile range could be significantly improved if a new threat to submarine 
258 [Jane’s], Weapons systems 1974–75, ref. 1133.411.
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survivability was to appear.259 Moreover, by allowing each re-entry ve-
hicle to be independently targeted, a single Poseidon missile could 
strike several cities, and adjust the number of warheads according to 
the size, geography and level of ABM defences of each urban centre.
Table 6: Basic organisational frame, Poseidon C-3
purpose/goal of the organisation providing a deterrent capability available 
even after a prolonged nuclear exchange
problems addressed 1. vulnerability
2. penetration of defended urban-
industrial targets
solutions proposed 1. SSBN basing, increased range for large 
patrol areas thanks to low inert weight, 
provided by multiple warhead system
2. high equivalent megatonnage for 
maximal effects against urban-industrial 
targets, multiple warhead system for 
increased ABM defences penetration
constraints on possible solutions communication systems excluded from 
the research agenda 
research on counterforce strikes excluded 
from the organisational knowledge of the 
SPO
The fact that multiple warhead technology was a good solution in 
the particular context of the FBM programme did not imply that the 
reaction of the SPO was irrational with regard to the strategic environ-
ment. Instead, the increasing returns of technology meant that mul-
tiple warheads were a sensible choice when taking into consideration 
the strategic problems, the mission, and the organisational capabili-
ties of the SPO. In this regard, policy makers considered the solution 
adopted by the FBM programme as optimal.260 In their opinion, when 
Poseidon C-3 became operational on 30 March 1971, the FBM pro-
gramme had become the specialist within a very particular and pre-
cise field: the development of a survivable deterrent against defended 
urban-industrial areas.261
259 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 107.
260 “Third Report of the Defense Science Board task Force on Penetration”, report, 15 
September 1967, Nuclear History Collection, NH 00534, DNSA, Washington D.C., 
7.
261 See: “Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces”, Memorandum, 9 January 1969, Nu-
clear History Collection, NH 00476, DNSA, Washington D.C.
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A self-sustaining weapons programme
While sunk costs, organisational knowledge and the increasing returns 
of technology played an important role in the development of the FBM 
programme after 1960, only discrete aspects of missile technology had 
been affected by these issues. So far, the evolution of nuclear strategy 
had always been at the origin of the development and commissioning 
of new missiles by the SPO. However, as the FBM programme was 
about to experience an important crisis shortly after the initial de-
velopment of the Poseidon missile, these three organisational features 
progressively became self-reinforcing. For the first time in the history 
of the FBM programme, a new SLBM would be developed, not as a re-
sult of the evolution of nuclear strategy, but as a consequence of previ-
ous activities of the SPO. While the new missile proposed by the FBM 
programme fitted well with previous and existing US nuclear policies, 
it presented the first sign of emancipation of the FBM programme 
from the strict control of US policy makers.
Bureaucratic politics and the Strat-X study
During the development of the Poseidon missile, the bureaucratic 
environment of the SPO presented a grave threat to the FBM pro-
gramme. The pertinence of survivability and anti-city retaliations, the 
two key problems that structured the activities of the programme, was 
contested by some bureaucrats from the Navy and the Department 
of Defense. Paradoxically, this crisis was triggered by the adoption 
of multiple warhead technology for land-based ballistic missiles. In 
1964, the Air Force launched an independent research project on mul-
tiple warhead and MIRV technologies, totally independent of the FBM 
programme.262 In contrast to the SPO, the Air Force was a strong sup-
porter of counterforce strikes. In order to persuade policy makers to 
fund its project, the Air Force argued that MIRVed ICBMs could pro-
vide “a war-fighting capability for precise surgical strikes against mili-
tary targets within or near urban areas, and for symbolic countervalue 
attacks against dams, nuclear facilities or other nonurban but impor-
tant targets”.263 This proposal led some key leaders of the Department 
of Defense to reconsider the purpose of MIRVed missiles and to at-
262 See: Daniel Ruchonnet, “MIRV: A Brief history of Minuteman and Multiple Reen-
try Vehicles”, report COVD-1571, February 1976, Nuclear History Collection, 
NH00840, DNSA, Washington D.C.
263 Greenwood, Making the MIRV, 50. In comparison, the SPO presented MIRVed war-
heads as “a solution to the technical problems involved in providing a high confidence 
and cost-effective means of penetrating ABM systems,” Ibid., 260. 
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tempt to redefine the problems addressed by the FBM programme. 
Influenced by his background in economics, McNamara considered 
MIRVed missiles as an opportunity to strike more military targets 
with a smaller missile force. As the Secretary of Defense, he proposed 
that new SLBMs should also address the issue of counterforce by solv-
ing the problem of destroying several hardened targets at a distance of 
75 miles.264 Moreover, bureaucratic pressures were also placed on the 
FBM programme by a group of naval officers, who named itself “the 
Great Circle Group”. From their perspective, the interest displayed by 
the Air Force and the Department of Defense in the problem of coun-
terforce implied that unless the FBM programme proposed a missile 
capable of destroying hard targets, the Navy would be progressively 
marginalised.265
However, adversaries of counterforce strikes were plentiful, es-
pecially within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Their 
primary objective was not to directly reinforce the deterrent role of 
the FBM programme, but rather to block the development of the WS-
120A, a large and revolutionary Air Force missile using MIRVed tech-
nology for counterforce strikes. In November 1966, members of the 
OSD successfully imposed that a comparative study of different types 
of ballistic missiles was to be carried out before the Air Force would 
be authorised to proceed with the development of the WS-120A.266 
According to Graham Spinardi, the main purpose of this study – 
named Strat-X – was probably to kill the Air Force’s missile and com-
mit policy-makers to the development of a purely deterrent system in 
the long-term.267 But in order to reach their objective, members of the 
OSD needed to be absolutely certain that a deterrent weapons system 
would win the competition, and not the WS-120A. 
In charge of defining the evaluation criteria of the Strat-X study 
was Lloyd Wilson, a former engineer who developed the original mul-
tiple warhead system of Polaris A-3.268 To ensure the defeat of the 
WS-120A, Wilson shaped the evaluation criteria according to solu-
tions already developed within the FBM programme, so that the SPO 
264 Robert S. McNamara, “Recommended FY-1966-1970 Programs for Strategic Offen-
sives Forces, Continental Air and Missiles Defense Forces, and Civil Defense”, draft 
Memorandum, 3 December 1964, Nuclear History Collection, NH00455, DNSA, 
Washington D.C., 30.
265 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 91.
266 See: “Task Order for Work to Be Performed by the Institute for Defense Analyses”, 
task Order T-56, 22 November 1966, personal archive.
267 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 113.
268 Unpublished Memoires of Art Lowell, 2001, personal archives.
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had the best chances of winning. Missiles in competition were “to 
provide economic surviving penetration payload for targeting against the 
urban/industrial base of the Soviet Union”.269 Counterforce capabili-
ties were relegated as a secondary, optional characteristic.270 In other 
words, missile proposals should address the problems of vulnerability 
and penetration of defended urban-industrial centres, and these two 
problems only.
For the SPO, the immediate consequence of the Strat-X study was 
to confirm the strategic problems that shaped the initial development 
of Poseidon C-3, and temporarily protect this project from bureau-
cratic attacks. Moreover, in 1968, the Undersea Long-range Missile 
System (ULMS) concept proposed by the FBM programme logically 
won the competition.271 As the WS-120A was cancelled, supporters 
of a counterforce posture were obliged to back off, at least temporari-
ly.272 Facing a public opinion hostile to counterforce ideas, President 
Nixon decided to end discussion in 1969, by declaring that “there is 
no current U.S. programme to develop a so called hard target MIRV 
capability”.273 While the SPO was renamed “Strategic Systems Project 
Office” (SSPO) after minor changes in the structure of the Navy, the 
organisation was de facto due to produce a new SLBM on the grounds of 
the problems of vulnerability and the destruction of defended urban-
industrial centres. While these two problems fitted well with the stra-
tegic objectives set by McNamara for the strategy of flexible response, 
the origins of ULMS proposal were not rooted in any evolution of US 
nuclear strategy. Instead the new proposal was the pure product of 
the interaction of bureaucratic politics and the experience previously 
gathered to the SPO. 
Increasing returns and sunk costs reloaded 
The Undersea Long-range Missile System was to be a paradigm design 
of the FBM programme. As its name explicitly indicated, the solution 
269 Lloyd H. Wilson, “Memorandum for the President, Institute for Defense Analyses, 
Director, Strat-X Study Group. Subject: Strat-X Steering Committee Guidance on 
Study Ground Rules”, memorandum, 16 January 1967, personal archive. Italics are 
from the original document.
270 Ibid.
271 D. Douglas Dalgleish and Larry Schweikart, Trident (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1984), 42.
272 Supporters of a counterforce posture would make a striking come back in the late 
1970s, and the WS-120A project would be resuscitated as the “MX” missile. In the 
meanwhile, the Air Force retrofitted MIRV technology on Minuteman missiles.
273 Alton Frye, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1975), 55.
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proposed by the SSPO to the problem of vulnerability was once again 
to place ballistic missiles in submarines and increase their range in 
order to allow wider patrol areas. Confident in the experience gath-
ered during the development of previous SLBMs, the SSPO proposed 
during the Strat-X study to develop a 6,000-miles missile. This was 
more than twice Poseidon’s range, but the challenge was considered 
worthwhile because it would multiply by 15 the sea-room available 
for submarine patrols.274 To achieve this range, the ULMS proposal 
planned to develop a new submarine, able to launch a much larger 
missile.275 The original constraints on size and weight set for early 
Polaris missiles had long been forgotten, but there was no one left in 
the Department of Defense or in the Navy to complain about it. In 
this context, the problems of survivability and penetration of defended 
urban-industrial targets contributed towards reinforcing solutions and 
technologies utilised on Poseidon in two different ways. 
Firstly, with regard to range objectives, multiple warhead and 
MIRV technology presented increasing returns. When the design of 
the new launch submarine began in 1970, it was immediately caught 
up in a bureaucratic fight of epic proportions. The object of the conflict 
was the propulsion system of the submarine. The SSPO and Admiral 
Rickover – the father of nuclear propelled submarines – disagreed fun-
damentally about which nuclear reactor was to be used.276 Concerned 
that this conflict could postpone the commissioning of the ULMS mis-
sile, the SSPO decided to go ahead with an interim missile able to fit 
Poseidon launch tubes.277 This turned the initial ULMS proposal into 
a minimum change concept and the missile was renamed EXPO, for 
extended range Poseidon.278 However, in May 1972, the missile was 
renamed Trident D-4, and then Trident I D-4 in March 1974, to stress 
that it was just a first step toward a larger weapons system meeting the 
standards set by the original ULMS proposal.279 As an interim weapons 
274 Dalgleish and Schweikart, Trident, 42.
275 Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Advances in U.S. Soviet Strategic Nu-
clear Forces During SALT”, in Year Book 1972. World Armaments and Disarmament 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1972): 8.
276 For an overview of the numerous controversies around the personality and action of 
Rickover, see: Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, Rickover: Controversy and Genius. 
A biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).
277 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 122–123. Spinardi gives a very detailed history of 
the ULMS submarine controversy pages 115–125. See also Dalgleish and Schweikart, 
Trident.
278 Robert C. Aldridge, First Strike: The Pentagon’s Strategy for Nulcear War (Boston: South 
End Press, 1983), 84–86; Norman Polmar, The Naval Institue Guide to the Ships and 
Aircrafts of the U.S. Fleet (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 2005), 531.
279 SSPO, “FBM Facts/Chronology. Polaris-Poseidon-Trident”, 42.
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system, Trident I had a range objective of 4,000 miles.280At first, the 
SSPO envisaged developing a new solid propellant with a higher spe-
cific impulse.281 However, in the face of unexplained engine failures, 
engineers had to limit the performance of the propulsion system, and 
it became necessary to reduce inert weight and find room inside the 
missile in order to store more propellant.282
The situation of the FBM was remarkably similar to that of the 
early 1960s when the SSPO faced the challenge of increasing the range 
Polaris A-3 without modifying missile dimensions. As multiple war-
heads had already been used to solve this situation, this technology 
was well known within the SSPO and enabled range to be increased 
relatively easily. To begin with, the bus vehicle and the payload could 
be made much lighter. As the USA and the Soviet Union were about 
to reach an agreement prohibiting ABM systems, the number of war-
heads could be reduced.283 Each side was authorised to retain one lim-
ited ABM system to protect its capital, but the problem of penetration 
was greatly relaxed. In these conditions, the SSPO came up with the 
number of eight warheads for optimal anti-city retaliations and pen-
etration of limited ABM systems. To conserve a satisfactory equivalent 
megatonnage, a new warhead of 100 kilotons was selected.284 As this 
new warhead was slightly lighter than those used on Poseidon, the 
weight reduction achieved was even greater, and the yield-to-weight 
ratio was dramatically improved. 
Additionally, the solution of multiple warheads also allowed more 
space for propellant. By placing the eight warheads at the periphery 
of the bus vehicle, a central pit could be opened in the payload sec-
tion. This allowed the SSPO to install a third stage in the Trident 
missile without increasing its length. Indeed, “instead of being below 
the post-boost [bus] vehicle containing the guidance systems and war-
heads, as was conventional, the third stage motor went effectively to 
the top of the missile with re-entry bodies, guidance system arranged 
280 Dalgleish and Schweikart, Trident, 31,; SIPRI, “SALT II: An analysis of the argu-
ments”, in Year Book 1980. World Armaments and Disarmaments (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980): 225.
281 “Updated Propulsion System Seen Extending Trident Range”, Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 1 September 1984.
282 United State’s Senate, “Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1977, Part 12, Re-
search and Development”, Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, 
6617; Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 130.
283 See: “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Limitation of anti-Ballistic Missile Systems”, Moscow, 6 May 1972 
<online>.
284 See: [Jane’s], Jane’s Weapon System 1987–1988, ref. 2840.411.
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round it”.285 The extra impulse provided by this original system was 
relatively modest, but it was sufficient to give Trident I a range of 
4,000 miles.
Fig. 5: Trident third stage and bus vehicle
The second mechanism by which the strategic problems identified by 
the Strat-X study reinforced technologies already used on Poseidon 
C-3 was the issue of sunk costs. As Trident I had to maintain a level of 
accuracy comparable to Poseidon despite increased range, an improved 
guidance system was needed. The difficulty did not lie in replicat-
ing previous levels of accuracy, but by doing so without a new, com-
plex and expensive technology. For this reason, the SSPO decided to 
re-utilise Poseidon’s guidance system for Trident I, with only minor 
improvements to reduce production costs.286 In order to maintain ac-
curacy over longer flight paths, a star-tracker was added to this basic 
system, a combination known as stellar-inertial guidance.287 Stellar-
inertial guidance represented a low-cost “fix” to previous guidance 
systems because the SSPO had already been developing this technol-
ogy when working on the backup counterforce version of Polaris A-3. 
Furthermore, after being abandoned by the SSPO, this technology had 
been further improved by private companies and had become mature 
285 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 126.
286 Ibid., 132.
287 Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 274–75. 
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enough to represent the safest and most competitive option for a cheap 
and accurate guidance system.288 
It must be noted that the SSPO did not consider using stellar-
inertial guidance for counterforce strikes. Instead, it was considered 
that this technology reinforced the deterrent capabilities of the SLBM 
forces by decreasing submarine vulnerability. Indeed, in stellar-inertial 
guidance, the role of the star-tracker was to reduce the loss of accu-
racy due to uncertainty about the position of the launching submarine. 
Therefore, the need for radio navigation fixes near the surface – where 
submarines were vulnerable – was reduced. The argument according 
to which stellar-inertial guidance was not utilised to develop coun-
terforce capabilities is confirmed by the fact that the SSPO did not 
search for maximal accuracy. With a CEP of 0.25 miles, Trident I ex-
actly matched the accuracy of the Poseidon missile and fell short of 
the accuracy level of some sophisticated and purely inertial guidance 
systems.289
When Trident I became operational on 20 October 1979, the 
organisational frame of the FBM programme had become self sus-
taining.290 Sunk costs, organisational knowledge and the increasing 
returns of technology had produced a strong rationale for the SSPO 
to continue addressing the problems represented by vulnerability and 
the penetration of defended urban-industrial targets, as demonstrat-
ed by the Strat-X study. As the SSPO repeatedly engaged with these 
strategic issues, sunk costs and the increasing returns of technology 
further increased the specialisation of the SPO, therefore placing new 
incentives to focus on problems related to anti-city strikes. Arguably, 
the organisational frame of the SSPO had become path dependent, in 
the sense that the development of new SLBM was mainly rooted in 
previous technologies developed within the FBM programme. In this 
context, the question as to whether or not the FBM programme could 
adapt to a major change in US policy was raised.
288 See: Ibid., 242–47.
289 Ibid., 429.
290 SSPO, “FBM Facts/Chronology. Polaris-Poseidon-Trident”, 53.
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Table 7: Basic organisational frame, Trident I C-4
purpose/goal of the organisation providing a deterrent capability, defined 
as “a surviving penetration payload for 
targeting against the urban/industrial 
base of the Soviet Union” (set by the 
Strat-X study)
problems addressed 1. vulnerability
2. penetration of defended urban-
industrial targets
solutions proposed 1. SSBN basing, increased range for larger 
patrol areas thanks to low inert weight, 
provided by multiple warhead system
2. High equivalent megatonnage for 
maximal effects against urban-industrial 
targets, multiple warhead system for 
increased ABM defences penetration
constraints on possible solutions communication systems excluded from 
the jurisdiction of the SSPO 
research on counterforce strikes excluded 
from the organisational knowledge of the 
SSPO
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Chapter	5
The limits of adaptation 
The Trident II missile
During the development of Trident I, the issues of sunk costs, organ-
isational knowledge and increasing returns of technology had little 
impact on the capability of the SSPO to propose relevant weapons 
systems to US nuclear strategy. While these three organisational fea-
tures progressively locked the evolution of the FBM programme into 
a narrow and path-dependent framework, US nuclear strategy had also 
remained remarkably stable. Although the ability of the FBM pro-
gramme to develop new technologies and propose new conceptual so-
lutions had been seriously weakened, the adaptability, flexibility and 
pragmatism of the SSPO had not been challenged since the initial 
design of Polaris A-1.
However, the development of a new SLBM during the two last 
decades of the Cold War would eventually shed light on the weak-
nesses of the FBM programme. Following its purely bureaucratic and 
internal logic, the SSPO proceeded to the development of an improved 
version of Trident I, matching the initial performance objectives set by 
the Strat-X study.291 This missile was to be commissioned by 1989 and 
would take full advantage of the larger launch tubes of forthcoming 
SSBNs.292 This relaxed development schedule and increase in missile 
size placed the SSPO in a relatively favourable position for developing 
new technologies, or improving existing ones to match changes in the 
strategic environment. However, as US nuclear strategy resumed its 
evolution during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ability of the 
291 See: Dalgleish and Schweikart, Trident, 42–43.
292 SSPO, “FBM Facts/Chronology. Polaris-Poseidon-Trident”, 57; Spinardi, From Polaris 
to Trident, 141.
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FBM programme to adapt its activities and propose relevant solutions 
was about to be put to the test. 
The Schlesinger doctrine
During the latter development years of the Trident I missile, US nu-
clear policy went through important changes. After Robert McNamara 
left the office of Secretary of Defense in February 1968, the doctrinal 
concepts of city avoidance and mutual assured destruction became in-
creasingly criticised within the Department of Defense and the execu-
tive branch.293 The main argument against McNamara’s heritage was 
that in spite of its name, the strategy of flexible response could lead 
to nothing other than a mutually assured destruction scenario. While 
the concept of city-avoidance had been implemented to encourage the 
Soviet Union to spare US cities, it did not include any options for a 
limited use of nuclear weapons. Instead the smallest counterforce strike 
proposed by the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) consisted 
of 2,500 nuclear bombs and warheads, used simultaneously against 
1,700 targets.294 Collateral damage and radioactive fallout would have 
caused an estimated 16 million fatalities, mainly in the Moscow ar-
ea.295 In this context, it was doubtful that the Soviet Union would 
recognise the so-called limited character of any US nuclear strike and 
would refrain from retaliating against cities.
While the need for a more flexible doctrine had been understood 
since the early years of Richard Nixon’s presidency, it was believed 
that technology was unable to provide decision makers with limited 
strike options.296 However, by early 1973, improvements in command, 
control and communications (C3) technologies as well as the retrofit of 
293 William Burr, “The Nixon Administration, the ‘Horror Strategy’, and the Search for 
Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972: Prelude to the Schlesinger Doctrine”, Jour-
nal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 3 (2005): 34–78; William Burr, “‘Is It the Best they 
Can Do?’: Henry Kissinger and and the U.S. Quest for Limited Nuclear Options”, in 
War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and the West, ed. 
Sven Holtsmark, Vojtech Mastny, and Andreas Wenger (London: Routledge, 2006), 
118–140; Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 366–69. 
294 “U.S. Strategic Objectives and Force Posture Executive Summary”, memorandum, 
7 January 1971, U.S. Nuclear History Collection, The National Security Archive, 
Washington D.C. 28–29. The SIOP is the nuclear war plan of the United States. It 
encloses several pre-established target lists to be submitted to the President in case of 
a nuclear conflict. 
295 Natural Resource Defense Council, “The U.S. Nuclear War Plan. A time for Change”, 
report, June 2001, Washington D.C., 45, fig. 4.4. See also: William Burr, “The Nixon 
Administration, the SIOP, and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1974”, 
www.gwu.edu, 23 November 2005, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing 
Book No. 173, 26 April 2010 <online>.
296 Terry Terriff, The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995); Olav Njølstad, In Search for Superiority. U.S. Nuclear 
Policy in the Cold War (Oslo: Norwegian Insitute for Defence Studies, 1994), 39. 
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MIRVed warheads on Air Force ICBMs opened new perspectives for 
more efficient and more discriminate counterforce strikes.297 During 
the summer and fall of 1973, James Schlesinger and Henry Kissinger 
were respectively appointed Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State. 
Despite personal rivalry and important disagreements over US policy 
toward the Soviet Union, both agreed on the need to design a new 
doctrine that would take full advantage of available technologies in 
order to better control and prevent the escalation of nuclear war. Their 
objective was to enable policy makers trapped in a nuclear conflict to 
avoid mutual assured destruction, a scenario considered by Kissinger 
as the “height of immorality”.298 
 Based on previous studies performed by James Schlesinger dur-
ing his work at the RAND Corporation, President Nixon proposed 
a new nuclear doctrine on 17 January 1974.299 The document, enti-
tled “Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons” explicitly stat-
ed that the new doctrine did “not constitute a major new departure 
in US nuclear strategy”, but was rather “an elaboration of existing 
policies”.300 Indeed, the main objectives of US nuclear strategy were 
still “(1) to deter nuclear attacks against the United States”, “(2) to 
deter attacks – conventional and nuclear – by nuclear powers against 
U.S. allies” and “(3) to inhibit coercion of the United States by nuclear 
powers.”301 Furthermore, the basic distinction between a nuclear ex-
change restricted to counterforce strikes and an all-out nuclear war was 
maintained. However, the new doctrine called for important changes 
in future US strategic weapons systems and their employment during 
a conflict against the Soviet Union. 
The main nuclear employment scenario considered by President 
Nixon was referred to as “escalation control” or “intra-war deterrence”.302 
The objective was to maintain deterrence even after the outbreak of a 
nuclear conflict and “to seek early war termination on terms acceptable to 
the United States and its allies, at the lowest level of conflict feasible”.303 
297 Lawrence D. Freedman, interview by author, 30 September 2009.
298 “Minutes of the Verification Panel Meeting held 9 August 1973. Subject: Nuclear 
Policy (NSSM-169)”, memorandum for Henry Kissinger, 15 August 1973, The Na-
tional Security Archive, Washington D.C. 
299 “Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons”, National Security Deci-
sion Memorandum (NSDM)-242, 17 January 1974, The National Security Archive, 
Washington D.C.
300 Ibid., 1.
301 Ibid., 2–3.
302 Ibid., 2. See also: Njølstad, In Search for Superiority, 38–47; Freedman, The Evolution of 
Nuclear Strategy, 360–365.
303 “Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons”, NSDM-242, 2.
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In contrast to a massive and instantaneous counterforce attack à la 
McNamara, the United States would perform pre-programmed “limited” 
nuclear strikes, against “selected” targets, “in conjunction with support-
ing political and military measures – including conventional forces”.304 
All counterforce strikes would not be executed simultaneously, but rather 
according to a precise time and pace carefully defined during peace time 
“in order to provide the enemy opportunities to reconsider its actions”. 
305 If, for whatever reasons, conflict escalation could not be controlled, 
a second employment scenario for a general nuclear war was considered. 
In this situation, the main priority would be the “maintenance of surviv-
able strategic forces in reserve for protection and coercion during and 
after major nuclear conflict”.306 While these survivable strategic forces 
– most probably SLBMs – would be used during a massive, instanta-
neous strike, the annihilation of Soviet population was not the primary 
objective. Instead, “systematic attacks on Soviet military, economic and 
political structures” would be performed in order to reduce “the enemy’s 
post-war power”, and therefore the risk of a new Cold War and nuclear 
conflict.307 The problem of pure anti-city retaliations, central to the 
organisational frame of the FBM programme, had virtually disappeared 
from US nuclear policy. 
The new doctrine was voluntarily leaked to the public and the 
Soviet Union by James Schlesinger on 4 March 1974, and immedi-
ately became attached to the name of the Secretary of Defense.308 For 
the first time in US nuclear history, counterforce strikes were clearly 
and officially defined as the main problem to be addressed by all stra-
tegic forces. The emphasis placed by the Schlesinger doctrine on the 
new role of ballistic missiles was so great that Henry Kissinger recom-
mended that President Nixon change NSDM-16 – the document con-
taining presidential directives for nuclear weapons acquisition – before 
endorsing the new doctrine.309 
With regard to the development of military technology, the main 
peculiarity of the Schlesinger doctrine was that not only doctrinal 
problems but also likely solutions were handed over to weapons sys-
304 Ibid., 2.
305 Ibid.
306 Ibid., 2–3.
307 Henry Kissinger, “Memorandum for the President. Subject: Nuclear Policy”, memo-
randum, 7 January 1974, the National Security Archive, Washington D.C., 2.
308 James Schlesinger, “Strategic Forces”, speech, Defense Department Annual Report, 4 
March 1974.
309 Kissinger, “Memorandum for the President. Subject: Nuclear Policy”, 2.
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tems designers. As the goal of the Schlesinger doctrine was to make 
limited strikes clearly distinguishable from an all-out attack, it was 
necessary to develop “a more efficient hard-target-kill capability” in 
order to reduce the number of missiles necessary for a counterforce 
attack.310 To this end, future weapons systems would have to enhance 
performance in terms of “accuracy, nuclear yield and the number of 
warheads applied to the target”.311 Finally, because the perspective of 
pure anti-city retaliations had vanished and because “a set of hard tar-
gets might be the most appropriate objective for our [U.S.] retalia-
tion”, the FBM programme was not exempted from addressing the 
problems and possible solutions identified by the new doctrine.312
Organisational knowledge and opposition to counterforce 
strikes
For the FBM programme, the technical requirements imposed by 
James Schlesinger on the development of new ballistic missiles was 
bad news. The SSPO had long excluded counterforce issues from its 
organisational knowledge. Instead, the organisation was committed to 
the development of a second version of the Trident missile, meeting 
the 6,000 miles objective of the initial ULMS concept.313 As no ini-
tiative to address the problems posed by the new doctrine was taken, 
the lack of reactivity and adaptability of the FBM programme became 
obvious.
The first indication that the FBM programme had difficulties 
adapting to the Schlesinger doctrine came in November 1974. In or-
der to reinforce the support of policy makers to the development of a 
second version of the Trident missile, the SSPO published a booklet 
explaining the contribution of the FBM programme to national secu-
rity. Based on the criteria of the Strat-X study, this short publication 
presented the purpose of the programme as providing a “survivable 
deterrent to nuclear war for the 1980’s and beyond”.314 The booklet 
also demonstrated that the problems and solutions attached to the 
Schlesinger doctrine had not been integrated into the organisational 
310 Schlesinger, “Strategic Forces”. It must be noted that Schlesinger also called for the 
parallel development of low yield weapons to limit collateral damages when striking 
targets located near or inside urban areas. However, low-yield nuclear weapons are not 
considered as strategic but as tactical weapons, and therefore lay outside the scope of 
this study.
311 James Schlesinger, “Strategic Forces”.
312 Ibid. 
313 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 141.
314 SSPO, “Trident System”, rapport, 1974, Operational Archives, Command File Post 1 
JAN 74, Naval Historical Center, Washington D.C., 3.
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frame of the FBM programme. Indeed, this publication did not con-
tain a single reference to characteristics such as missile accuracy or 
nuclear yield. Instead, missile range, increased patrol areas and sub-
marine survivability – three issues ignored by Schlesinger during his 
presentation of the new doctrine – were heavily emphasised.315 
The gap between the “old” conception of deterrence proposed by 
the FBM programme and the concepts of counterforce, limited strikes 
and intra-war deterrence was obvious, and would heavily penalise the 
SSPO. In the context of the economic downturn following the 1973 
oil crisis, the US Congress refused to fund the development of a second 
version of the Trident missile, but instead authorised the Air Force to 
resuscitate the WS-120A under a new name: the MX missile.316 
High accuracy imposed on the FBM programme
This first conflict between the FBM programme and US nuclear strat-
egy was overcome when the executive branch intervened directly to 
force the SSPO to develop a missile with the technical characteristics 
suggested by James Schlesinger. In 1975, the Department of Defense 
successfully persuaded the Congress to fund the “Improved Accuracy 
Program” (IAP) as a part of Trident I development activities.317 Work 
on a second version of the Trident missile was still denied, but the 
results of the IAP could be applied to existing weapons systems and 
the Congress was committed to the long-term support of the FBM 
programme. The SSPO remained unenthusiastic about developing 
missile guidance solely for the purpose of counterforce strikes. The 
possibility of improving SLBM accuracy beyond that of Trident I was 
disputed and the cost of the IAP was – probably deliberately – over -
estimated at 1.5 billion dollars.318 Schlesinger did not agree and decid-
ed to “push” the FBM programme once more for maximal accuracy by 
personally meeting with the director of the SSPO in order to explore 
315 Ibid., 10, 11, 16, 21.
316 Traditionally, the US Congress is relatively hostile to counterforce ideas. However, in 
1974, the Nixon administration successfully convinced the Armed Force Committee 
that better capabilities against hard targets were needed. See: Håkan Karlsson, Bure-
aucratic Politics and Weapons Acquisition: The Case of the MX ICBM Program (Stockholm 
University, Department of political science, 2002), 188–211.
317 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 143. For more details on the IAP and the decision to 
allow funds for improving SLBM accuracy, see also : United State’s Senate, “Commit-
tee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1975, Authorization for Military Procurment, Part 
6, Research and Development”, 3289.
318 United State’s Senate Armed Service Committee, “Committee on Armed Services, Fis-
cal Year 1975, part 6”, 3298; Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 142.
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possible improvements in missile guidance.319 Several technologies 
such as GPS guidance, better exploitation of previous flight-test data, 
and more precise submarine navigation assets were initially consid-
ered. Eventually, it appeared that the best possible increase in missile 
accuracy would be realised by improving the stellar-inertial guidance 
system of Trident I.320 
High accuracy was considered by Schlesinger as a solution to the 
problem of counterforce strikes. However, based on his recommenda-
tion to rely on technology previously developed for Trident, high ac-
curacy suddenly became compatible with the rest of the organisational 
frame of the FBM programme for two reasons. Firstly, as the SSPO had 
sunk costs in the guidance system of the Trident I missile, improv-
ing stellar-inertial technology represented the most sensible way to 
develop a new guidance system for future SLBMs. Secondly, as stellar-
inertial technology reduced the need for submarines to perform posi-
tion fixes near the surface, a more accurate star tracker might further 
reduce the need for position fixes and improve submarine survivabil-
ity. Therefore, in the particular perspective of the FBM programme, 
stellar-inertial technology also proposed increasing returns, because 
it could serve as a solution to the problem of vulnerability. For this 
reason, the SSPO began the development of a new star-tracker and 
broke new ground in this challenging technology.321 In contrast, the 
development of inertial components of guidance systems did not re-
ceive much attention during the Improved Accuracy Programme, as 
they could not improve survivability of the missile force.322 However, 
by 1977, the SSPO had made significant progress in the area of missile 
319 The choice of the expression “to push” is from James Schlesinger himself, during an 
interview with Donald Mackenzie. See: Inventing Accuracy, 287.
320 Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 284; Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 145–46.
321 The technology employed on Trident I relied on a Vidicon tube, a variation of con-
ventional cathode ray tubes used in regular televisions and low-end consumer cameras. 
However, Vidicon tubes were subject to various kinds of interferences and not least 
to “Vidicon microphony,” a phenomenon occurring when intense noises or vibrations 
bended the surface of the sensor and distorted the picture generated by the star-tracker. 
To overcome this problem, the SSPO decided to switch to solid-state electronics and 
developed the first operational Coupled-Charge Device (CDD). While CDD represent 
today a common feature for general public digital cameras, by the time this technol-
ogy was considered by many as beyond the state of the art. On 6 October 2009, George 
Elwood Smith and William Sterling Boyle were awarded Nobel Prize in Physics for 
the development of early CCD sensor technology. See: Ove Strindehag, Optimized per-
formance of the vidicon (Göteborg: Scandinavian Univeristy Books, 1963); Mackenzie, 
Inventing Accuracy,251–90; Julio Sanchez, Space Image Processing (Boca Raton: CRC 
Press, 1999), 90–91.
322 While gyroscopes used in Trident II guidance system represented direct adaptations of 
those used for Trident I, accelerometers were more complex and proved challenging to 
manufacture. However, their design was still inspired by the pendulous accelerometers 
used on Polaris missiles. See: Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 290. See also: Spinardi, 
From Polaris to Trident, 145–46.
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accuracy and the Congress allowed the development of a new missile, 
named Trident II D-5.323 
Improving nuclear yield from the perspective of anti-city 
strikes
The decision of the Congress to fund the development of Trident 
II D-5 was also motivated by a new presentation booklet explicitly 
stating that “Trident II would have a greater payload and improved 
accuracy”.324 The expression “greater payload” was an obvious allusion 
to Schlesinger’s requirement that the nuclear yield of new ballistic 
missiles be increased. In contrast to its initial resistance to develop a 
more accurate missile, the SSPO had no objections to increasing the 
military payload for Trident II. Indeed, as long as the new missile 
would be equipped with multiple warheads, any improvement in nu-
clear yield would increase the total equivalent megatonnage of the 
missile and therefore its ability to destroy soft targets such as urban 
centres. 
In order to increase nuclear yield of Trident, the FBM programme 
took full advantage of the increasing returns of multiple warhead tech-
nology. In 1979, the first large SSBN, initially intended for Trident 
missiles, was launched.325 While the submarine was not yet operation-
al, it was now certain that Trident II would be housed in larger launch 
tubes.326 The SSPO therefore began the preliminary design of the new 
missile as a scaled-up version of Trident I. By using an enlarged bus 
vehicle, the eight warheads carried by Trident I could be improved and 
eventually achieved an individual yield of 475 kilotons.327 This repre-
sented an impressive equivalent megatonnage of 3.8 megatons, more 
than any single warhead SLBM of comparable size could ever deliver. 
Therefore, in comparison with single warhead technology, the further 
development of the MIRV vehicle used on Trident I presented a better 
potential to improve destruction of defended urban-industrial targets. 
As a consequence, improving nuclear yield of the Trident II missile as 
323 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 146.
324 SSPO, “Trident System”, rapport, 1977, Operational Archives, Command File Post 1 
JAN 74, Naval Historical Center, Washington D.C., 2.
325 SSPO, “FBM Facts/Chronology. Polaris-Poseidon-Trident”, 52.
326 The first Trident II submarine was commissioned on 11 November, 1981 and was 
equipped as an interim measure with Trident I missiles. See: Mathew M. Wald, “First 
Trident Sub is Commissionned in Connecticut”, New York Times, 12 November 1981; 
“1st Trident Sub Is Commissioned”, Washington Post, 12November 1981. 
327 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 153.
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requested by James Schlesinger was not only technologically “sweet”, 
but represented an excellent occasion to improve anti-city capabilities.
Survivability versus counterforce
With a predicted accuracy of 0.06 miles (120 meters) and eight 
MIRVed warheads of 475 kilotons, the future Trident II was considered 
by some policy makers and the public opinion as a good hard -target 
killer.328 However, the SSPO never primarily considered Trident II as 
such. During the development years of Trident II, the organisation 
reaffirmed on several occasions that the supposed first strike and coun-
terforce capabilities of the missile were a “myth”, arguing instead that 
the problem of survivability was the key to the Trident programme.329 
Naturally, the communication agenda of the SSPO was shaped partly 
by the need to reduce public opposition and win the support of the 
Congress – an institution traditionally hostile to counterforce ideas. 
Nevertheless, this line of argument seems to have been genuine. In 
1990, several years after the counterforce controversy was over, a third 
booklet was published to present the result of the Trident II project. 
Expressions such as “hard-target,” “counterforce” or “intra-war deter-
rence” were still carefully avoided. Instead, the declared purpose of the 
FBM programme was still “to prevent nuclear war”, and the emphasis 
was put on more time on improving survivability provided by devel-
oping long range SLBMs.330
The technical characteristics of Trident II tend to confirm that the 
FBM programme did not attempt to optimise the missile for counter-
force strikes. Indeed, the SSPO refused to increase missile payload to 
a proportion that could have conflicted with submarine survivability. 
328 For example, see: United State’s Senate, “Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 
1982, Part 9”, hearing, Natural Resource Defense Council Research Collection, record 
431, box 30, The National Security Archive, Washington D.C., 291; United State’s 
Senate, “Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1985, Part 6”, hearing, Natural 
Resource Defense Council Research Collection, Record 431, box 30, The National 
Security Archive, Washington D.C., 110–111; Wayne Biddle, “New Trident Missile 
Bears a Payload of Apprehension”, New York Times, 9 September 1984; “Why Fly Tri-
dent II?”, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 5 December 1986; “Newest U.S. Submarine called 
nightmare for the Soviets”, Houston Chronicle, 18 December 1986. This debate also 
reached the academic community, through a set of articles published mainly in the 
Journal of Peace Research. For example, see: Desmond J. Ball, “The Counterforce Po-
tential of American SLBM Systems”, Journal of Peace Research 14, no. 1 (1977); Albert 
Langer, “Accurate Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Strategy”, Jour-
nal of Peace Research 14, no. 1 (1977); Robert D. Glasser, “Enduring Misconceptions of 
Strategic Stability: The Role of Nuclear Missile-Carrying Submarines”, Journal of Peace 
Research 29, no. 1 (1992).
329 For example, see: John M. Weinstein, “Trident II Remains Vital to Deterrence”, New 
York Times, 24 March 1986.
330 SSPO, “FBM Facts/Chronology. Polaris-Poseidon-Trident”, 3.
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Initially, several different adaptations of the Trident I missile were 
considered in order to take advantage of the extra room allowed by 
larger launch tubes.331 In terms of payload, the best performances for 
counterforce strikes were presented by a design known as “D-5 clear 
deck”, where the third stage was omitted to liberate space for two to 
four extra warheads.332 The “D-5 clear deck” would have had the same 
range as Trident I, and therefore failed to generate interest within the 
SSPO. Instead, by including a third stage at the expense of extra war-
heads, the SSPO augmented the range of Trident II to 6,000 miles.333 
The loss of counterforce power represented by this decision should not 
be underestimated. Considering that new SSBNs had 24 launch tubes, 
the installation of a third stage on Trident II implied a potential loss 
of 48 targets per submarine, and the reduction of 22,800 kilotons of 
the total megatonnage of the missile force – more than the total yield 
delivered by 24 Trident I missiles.
Table 8: Basic organisational frame, ULMS proposal, Trident II D-5
purpose/goal of the organisation “to prevent nuclear war” (SSPO 
presentation booklet, 1990)
problems addressed 1. vulnerability
2. penetration of defended urban-
industrial targets
solutions proposed 1. SSBN basing, increased range for larger 
patrol areas thanks to low inert weight, 
provided by multiple warheads system
2. high equivalent megatonnage for 
maximal effects against urban-industrial 
targets, multiple warhead system for 
increased ABM defences penetration
constraints on possible solutions communication systems excluded from 
the jurisdiction of the SSPO
research on counterforce strikes excluded 
from the organisational knowledge of the 
SSPO
331 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 146–47.
332 Dalgleish and Schweikart, Trident, 32–35. There is no official data about the exact 
number of extra warheads the “D-5 clear deck” would have carried. The numbers 
presented in this study represent the most conservative estimate.
333 Officially, the SSPO and the Navy have not released any information about Trident II 
range, except the statement “superior to 4,000 miles.” However, Trident II’s actual 
range of 6,000 miles range was leaked apparently for the first time in a 1997 publi-
cation of the U.S. Naval Institute. See: Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World 
Naval Systems 1997–1998, 189.
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War-fighting or fighting change?
The evolution of nuclear strategy toward counterforce strikes during 
the early development of Trident II sheds light on interesting fea-
tures of the FBM programme. The organisational knowledge of the 
SSPO prevented the organisation from recognising and addressing the 
Schlesinger doctrine in the first place. But under the constraints of 
policy makers, the FBM programme was able to adapt its activities and 
propose some changes in the design of the Trident II missile. However, 
political control over the activities of the FBM programme was only 
superficial. During the early development of the Trident II, the FBM 
programme did not seek to optimise missile technology for counter-
force strikes. Instead, characteristics suitable for counterforce strikes 
were developed only if they also improved survivability and anti-city 
strikes, and exploited the sunk costs and the increasing returns of pre-
vious SLBM technologies. As the FBM programme was pursuing the 
development of the Trident II missile, a new evolution of US nuclear 
strategy would call for missile characteristics opposed to the previous 
activity of the FBM programme. This would shed light on the inca-
pacity of policy makers to control the development of military tech-
nology outside the organisational framework of the FBM programme, 
and impose solutions that cannot be linked to previous sunk costs or 
increasing returns of previous technologies.
The countervailing strategy
From 1976 to 1983, the Schlesinger doctrine progressively evolved 
into a countervailing strategy. At the origin of this change was an 
important modification of the strategic balance between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. For several years, Soviet leaders had been 
trying to achieve nuclear parity with US strategic forces. Firstly, from 
1965 to 1972, the USSR sought to counteract the quantitative advan-
tage of the United States by commissioning two new types of ICBMs 
in large numbers.334 Secondly, from 1972 to 1980, Soviet ballistic mis-
siles were modernised to feature high accuracy, MIRVed payloads, and 
high-yield warheads.335 Because of these characteristics, new Soviet 
missiles were considered by the United States as counterforce weapons. 
In public opinion and among most policy makers, a feeling of vulner-
ability soon appeared. In 1976, the belief that the Soviet Union could 
334 Podvig Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 6–8. 
335 Ibid., 16–19.
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eliminate as much as 90 per cent of US land-based missiles during a 
pre-emptive attack began to emerge.336 Thanks to SLBMs and manned 
bombers, the ability of the United States to perform some kind of nu-
clear retaliation was not in doubt. However the capability to perform 
one of the limited scenarios proposed by the Schlesinger doctrine after 
enduring a Soviet first strike was uncertain. A “window of vulnerabil-
ity” was opened.337
The new strategic situation became an important political issue 
following the publication of two controversial articles by Paul Nitze 
in 1976.338 Nitze was a former member of the TCP panel that recom-
mended that Eisenhower develop IRBMs in 1955, and was extremely 
influential among defence intellectuals and the executive branch.339 
His two articles presented a nightmare scenario in which the Soviet 
Union could destroy virtually all US ICBMs while retaining a large 
reserve force.340 As of 1976, land-based ICBMs were the only counter-
force weapons systems in the US strategic arsenal, Nitze argued that 
the United States would have lost the capability to perform limited 
nuclear strikes and control conflict escalation. Within the department 
of Defense and the strategic community, many were uncertain about 
whether escalation, once begun, could be controlled, even under the 
most favourable conditions. But if American cities were to be left in-
tact by the first attack, the United States would certainly be deterred 
from striking back against Soviet urban, industrial and economic cen-
tres in fear of a retaliation in kind.341 Under these circumstances, US 
decision-makers would be left with only two alternatives: to surrender 
or to commit suicide by performing a major retaliation on Soviet cit-
ies. Therefore, for the communist bloc, a nuclear war was not only 
possible, but winnable.342 
336 Warner R. Schilling, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s: The Search for 
Sufficiently Countervailing Parity”, International Security 6, no. 2 (1981): 69. The be-
lief that a pre-emptive attack could destroy 90 per cent of U.S. ICBMS was also widely 
spread within the general public see: Strobe Talbott, “The Vulnerability Factor”, Time 
Magazine, 31 August 1981.
337 Pavel Povdig, “The Window of Vulnerabilit that Wasn’t: Soviet military Buildup in 
the 1970’s”, International Security 33, no. 1 (2008): 118–138.
338 Paul Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente”, Foreign Affairs 54, no. 
2 (1976): 207–232; Paul Nitze, “Deterring our Deterrent”, Foreign Policy 25 (1976): 
195–210.
339 On Paul Nitze’s influence on the emergence of the countervailing strategy, see: Kap-
lan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 377–84; Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul 
Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Vintage books, 1988).
340 Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente”.
341 Nitze, “Deterring our Deterrent”.
342 Ibid.; Colin S. Gray, The MX ICBM and National Security (New York: Praeger, 1981), 
17.
DSS-2_2010.indd   90 09.08.2010   16:06:19
	 Nuclear	strategy	and	the	d	evelopment	of	military	technology	 91
Initially, the scenario presented by Paul Nitze was understood as 
“paper and pencil strategy”.343 His argument was valid from a concep-
tual point of view, but it was the height of abstraction and relied on 
too many doubtful assumptions.344 However, during the late 1970s, 
US policy makers became progressively convinced that Soviet doctrine 
was oriented toward nuclear war-fighting and considered victory pos-
sible.345 Still, a successful Soviet pre-emptive strike was considered 
unlikely. But in order to prevent the Soviets “from doing something 
stupid”, President Carter progressively came to the conclusion that 
“the most potent deterrent America could possess was a capacity to 
engage, and win a war”.346 
Between 1977 and 1980, the Carter administration published sev-
eral directives to transform this conclusion into an actual strategy.347 
For the first time the concept of countervailing was applied in nuclear 
strategy, implying that the United States now envisaged assuring its 
national security by being ready to fight a nuclear war. The doctrinal 
background of the new strategy was rooted in the heritage of James 
Schlesinger. Indeed, in order to conduct war-fighting operations, the 
concept of limited counterforce strikes was essential because of the 
need to precisely discriminate targets from their environment and em-
ploy forces effectively – that is to use the right number of warheads per 
objective, without overkill. 
The new doctrine attached to the countervailing strategy had nev-
ertheless two noteworthy differences with what Schlesinger had pre-
viously proposed. Firstly, the infrastructure of the communist party, 
centres of political decisions, military command posts and Soviet com-
munications assets were introduced as a new category of targets, and 
343 Freedman, interview.
344 Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 379. Lacking intelligence data on Soviet missiles, 
Nitze had to assume values such as silo hardiness, missile accuracy and number of 
MIRVed warheads. His assessment of Soviet forces turned to be proved wrong after the 
Cold War.
345 Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente”, 215–17; Njølstad, In Search 
for Superiority, 49.
346 Freedman, interview; Njølstad, In Search for Superiority, 122.
347 “U.S. Nuclear strategy”, Presidential directive PD/NSC-18, 24 August 1977, Presi-
dential Directives, part II, PR 01359, DNSA, Washington D.C.; “National Security 
Telecommunications Policy”, PD/NSC-53, 15 November 1979, Presidential Direc-
tives, PD 01526, DNSA, Washington D.C.; “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy”, 
Presidential Directive PD/NSC-59, 25 July 1980, Presidential Directives, PD 01530, 
DNSA, Washington D.C. It must be noted that the copy of PD/NSC-59 available at 
the National Security Archive is very highly excised. More detailed data can be found 
in Njølstad, In Search for Superiority, 48.
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given the highest priority.348 The objective was to reduce the abil-
ity of the Soviet leadership and the communist party to control the 
USSR and coordinate nuclear war-fighting operations. Secondly, while 
Schlesinger called for pre-planned limited strikes, the countervailing 
strategy asked for increased flexibility and the ability to make tailor-
made attacks, according to the evolution of war.349 Indeed as the combat 
progressed, the Soviet leadership might change location and some US 
silos would be destroyed, being unable to cover their initially intended 
targets. Additionally, enemy silos that had already fired their missile 
would not present any military value. Therefore, survivable C3 assets 
became as important as the survivability of the missile force itself.350
While the Carter administration stopped short of publicly calling 
the countervailing strategy a “winning strategy”, the Reagan admin-
istration did not display the same restraint.351 With victory set as a 
clear objective for nuclear strategy, the early 1980s were characterised 
by a re-activated arms race between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The appearance of mobile ICBMs in the USSR led American 
policy-makers to devise a new Single Integrated Operational Plan, in-
cluding 4,000 re-locatable targets.352 In order to perform disarming 
strikes against mobile ICBMs, the Congress allocated funds for devel-
oping communications networks able to survive up to 180 days during 
a nuclear conflict.353 However, finding a survivable basing mode for 
land-based ICBMs such as the MX missile proved to be more difficult 
than first expected.354 After many proposals were rejected, a presiden-
348 Desmond J. Ball, Targeting for Strategic deterrence, Adelphi Papers, no. 185 (London: In-
ternational Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983): 23; Njølstad, In Search for Superiority, 
50.
349 “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy”, PD/NSC-59; Njølstad, In Search for Superio-
rity. U.S. Nuclear Policy in the Cold War.
350 “National Security Telecommunications Policy”, PD/NSC-53, 1–2.
351 Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War (New York: Random 
House, 1982); Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 387–88.
352 Desmond J. Ball and Robert C. Toth, “Revising the SIOP: Taking War-fighting to 
Dangerous Extremes”, International Security 14, no. 4 (1990): 72–77; Njølstad, In Se-
arch for Superiority, 51. See also: William M. Arkin, “Why SIOP-6?”, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 39, no. 4 (1983): 9–10.
353 Ball and Toth, “Revising the SIOP: Taking War-fighting to Dangerous Extremes”, 
68; Loren B. Thompson, The emergence of American Central Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1984 
(Washington D.C: Geortown Univeristy, 1986), 530–531.
354 See: Jeffrey G. Barlow, “Insuring Survivability: Basing the MX missile”, report, 27 
May 1980, personal archive; Jeffrey R. Smith, “A Last Go-Around for the MX Mis-
sile”, Science 218 (1982): 865–866; J. Raloff, “Regan’s MX ‘Peceakeeper’ Draws Fire”. 
Science News 122 (1982): 536; Colin S. Gray, The Future of Land Based Missile Forces, 
Adelphi Papers, no. 140 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977); 
Gray, The MX ICBM and National Security ; Barry R. Schneider, Colin S. Gray, and 
Keith B. Payne, Missiles For the Nineties: ICBMs and Strategic Policy (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1984); Hebert Scoville, MX: Prescription for Disaster (Cambridge: MIT press, 
1982); For an analysis of the MX programme from the bureaucratic politics perspec-
tive, see: Karlsson, Bureaucratic Politics and Weapons Acquisition.
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tial commission on strategic forces finally concluded in 1983 that a 
survivable basing mode for ICBMs was impossible and called instead 
for increased reliance on SLBMs.355 For the FBM programme the chal-
lenge was now to design a missile with an actual war-fighting capabil-
ity, flexible enough to adapt promptly to the evolution of the conflict 
and not just to perform pre-planned options.
Submarine communications
As early as 1979, the problem of communications between the 
National Command Authority and submarines on patrol was identi-
fied as the main obstacle to using SLBMs for war-fighting missions.356 
Peace-time systems were able to “provide reliable communications to 
the strategic submarine forces”, but war-time command and control 
capabilities were considered insufficient.357 At the time, communi-
cations with submerged submarines relied on two different systems. 
Firstly, during normal operations, command and control of SSBNs was 
supported by land-based Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio stations. 
However, VLF transmissions are characterised by a very limited band-
width. In optimal conditions the maximum transfer data rate was only 
about 67 words per minute.358 Secondly, during war-time, or if land-
based radio stations were destroyed, surveillance aircrafts trailing a 
long aerial would be used to deliver emergency action messages with a 
comparable data-rate.359 
War-time communications with submarines were inadequate for 
three reasons. Firstly, the airborne system had been allowed to decay 
and its operational capabilities were doubtful.360 Secondly, in the con-
355 Known as the “Report of the President’s Commission On Strategic Forces”, or the 
“Scowcroft Commission Report”, this document is partly reproduced in Philip Bob-
bitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, U.S. Nuclear Strategy: A Reader 
(London: McMillan, 1989), 477–510. The Congress also considered replacing the MX 
missile by Trident II. See: House Appropriation Committee (HAC), “Department of 
Defense Appropriation, Fiscal Year 1984”, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, part 1, 475.
356 The expression National Command Authority refers to the lawful source of orders dur-
ing a nuclear war, that is the President and the Secretary of Defense.
357 Government Accountability Office (GAO), “An Unclassified Version of a Classified 
Report Entitled ‘The Navy’s Strategic Communications Systems – Need for Manage-
ment Attention and Decision Making”, report PSAD-79-48A, 2 May 1979, Natural 
Resource Defense Council Research Collection, record 431, box 30, The National Se-
curity Archive, Washington D.C., I.
358 Ibid., 33.
359 Ibid., I-II, 8.
360 Ibid., 9, Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 83–84. Supposed to provide a permanent air-
borne alert in order to defeat a potential surprise attack on land based communication 
stations, the system was operational only 25 per cent of the time by 1980. See: House 
Appropriation Committee (HAC), “Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 1982”, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, hearing, part 7, 
4048.
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text of a nuclear war in which mobile missiles and Soviet leadership 
might constantly change their location, slow communications were 
irrelevant. As communications were ciphered and each submarine 
would have a missile force totalling up to 192 warheads, re-targeting 
would take hours.361 When striking fixed missile bases, there was a 
risk that enemy missiles would have left their silos before retarget-
ing was completed. This problem was reinforced by the low rate of 
fire of submarines, taking several minutes to launch an entire force of 
24 Trident II.362 Thirdly, as submarines could not communicate back 
to the National Command Authority, there was no way to be certain 
that SSBNs had received proper re-targeting information.363 While the 
objective was to control conflict escalation or to perform efficient war-
fighting operations, a significant risk existed of striking unintended 
targets such as the Kremlin or a random dam in Siberia.
The inability of SLBMs to conduct proper war-fighting operations 
due to the lack of efficient C3 assets was widely recognised during the 
1980s.364 However, there is no declassified document or available ma-
terial indicating that the SSPO ever directly addressed this problem 
during the development of Trident II or before the end of the Cold 
War. The reason for this is simple. Since Polaris A-1, the organisation-
al frame of the FBM programme limited the development of advanced 
communications systems for SSBNs. As research into command, con-
trol and communications was eventually transferred to another branch 
of the Navy in 1967, developing a coherent C3 system for Trident II 
was no longer the responsibility of the SSPO.365 The path dependent 
evolution of the FBM programme had materially locked the organisa-
tion into a very specific and restricted field of activities. 
361 192 warheads represent the payload carried by a force of 24 trident II missiles, each 
equipped with eight warheads. Beside the coordinates of the target allocated to each 
warhead, messages sent to submarine had to enclose an authentication key, fusing 
parameters for proper explosion, and the timing of the attack. 
362 “Congressional Record – House of representative”, minutes, 18 June 1985, Natural 
Resource Defense Council Research Collection, record 431, box 30, The National Se-
curity Archive, Washington D.C., 4471.
363 This problem was noticed by Henry Kissinger as early as 1969. See: Laurence E. Lynn, 
“Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, Subject: the SIOP”, minutes of telephonic conversa-
tion, 8 November 1969, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC files, box 384, folder SIOP, 
National Archives, College Park, 7. 
364 Michael F. Altfeld and Stephen J. Cimbala, “Trident II for Prompt Counterforce? A 
critical Assessment”, Defence Analysis 3, no. 4 (1987): 349–359; Schneider, Gray, and 
Payne, Missiles For the Nineties; Gray, The Future of Land Based Missile Forces, 9; Gray, 
The MX ICBM and National Security, 85. 
365 Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Wash-
ington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), 169; Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 83; 
Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 240.
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The Navy organisation in charge of the development of C3 tech-
nologies for SSBN operations was the Special Communications Project 
Office (SCPO). Established in the immediate aftermath of the Strat-X 
study, the objective of this organisation was to design the means to 
receive “communications at all time from the National Command 
Authorities and Commander in Chief to the deployed FBM forces […] 
during and after heavy nuclear and electronic attack”.366 The solutions 
proposed by the SCPO relied on a network of extremely low frequency 
(ELF) radio stations named “Austere ELF”.367 The advantages of this 
system were its virtual immunity to jamming and interferences gener-
ated by nuclear explosions, coupled with a better penetration of sea 
water allowing SSBNs to remain at greater depths. However, with re-
gard to the countervailing strategy, Austere ELF had highly undesir-
able characteristics. Given that the original purpose of the SCPO was 
to exclusively develop a means to receive radio signals, two-way com-
munications were left unaddressed. Moreover, extremely low frequen-
cies are characterised by their very poor bandwidth, and it would have 
taken more than 15 minutes to communicate a group of three letters 
to a submarine.368 Instead of increasing SSBNs’ responsiveness to the 
National Command Authority, the “Austere ELF” proposal presented 
the risk of further reducing the flexibility of the SLBM force.369 
In light of these conditions, why did policy makers refrain from 
imposing on the SCPO the development of efficient C3 assets? A pos-
sible answer lies in the organisational knowledge attached of the FBM 
programme. Excluded from the research agenda of the SSPO during 
the development of Polaris A-1, two-way communications were soon 
regarded as an “impossible technology”.370 As all research on SSBN 
communications were excluded from the FBM programme in 1967, 
the SSPO was unable to pursue and endorse evolutions in radio-com-
munications technologies. As late as October 1988, representatives 
366 United State’s Senate Armed Service Committee, “Fiscal Year 1973 Authorization for 
Military Procurement, Research and Development, hearings, part 5”, Washington 
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 2844. Quoted in Blair, Strategic Command and 
Control, 169.
367 Walter Sullivan, “How Huge Antenna Can Broadcast Into the Silence of the Sea”, New 
Yorks Times, 13 October 1981.
368 Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Command and Control of the Sea Based 
Nuclear Deterrent: The Possibility of a counterforce role”, in Year Book 1979. World 
Armament and Disarmaments (New York: Oxford University press, 1979), 402.
369 Eventually, the Austere ELF proposal was abandoned on the ground of environmental 
and public health concerns. See: Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 82.
370 Polaris Command Communications Committee, “Where did the $100 millions go? 
Polaris Command Communications Yield Summary”, Washington D.C.: Special 
Project Office, 11 May1964. Quoted in Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 239. 
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of the Navy and the SSPO presented two-way communications and 
submarine responsiveness to the National Command Authority as im-
possible to achieve in the “foreseeable future”.371 Whether this was a 
genuine belief within the FBM programme, or an argument developed 
by the SSPO to avoid developing a technology perceived as undesir-
able, is an open question. However, policy makers seem to have been 
persuaded that an efficient command, control and communications 
chain could not be established with submarines on patrol. Despite 
the absence of improvement in flexibility and responsiveness to the 
National Command Authority, neither the Department of Defense nor 
the Congress opposed the commissioning of the Trident II missile in 
1990. 372 
The failure of the FBM programme to develop relevant C3 tech-
nologies, illustrates the limits of political control over military tech-
nology. As the SSPO could not rely on any technology previously 
developed within the FBM programme, two-way communications 
were simply declared beyond the state of the art. In addition, as the or-
ganisational knowledge of the SSPO contaminated political elites, all 
impartial and independent control of the technological development 
of the FBM programme was lost. While Trident II had acceptable ca-
pabilities against hardened targets, the failure to swiftly retarget the 
SLBM force at sea implied that this weapons system was ineffective 
for the flexible and tailor-made counterforce strikes envisaged by the 
countervailing strategy.
The SUM proposal
Contrary to the belief held by the SSPO, the Navy, the Congress and 
the Department of Defense, efficient C3 assets adapted to SLBM op-
erations were probably well within the state of the art by the ear-
ly 1980s. However, in order to develop two-way communications 
without decreasing submarine survivability, an important departure 
from the organisational frame of the FBM programme was necessary. 
Such a departure was proposed in 1981 by two noted defence scien-
371 James R. Woosley, “Remarks at the conference ‘The Future of Land-based deterrent’”, 
speech, October 17, 1988, Washington D.C., personal archive, document provided by 
The Heritage Foundation. 
372 SSPO, “FBM Facts/Chronology. Polaris-Poseidon-Trident”, 7.
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tists and Pentagon consultants, Richard Garwin and Sidney Drell.373 
Anticipating the conclusions of the Scowcroft commission report about 
the vulnerability of land-based missiles, the two scientists investigated 
a method “to provide a survivable, sound and economical approach 
to basing the MX missile system”.374 The result of their research was 
known as the smallsub undersea mobile (SUM) missile system, but 
presented substantial differences with SLBMs operations as they were 
conceived by the SSPO.375 
As Garwin and Drell developed the SUM proposal, they identi-
fied three key problems. Firstly, the missile force had to be survivable, 
i.e. relatively immune to a pre-emptive attack and able to maintain 
operational capabilities during a nuclear war. Secondly, missiles had 
to feature high accuracy and responsiveness to the National Command 
Authority. Thirdly, the whole system had to be more cost-effective 
than the MX basing modes previously rejected by the presidential 
commission on strategic forces.376 The solution proposed to solve the 
problem of vulnerability was to base the MX missile on board sub-
marines. However, contrary to large SSBNs, SUM-submarines would 
be limited in size, have conventional diesel-electric propulsion and 
only carry two missiles in external canisters.377 The intercontinental 
range of the MX missile would not be used to provide large patrol 
areas, but instead to allow submarines to stay within the coastal waters 
of the United States, under the permanent protection of the surface 
fleet.378 In order to solve the problem of accuracy and responsiveness 
to the National Command Authority, Garwin and Drell proposed sev-
eral distinct technical solutions. Firstly, submarine position at launch 
would be determined thanks to GPS navigation. To enforce the sur-
373 Richard Garwin is a noted physicist who developed the first thermonuclear device 
under the supervision of Edward Teller. During the three following decades Garwin 
worked for IBM and the Department of Defense as one of the main experts on nuclear 
weapons technology. Garwin was also an active member of the Jason Defense Advisory 
Group and was awarded the National Medal of Science in 2002. Sidney Drell is an 
expert in theoretical physics, nuclear weapons technology, arms control and public 
policy. Drell also worked fort the Jason Defense Advisory Group and is a fellow of the 
Hoover Institution, an important US public policy think thank.
374 Garwin, interview.
375 See : Sindey D. Drell and Richard L. Garwin, “Basing the MX Missile: A Better Idea”, 
Technology Review, edited by the Massachusetts Instiute of Technology, no. 050081MXTR 
(1981): 29.
376 Garwin, interview.
377 Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), “MX Missile Basing”, report NTIS #PB82-
108077, September 1981, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 172; 
Drell and Garwin, “Basing the MX Missile: A Better Idea”, 25.
378 SUM submarines were planned to operate within 600 miles of US cost line, with pos-
sible extension to 1,000 or 1,500 miles. See: OTA, “MX Missile Basing”, 180; Drell 
and Garwin, “Basing the MX Missile: A Better Idea”, 24.
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vivability of this part of the system, it was also planned “to deploy 
thousands of ‘pseudolite’ GPS stations on US territory that would give 
GPS-equivalent accuracy if GPS [satellites] were destroyed”.379 After 
launch, accuracy would be further improved by the use of a stellar-
inertial guidance system. Secondly, in order to be in permanent con-
tact with the National Command Authority, each submarine would 
be equipped with several mechanical “fish” patrolling directly above 
the submarine, at very low depth.380 Because of their proximity to the 
surface, the “fish” would be able to pick up radio signals easily before 
sending them back to the submarine as mega-hertz acoustic waves. For 
tactical and two-way communications, SUM-submarines would have 
used expandable surface buoys that could be trailed at a distance of 
more than 20 kilometres thanks to a thin fibre-optical cable.381 Finally, 
the only constraints placed on the development of the system were cost 
effectiveness and a relatively short development time for technological 
solutions.382
According to the SUM proposal, each submarine could have made 
extensive use of two-way communications systems because the surviv-
ability approach selected by Garwin and Drell differed significantly 
from that of the FBM programme. Instead of focusing on the vulner-
ability of each submarine, the point of the SUM system was to increase 
the survivability of the missile force as a single entity. As each SUM-
submarine would carry no more than two missiles, a fleet of more than 
50 vessels would be deployed to assure that at least 100 missiles were 
on permanent alert at sea.383 Therefore, the use of communication 
buoys by a single submarine would not reveal the location of more 
than two per cent of the submarine fleet. As two-way communica-
tions would only be used to confirm re-targeting immediately prior to 
launch, by the time the enemy had discovered the position of a SUM 
submarine, it would be empty or have only one remaining missile on 
board. Therefore, the use of advanced and active communications by 
SUM submarines would never expose more than one missile at a time, 
accounting for one per cent of the total missile force. Furthermore, 
two more protective measures assured the safety of SUM-submarines 
379 Electronic correspondence with Richard Garwin, September 2009.
380 For a description of this system, see: Richard L. Garwin, “Fish-Ragu (Fish, Radio-
Receiving and Generally Useful)”, Technical note JSN-81-64, August 1981, JASON 
Defense Advisory Group / SRI international, Arlington. 
381 Garwin, interview.
382 Electronic correspondence with Richard Garwin, September 2009.
383 OTA, “MX Missile Basing”, 171; Drell and Garwin, “Basing the MX Missile: A Bet-
ter Idea”, 28.
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that had fired one of their missiles. Firstly, because the communication 
buoy could be trailed tens of kilometres behind the vessel, the use of 
direction-finding equipment could only provide a very approximate 
position of the submarine.384 Secondly, as SUM-submarines would not 
roam the oceans but remain in coastal waters, they would be protected 
by surface units once their location was revealed to the enemy.385 
Table 9: Summary of the SUM proposal
purpose/goal of the organisation “provide a survivable, sound and 
economic basing mode for the MX missile”
problems addressed 1. vulnerability
2. high accuracy and responsiveness to 
the National Command Authority
3. cost effectiveness
solutions proposed 1. submarine basing, SLBM operations 
from friendly waters under protection 
of the surface fleet
2. GPS navigation/stellar -inertial 
guidance, communication “fish”, two-
way communications buoy
3. small submarines, diesel propulsion
constraints on possible solutions proposed solutions are to be less 
expensive than other suggested basing 
modes
In contrast to most weapons systems developed during the 1980s, 
the SUM proposal relied on well-proven technology. The MX mis-
sile selected by Garwin and Drell had already been developed by the 
Air Force and did not encounter any failure during its flight tests. 
Diesel-electric submarines had been used since World War I, and 
it was considered that Germany had already developed a vessel per-
fectly adapted to the SUM system.386 Finally the “fish” and surface 
buoy used for communications relied on cheap technology and could 
be assembled for less than 1,000 dollars per unit.387 The total cost of 
55 SUM-submarines, three operating bases, 100 MX missiles and the 
exploitation of the system during a ten year period was estimated at 
$ 30 billion, less than any other land-based solutions considered at the 
384 Garwin, interview.
385 Furthermore, coastal and shallow waters are known to represent a very difficult envi-
ronment for Anti-Submarine warfare. See: Kosta Tsipis, Tactical and Strategic Antisub-
marine Warfare (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974).
386 OTA, “MX Missile Basing”, 171. 
387 Garwin, “Fish-Ragu (Fish, Radio-Receiving and Generally Useful)”, 13.
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time by the Department of Defense.388 A survivable SLBM force with 
a high degree of responsiveness to the National Command Authority 
was not only possible, but technologically “sweet” and affordable.
Given these conditions, why did the SUM system never leave 
the drawing board? The answer to this question seems to lie in the 
organisational frame of the FBM programme. According to Richard 
Garwin, the SUM system “was not so much rejected as ignored”, be-
cause “neither the Air Force nor the Navy [i.e. the SSPO] wished to 
sponsor it”.389 While the causes of the Air Force refusal stand beyond 
the scope of this study, the refusal of the SSPO can be explained by 
its particular organisational knowledge. As the issue of two-way com-
munications and C3 with the National Command Authority had been 
excluded from the research agenda of the FBM programme, there was 
little chance that the value added by the SUM proposal would be 
acknowledged. While the SSPO merely ignored the SUM proposal, 
the rest of the Navy literally “hated” this project.390 As the US Navy 
had sunk costs in nuclear propulsion for almost thirty years and just 
cleared the controversy about the new Trident submarine, the SUM 
system and its potential German-made diesel-electric submarine was 
considered a sacrilege.391 Compared with the ease with which the FBM 
programme switched from surface ships to submarine basing during 
the development of the Polaris A-1 missile, the reaction of the SSPO 
clearly illustrated how a efficient adaption to nuclear strategy had now 
become impossible.
The argument proposed by Richard Garwin to explain why the 
SSPO and the Navy ignored the SUM system is difficult to verify as 
there is no available documents from the FBM programme discussing 
the SUM project. Nevertheless, the absence of such documents tends 
to confirm the account given by Garwin. Arguably, the SUM proposal 
had its own limitations. In contrast to their nuclear counterpart, diesel 
388 OTA, “MX Missile Basing”, 210; Drell and Garwin, “Basing the MX Missile: A Bet-
ter Idea”, 28.
389 Garwin, interview. In addition, the author has not been able to find any congressional 
record or technical evaluation sceptical about the SUM system. On the contrary, the 
evaluation of the Office of Technology Assessment was very positive. See: OTA, “MX 
Missile Basing”.
390 Quoted from Richard Garwin, electronic correspondence, 21 September 2009. This 
expression was also repeated during his interview.
391 On the emergence of nuclear submarine propulsion within the US Navy, see: Theo-
dore Rockwell, The Rickover effect: How one Man Made a Difference (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1992); Richard G. Hewlett, Nuclear Navy, 1946–1962 (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1974). For an example of criticism against SUM-submarines 
on the grounds of their small size and non-nuclear propulsion, see: Dalgleish and 
Schweikart, Trident, 289–93.
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submarines need to snorkel close to the surface to recharge their bat-
teries, making them easier to detect and to track down. Accordingly, 
snorkelling operations must be carefully planned so as to only expose 
a few submarines simultaneously, and allow time for their dispersion 
before new units could recharge their batteries.392 In addition, carry-
ing missiles in external canisters raised safety issues and environmental 
risks in case of submarine collision. With 14 underwater collisions 
reported between 1962 and 1984 – five of which involving nuclear 
missile submarines – patrol routes would have to be precisely deter-
mined to remove any risk of accident among the 50 planned SUM 
submarines.393 
These difficulties might have made the actual development of the 
SUM system more challenging than first assessed by Garwin and Drell. 
Nevertheless, the mere existence of the SUM proposal shed light on 
how scientists outside the FBM programme reacted to the countervail-
ing strategy, by devoting important efforts to optimise counterforce 
capabilities and developing adequate communications and control 
technologies. A course of action that was never envisaged by the SSPO, 
locked as it was in a narrow technological framework by nearly 30 
years of path dependent evolution.
392 Assuming a speed of five knots, a submarine snorkelling every 24 hours could only be 
localised on average with a precision of 120 nautical miles. This represents a circular 
area of 45,000 squared miles, so a barrage attack with nuclear weapons would have to 
use 600 warheads with a five miles kill radius in order to destroy a single SUM subma-
rine spotted while snorkelling. See: OTA, “MX Missile Basing”, 176–182.
393 Dalgleish and Schweikart, Trident, 42.
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Chapter	6
Conclusion
Far from being a well-controlled weapons programme finding its ori-
gins in the problem of missile vulnerability, the FBM programme pre-
sented complex dynamics throughout its history. Paradoxically, SLBM 
technology initially emerged with ambitions of providing a tactical, 
war-fighting weapons system, but eventually failed to provide such a 
capability when 30 years later, US nuclear strategy placed its empha-
sis on counterforce strikes. In the meanwhile, the FBM programme 
had become the specialist of survivable strategic forces and retaliatory 
strikes on urban-industrial centres.
This study revealed two essential misunderstandings of previ-
ous accounts of the FBM programme. The first being the belief ex-
pressed by Harvey Sapolsky, that SLBMs were initially developed as 
purely deterrent weapons. While this author acknowledged that some 
documents from the FBM programme were addressing counterforce 
issues, he described them as a “smokescreen” to win the support of 
naval aviators.394 From his perspective, the SPO never seriously en-
visaged developing and commissioning the Jupiter and Polaris mis-
siles as counterforce weapons. However, this study has rejected this 
interpretation, for two reasons. Firstly, the documents produced by the 
SPO presenting the counterforce potential of its SLBM project were 
not only addressed to naval aviators, but also to policy makers who 
favoured the concepts of deterrence and massive retaliation. Secondly, 
the FBM programme did not only purport to develop technologies 
relevant for counterforce strikes, but also had an active research project 
on this issue until 1964.
The second misunderstanding identified by this study is the wide-
spread belief that Trident I and Trident II missiles had a counterforce 
394 Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 44, 220.
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and war-fighting capability.395 For instance, Spinardi argued that the 
history of the programme could be understood as a relatively uncon-
trolled evolution from deterrence to counterforce.396 In contrast, based 
on recently available documents and current declassifications, this 
study presented evidence to the contrary. From this new perspective, 
the history of the FBM programme is to be understood as a process by 
which counterforce ideas were progressively excluded and the deter-
rent mission of SLBMs reinforced.
However, Spinardi was correct when he concluded that “technol-
ogy is not completely out of control […], but neither is it very much 
under control”.397 This study has further developed this idea in order 
to determine more precisely by which process political control over 
some precise technologies was gained, or lost. As the FBM programme 
was created in the midst of a critical juncture, its survival was threat-
ened and its leadership was pushed towards searching permanent sup-
port at the bureaucratic and strategic level. Because the programme 
could not rely on any previous missile technology, it had to invent ef-
ficient solutions ex-nihilo, and was free to change its activities to match 
the evolution of its strategic and bureaucratic environment. However, 
during the development of new generations of SLBMs, the FBM pro-
gramme became locked in a narrow framework as it followed a path 
dependent evolution. Concluding that technological determinism di-
rectly explains the evolution of the FBM programme would neverthe-
less be too simple. Instead, particular SLBM technologies such as solid 
propellant, multiple warheads or stellar inertial guidance, contributed 
to modify organisational interests of the SSPO and limited the set of 
attractive solutions proposed to policy makers.
What lessons can be learned from the case of the FBM programme 
to better an understanding of current issues in nuclear technology? 
Firstly, this study sheds new light on the nature and limits of politi-
cal control over the development of nuclear weapons technology. Such 
control cannot be merely understood as the ability of civilian leaders to 
change the course of main weapons programmes. Indeed, while civil-
ian authorities, to a certain extent, had some influence on the activities 
395 Ball, “The Counterforce Potential of American SLBM Systems”; Langer, “Accurate 
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Strategy”; Glasser, “Enduring 
Misconceptions of Strategic Stability: The Role of Nuclear Missile-Carrying Subma-
rines”.
396 Spinardi, “Why the U.S. Navy went for Hard-Target Counterforce in Trident II” ; 
MacKenzie and Spinardi, “The Shaping of Nuclear Weapon System Technology”.
397 Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 193.
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of the SSPO until the term of the FBM programme, they still failed 
to obtain a weapons system adapted to the countervailing strategy. 
Instead, political control may be defined as the ability of civilian lead-
ers to initiate weapons programmes at their discretion, and to reject 
any proposed solutions unless they precisely match particular specifi-
cations. From this perspective, civilian authorities do not necessarily 
need to address intricate issues such as propulsion or guidance systems 
to keep a tight control of military technology. During the 1950s and 
1960s, civilian authorities kept SLBM technology under tight con-
trol threatening to reduce SPO resources or to close down the FBM 
programme; but refrained from intervening directly in the research 
agenda. In contrast, James Schlesinger achieved only limited results 
by directly addressing the practical development of guidance systems 
or missile payloads with engineers from the SSPO.
Secondly, as the SPO/SSPO introduced most of the solutions 
currently used in ballistic missile technology in the US and abroad, 
the history of the FBM programme provides new insights about the 
technical characteristics of current nuclear weapons systems and their 
origins. The majority of long range ballistic missiles currently under 
development rely on solid propellant, multiple warheads and stellar-
inertial guidance.398 While these technologies currently represent the 
most efficient solutions to addressing problems relative to propulsion, 
penetration of ABM defences and accuracy, this study demonstrated 
that this has not always been the case. Instead, solid propellant was ini-
tially developed to face safety issues, multiple warheads to reduce inert 
weight and stellar-inertial guidance to keep accuracy constant with-
out making submarines vulnerable during navigation fixes. However, 
as several decades of development have increased the returns of these 
technologies while other fields of research – such as liquid fuels – have 
been allowed to decay, they may currently represent the most sensible 
option for engineers developing nuclear weapons.
In this context, the path dependent evolution of the FBM pro-
gramme may well contribute to explaining why some ballistic missiles 
under development seem to be locked in a Cold War framework, while 
current nuclear policies address new threats such as proliferation, ter-
rorism and transnational actors. As current weapons programmes ex-
ploit the sunk costs and increasing returns of technologies developed 
398 See: A. Ochsenbein “SS-NX-30 Bulava Datenblatt”; “M-51. Missile mer-sol balistique 
stratégique”; “JL-2 (CSS-NX-4)”.
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by SSPO during the Cold War, they are unlikely to easily adapt to 
new policies or strategic problems. Neither are they likely to invest 
in totally new technologies that would initially be less efficient than 
the existing ones. In addition, current constraints on military spend-
ing represent a major obstacle to the creation of new organisations 
dealing with the development of nuclear technology. These conditions 
create an unfavourable environment for the occurrence of a new critical 
juncture that may reconnect nuclear strategy and the development of 
nuclear weapons technology.
There is, however, still place for moderate hope. As current weapon 
programmes face limited and unstable funding, their survival might 
be conditioned to the development of ballistic missiles contributing 
more directly to national security and increasing the credibility of 
new nuclear policies. This might present sufficient incentives to sig-
nificantly reframe the activity of some of the most threatened weap-
ons programmes, and search for alternative technologies more suitable 
for current nuclear employment scenarios. Such an evolution is most 
likely to occur within the United States, which is likely to launch the 
development of a successor to Trident II in the next decade. As more 
than twenty five years will separate the two missiles, the missile devel-
opment team would be totally renewed. Under these conditions, the 
next US ballistic missile might be less affected by the organisational 
knowledge, sunk costs and increasing returns inherited from the FBM 
programme. After having locked the evolution of ballistic missiles 
into a path dependent framework, time might eventually become the 
best ally of a new generation of sound, safer and more sensible nuclear 
weapons.
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